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Sexual harassment in all societies and in all social classes hampers
the integration of women into the labor market. Sexual harassment,
commonly understood as the "unwanted imposition of sexual require-
ments in the context of a relationship of unequal power,"1 is a form of
violence against women. Like rape, it generally occurs not out of sexual
arousal, but rather from a desire to assert power over the victim or to
"punish" or "control" the victim. 2 In addition to threatening a woman's
right to physical integrity, it also threatens a woman's liberty, autonomy,
and equality by limiting the number of workers able to secure gainful
employment and by limiting the rights and opportunities of women in the
'CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING VoMEN: A CASE
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 1 (1979).2See Lisa Vetten, Why Do Men Rape?, at http://www.cosatu.org.za/shop/shop090l/
shop090l-08.html (last modified June 27, 2000) (noting that rapists often use rape "to
punish women who do not behave in ways [they] consider acceptable in women ....
[They] also rape to express their anger and frustration"); see also infra notes 37-38 and
accompanying text.
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workplace. Often times, these inequities are so subtle they seem "too
small to bother with" but taken together, "they constitute a serious bar-
rier to productivity, advancement, and inclusion."3
Most countries have a long history of tolerance toward sexual harass-
ment,4 and the laws of various countries have only recently been inter-
preted to prohibit sexual harassment. In the 1970s, the United States was
the first country to coin the term "sexual harassment" and to recognize it as
a form of discrimination against women. By 1992, only six more countries
prohibited sexual harassment outright through legislation;5 but today, at
3 NuOLE V. BENOKRAITIS, SUBTLE SEXISM: CURRENT PRACTICE AND PROSPECTS FOR
CHANGE 38 (1997).
4 See, e.g., Beverly H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek. An International Perspective on Sex-
ual Harassment Law, 12 LAW & INEQ. 43, 46 (1993) (explaining that [Iless than twenty
years ago no court either in the United States or abroad considered sexual harassment ac-
tionable, let alone a form of discrimination"); Michael Hanlon, Canada Near Top in Re-
porting Workplace Violence, TORONTO STAR, July 20, 1998, at Al ("Women in some
countries may consider only rape to be sexual harassment:'); MINN. ADVOCATES FOR HU-
MiAN RIGHTS, SEX DISCRUNATION AND SEXUAL HARASSMIENF IN THE WORKPLACE IN
BULGARIA 25 (1999) (explaining that "[t]here is no social condemnation of sex discrimi-
nation or sexual harassment in Bulgaria. Sex discrimination and sexual harassment are
tolerated in the Bulgarian workplace and not taken seriously by the Government or labor
unions"); U.N.: Despite Government Declaration of Equal Rights. Thai llbmen Continue
in Traditional Roles, Committee Told, M2 PRESWS\iRE, Feb. 1. 1999, available at 1999 WL
7551879 (noting that in Thailand, "the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace has yet
to receive significant public attention"); Jenalia Moreno. Cuidado! AMtujeres Trabajando!
Scaling Mount Machismo: Number of Women Who Reach the Erecutive Suite on the Rise
in Latin America, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 13, 2000, at I (observing that despite the fact
that many Latin American countries, including Mexico and Brazil, have laws prohibiting
sexual harassment in the workplace, it is still tolerated: "If you went to court to complain
of sexual harassment, the judge would fall down laughing.') (quoting Carmen Arreola de
Mestre, General Director of Grupo Azucarero Mexico, one of Mexico's largest sugar com-
panies)); Sonni Efron, Japanese Governor Resigns in Scandal; Charges of Assaulting Fe-
male Worker Are First Big Test of Nation's New Sexual Harassment Law, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Dec. 22, 1999, at Al (noting that sexual harassment in Japan was until recently
"brushed off with a wink and a nod"); John Varoli, Sexual Harassment, Russian Srvle,
Moscow Tnms, Mar. 11, 1999, at 0102 ("[I]t's hardly news to say that sexual harassment
is a problem in Russia. In fact, it is ... often accepted as the natural course of relations
between men and women.... [Sexual harassment] is fostered by an atmosphere of tacit
tolerance in Russia toward the problem... :'); Renee G. Scherlen & Ruth Ann Strickland,
The NAFTA(ization) of Sexual Harassment: The Experience of Canada, Mexico. and the
United States, 3 NAFrA L. & Bus. REv. Ahs. 96, 109 (1997) ("The tradition of machismo
has led many-both male and female-to consider sexual harassment as a foreign concept
that does not make sense in the cultural context of Mexico. All of this contributes to the
widespread practice of sexual harassment.").
5 See Sex Harassment a Global Plague: U.N. Study Cites Scope of Problem. SEATTLE
PosT INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 1, 1992, at B5 (reporting that out of twenty-three countries
surveyed by the United Nations, only Australia, Canada France, New Zealand. Spain.
Sweden, and the United States had statutes specifically referring to sexual harassment).
Interestingly, the United Nations survey included the United States as a country with sex-
ual harassment legislation, though even though Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
never explicitly mentions sexual harassment. In fact, the term was first used in case law
that interpreted the language in Title VII to proscribe discrimination on the basis of sex.
See, e.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977): Barnes v.
Costie, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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least forty countries have legislation specifically prohibiting sexual har-
assment.6
In 1998, South Africa joined those countries that formally prohibit
sexual harassment as a form of gender discrimination through its enact-
ment of the South Africa Employment Equity Act ("EEA").7 Although
this statute deals primarily with affirmative action, it is also ground-
breaking national legislation in the area of sexual harassment. It can be
considered an international model because of its comprehensive approach
to and its ambitious treatment of sexual harassment, specifically defining
the type of conduct that is prohibited,8 and providing detailed procedures
to address the problem and prevent its recurrence.9 The legislation recog-
nizes the severity and danger of sexual harassment and prescribes serious
civil sanctions for the harasser.
Legal reform, however, has its limits. It is not yet clear to what ex-
tent sexual harassment has actually diminished in South Africa since the
implementation of the EEA. South Africa is a strongly patriarchal society
with a long history of sexual violence, 0 and an extremely high incidence
of reported rape." Comparatively, sexual harassment is not a top priority
in South Africa and many men and women alike see it as a relatively
unimportant issue. Practically speaking, it is still very difficult for em-
ployees in subordinate positions to insist upon their rights, and if they do,
their claims are likely to be met with resistance by employers and receive
varied responses through the legal system. In fact, since the enactment of
the EEA over two years ago, very few cases have been brought, and the
problem of sexual harassment is still treated as of minor importance. 2
The South African experience is not surprising considering the en-
trenched, state-sponsored discrimination inherited from the apartheid
6Sexual Harassment: Breaking the Taboo, BUSINESS AGE, Aug. 2000 [hereinafter
Breaking the Taboo], at http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/engllshmonthly/businessage/
2000/aug/cover.htm.
7 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998.
8 NAT'L EcoN. DEV. & LABOUR COUNCIL, CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE ON THE HAN-
DLING OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES §§ 3-4 (May 4, 1998) [hereinafter CODE OF GOOD
PRACTICE], available at http:llwww.nedlac.org.zaldocs/agreements/main.html#codes. See
generally infra notes 101-132 and accompanying text (explaining the significance of the
Code of Good Practice in South African sexual harassment law).
9 CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE, supra note 8, § 7.
10 See generally Penelope E. Andrews, Violence Against Women in South Africa: The
Role of Culture and the Limitations of the Law, 8 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs, L. REV. 425,
450-52 (1999); Paula C. Johnson, Danger in the Diaspora: Law, Culture and Violence
Against Women of African Descent in the United States and South Africa, 1 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 472 (1998); Adrien Katherine Wing, A Critical Race Feminist Conceptuali-
zation of Violence: South African and Palestinian Women, 60 ALB. L. REv. 943 (1997);
Celina Romany, Black Women and Gender Equality in a New South Africa: Human Rights
Law and the Intersection of Race and Gender, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 857, 867 (1996);
Navi Pillay, Judge and Gender. Wife Battery and Child Abuse, 16 AGENDA 62 (1993).
"See infra notes 380-381 and accompanying text.
'2 See infra notes 368-373 and accompanying text.
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system and the sexism inherent in the tribal system of customary law.' 3
As Judge Albie Sachs of the South Africa Constitutional Court said, "It
is a sad fact that one of the few profoundly non-racial institutions in
South Africa is patriarchy." 4 Sexism is inherent across racial lines in all
South African communities, so much so that:
[It is frequently given a cultural halo and identified with the
customs and personality of different communities. Thus, to
challenge patriarchy, to dispute the idea that men should be the
dominant figures in the family and society, is to be seen not as
fighting against male privilege but as attempting to destroy Af-
rican tradition or subvert Afrikaner ideals .... Is
Existing disregard for the progressive sexual harassment law in
South Africa echoes the resistance many Americans have shown to the
recent developments to sexual harassment laws in the United States. Five
recent United States Supreme Court cases involving sexual harassment 6
and extensive media coverage of them have heightened awareness of the
issue of sexual harassment, 7 and large jury awards, although rare and
exceptional, have scared companies into improving their policies and
practices. 18 Yet many highly publicized sexual harassment cases, from
Anita Hill's claim against Clarence Thomas in 1992, 9 to Paula Jones'
more recent suit against Bill Clinton,' have made the sexual harassment
laws the subject of ridicule in the United States.2' The media has been
diligent in its accounts of male victimization from false claims of sexual
harassment,2 affirming the sexist stereotypes that women are unreason-
13 For a background description of the laws of apartheid's caste system and the patriar-
chal traditions of customary law and how both those legal regimes "relegated black women
to the lowest form of citizenship in South Africa prior to 1993.' see generally Adrien
Katherine Wing & Eunice P. de Carvalho, Black South African 1I1bmen: Toward Equal
Rights, 8 HARv. Hm. RTS. J. 57, 60-75 (1995).14 AI.Br SACHS, PROTECTING HUtAN RIGHTS IN A NEW SOUTH AFRICA 53 (1990)
(discussing the constitutional rights of women in a post-apartheid South Africa).
15 k&
1 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. El-
lerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner, 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526
U.S. 629 (1999).
17 See generally Deborah Zalesne, Sexual Harassment Law: Has It Gone Too Far or
Has the Media?, 8 ThMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 351, 352 (1999).
I See infra note 168 (listing cases with high punitive damage awards).
9 S. EXEC. Doc. No. 15 (1991).
2 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
21 Zalesne, supra note 17, at 359.
2 See, e.g., MacKenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 94-CV-010871 (Cir. Ct.. Milwaukee
Co., Wis. 1994) (awarding $26 million for wrongful termination to an employee who was
fired for telling a female co-worker about a racy Seinfeld episode); Graydon Snyder v.
Chicago Theological Seminary, 94 L 1423 (Cir. Ct., Cook Co., I11. 1994) (awarding dam-
ages to a theology professor who was wrongly ordered to into counseling after a classroom
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able and provocative, and creating a safe harbor for the belief that women
attempt to exploit men through a code of political correctness. 2 Accord-
ingly, the legal advances of the last few years in the United States have
been met with a counterattack by those who believe that the laws have
gone too far in favor of the accuser.24
As the development of the sexual harassment law in both the United
States and South Africa illustrates, the law's effect on social reform is
unclear. Although legal reform in both countries has certainly had some
impact on shaping social attitudes,2 the progress has been complex and
has seen various degrees of resistance. In the United States, rather than
advancing our collective thinking, the sexual harassment laws, which
some view as progressive, have led to backlash. Hostility toward the law
is generally fed by the media26 and by those who likely fear that women
are making progress that will threaten their economic and social well
being. In contrast, South Africa is not yet experiencing any backlash
from the media, as there are a number of female journalists raising the
question of gender equality. Rather, there is a feeling that the urgency of
dealing with sexual violence is so powerful that it is distracting to deal
with the more nuanced issues of nonphysical, problematic gender dy-
namics in the workplace. In South Africa, at this early stage, the extent
of these effects remains unclear, but evidence indicates that sexual har-
assment law is receiving low priority status and, as in the United States,
social transformation is lagging far behind legal reform.
This Article explores the use of sexual harassment law as a force for
imposing external morality. Typical sexual harassment regulatory
schemes have had limited success in altering workplace behavior for a
combination of reasons. In most cultures the laws prohibiting sexual har-
assment do not generally reflect existing social norms. In such a context,
for a law to be an effective impetus for social change, it must call for and
explain the need for the elimination of the "immoral" behavior, as well as
provide for meaningful sanctions. Typical sexual harassment schemes,
however, call for corporate self-regulation. The idea is that companies
will be responsible in maintaining a workplace free of sexual harassment
if doing so will be to their economic benefit. Failing to address a hostile
work environment can impact a company's bottom line in two ways: the
company can either be penalized directly through legal damages, or indi-
rectly through social disapproval and a negative reputation. Under the
current self-regulatory schemes, however, companies often work to pre-
vent legal intervention, without addressing the inherent sexism that un-
derlies claims of sexual harassment. In this way, economic costs have not
discussion of a classic story from the Talmud that includes an explicit sexual reference).
23Zalesne, supra note 17, at 358.
24 Zalesne, supra note 17, at 352.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 223-225.
26See generally Zalesne, supra note 17.
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been sufficient in making companies responsive to normative demands.
Law is only useful as an impetus for social change if it has cultural le-
gitimacy. Sexual harassment law will only have the requisite legitimacy
when those in power in the workplace understand the physica, psycho-
logical, economic, and moral harm of sexual harassment, and why it
amounts to sexual discrimination.
The United States is a good model for the study of law and social
change in the area of sexual harassment, since it is the first country to
recognize sexual harassment as a form of discrimination against women,
and therefore has the longest history to study. Over the past several dec-
ades, the United States has undergone significant legal transformation in
the law of sexual harassment and has seen various trends in attitudes
about those laws.
South Africa, in contrast, is a fascinating case study of law and so-
cial change in the area of sexual harassment because of the great dispar-
ity between its history with regard to race and gender discrimination and
its current progressive legal system. Under apartheid, racism and sexism
were inherent in the legal regime, and the country was "one of the
world's strictest in its public mores" '27 Sex was completely banned across
racial lines, and homosexuality and pornography were forbidden.? Now,
in the new democratic era, the country has legally become one of the
most tolerant in the world.?9 Observers note that "the country has gone,
seemingly overnight, from one of the world's most oppressed and re-
pressed to one of the world's most open and permissive. '" The effect of
sexual harassment law on social behavior is more apparent in a country,
such as South Africa, where there is a wide chasm between cultural and
legal norms.
Using United States and South African sexual harassment laws as
case studies, this Article examines the power of the law as a moral
authority. In that light, the Article considers the development of the sex-
ual harassment law over the years in the United States and the resulting
backlash from that law, and then examines the likelihood that South Af-
rica will experience a similar pattern of behavior in light of its unique
social context. Using the United States and South African experiences as
a guide, the Article then suggests ways in which nations that choose to
legislate against sexual harassment might properly facilitate the transition
from legal reform to actual change in social behavior.
Part I examines attempts by the United States and South Africa to
legislate social behavior in the workplace through sexual harassment
21 Revolutionary Country; South Africa: Mandela Rule Bans Discrimination-But Mill
People's Behavior Change?, BALT. SUN, Apr. 23, 1997, at 18A.
21 See infra notes 425-433 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 437-451 and accompanying text.
30 Ken Wells, Nation in Flux: The New South Africa Sheds Calvinist Past and Mutates
Daily, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1995, at Al.
Harvard Women's Law Journal [
statutes. This Part starts with an examination of the extent of the problem
of sexual harassment in South Africa, fully reviewing the Employment
Equity Act and the extent to which it has achieved its stated purposes.
This Part then goes on to look at experiences in the United States with
respect to the development of sexual harassment laws, drawing on five
recent Supreme Court cases that have modernized our sexual harassment
laws, and analyzing the backlash that resulted from these recent cases,
Part II focuses on aspirations for social transformation in countries
with evolving sexual harassment legislation. This Part begins with a dis-
cussion of the efficacy of legislative schemes that rely on the use of self-
policing as a method of conforming social behavior, ultimately asserting
that sexual harassment law will not have the power to effectuate true so-
cial change if the law lacks legitimacy. This Part then posits that sexual
harassment laws will not be seen as legitimate until societies understand
the real harm and immorality of sexual harassment. Part II then goes on
to analyze the political, economic, and cultural limits to the full under-
standing and use of sexual harassment legislation, identifying a variety of
factors that are crucial in facilitating or retarding the effectiveness of
anti-harassment objectives. I examine each of these factors in light of the
United States experience and the South African experience, and then at-
tempt to show how these factors may work in societies that have different
cultural or historical starting points. This Part concludes that sexism, ra-
cism, unequal access to the law, gender-specific cultural norms, and fail-
ure to make sexual harassment a priority, may continue to thwart the le-
gal progress made by many countries in the area of sexual harassment in
recent years.
Part III suggests ways in which a country can facilitate the transition
from law to social reality. This Part denounces litigation as the sole, or
even the best, method for dealing with sexual harassment because of the
impediments discussed above. Since the most likely victims of sexual
harassment are those with the least amount of power, reliance on the
courts means relief for those with the best lawyers, at the exclusion of
those who need and deserve representation most. The problem of sexual
harassment is one involving ordinary people in ordinary settings, which
makes it amenable to ordinary solutions, outside the context of law en-
forcement agencies, such as greater involvement of unions and other em-
ployee organizations. For many women, a shift away from litigation to
active engagement of the working community might have greater
empowerment value than going to court. Ultimately, a statute's capacity
for social reform will depend in large part on the eradication of misper-
ceptions and stereotypes about the nature of sexual harassment and the
harm it causes, and on integration into the legal and political discourse
on both economic equality and violence against women.
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I. ATTEMPTS AT LEGISLATING PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE
WORKPLACE: SEXUAL HARASSMENT LEGISLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND
THE UNITED STATES
A. South African Sexual Harassment Law: Low Priority Status
1. The Root of the Problem
It is well documented that sexual harassment is a serious problem in
South Africa.31 Although underreporting-3 makes it impossible to know
the true extent of sexual harassment, one survey, conducted in May of
1992, revealed that about seventy-six percent of working women in South
Africa claimed to have been subjected to some form of sexual harassment
at work.33 That survey indicated most of those women "would rather re-
sign than 'make a fuss." '34 The survey revealed that 37.7% of respondents
knew of sexual harassment in their organizations, but only 6.5% of those
companies have a formal sexual harassment policy.35 Another survey
showed that although many respondents wish to remedy the gender im-
balance in management, over fifty percent of employers felt uneasy about
promoting women to management positions.3 6
It is by now well accepted that the root of sexual harassment is gen-
erally not sexual attraction, but the desire to assert power over an indi-
31 See generally Polly Halfkenny, Legal and 11brkplace Solutions to Sexual Harass-
ment in South Africa (Part 2): The South African Erperience, 17 INDUS. LJ. 213 (1996);
Polly Halfkenny, Legal and 1brkplace Solutions to Sexual Harassment in South Africa
(Part 1): Lessons from Other Countries, 16 INDUs. L.J. 1 (1995): Gumisai Mutume. South
Africa: Victims of Sexual Harassment Suffer in Silence, INT'L PRESS SERV. May 17. 1995
(on file with author); Managay Reddi, Sexual Harassment in the W1orkplace: Do We Need
New Legislation?, in GENDER AND THE NEv SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 109 (Chris-
tina Murray ed., 1994); Lisa Dancaster, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Should South
Africa Adopt the American Approach?, 12 INDUS. L.J. 449 (1991); 1. G. Mowatt, Sexual
Harassment-New Remedy for an Old IVrong, 7 INDUS. LJ. 637 (1986).
32 See infra notes 332-335 and accompanying text.
33 INST. OF Dius. ET AL., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (1992) (survey
conducted by the Institute of Directors, the Institute of Personnel Management, the UNISA
Centre for Women's Studies, the women's Bureau of South Africa, and the ANC Women's
League) [hereinafter SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE], cited in Lisa Vetten,
Adding Up the Costs of Sexual Harassment, at http://www.csvr.org.zalarticlesfartcostl.htm:
Averile Ryder, Devising a Sexual Harassment Policy, PEOPLE DYNAMICS. Jan. 1998, at 26
(citing research done in 1987 for an MBL thesis); see also UNISA UNIT FOR GENDER
RESEARCH IN LAW, WOMEN AND THE LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA: EMPOWERIMENT THROUGH
ENLIGHTENMENT 169 (1998) (noting that "researchers argue that the percentage of women
in South Africa who have been subjected to some form of harassment during their em-
ployment may even be as high as 70%").
34 CENTRE FOR Soclo-LEGAL STUDIES, 7 SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS YEARBOOK
351 (1998) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS YEARBOOK] (citing sexual harassment in the work-
place, supra note 33).
35 SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE VORKPLACE, supra note 33.
36 Lydia Levin, Human Rights Index, 7 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 356. 366 (1991).
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vidual.37 The harassers exploit what they see to be a weakness in their
victims so as to reassert their superiority and keep victims subordinated.A8
There is a myriad of ways in which one person can come to have power
over another, particularly in the workplace. Employers have inherent
power over their employees because of employers' ability to punish or
reward their employees, and because of economic and social inequalities
likely to be found between the two groups.39
In addition to the natural power imbalances intrinsic to the em-
ployer/employee relationship, women, and racial and sexual minorities
are often vulnerable to a different type of subordination based on a gen-
dered and racialized imbalance of power in society. "Power is socially
constructed," 4 and in most societies, masculinity and whiteness have
come to be associated with power and success, while traits associated
with "other" have come to be devalued in the workplace." Therefore,
women and racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities can be targets for sexual
harassment.
In South Africa, women are particularly vulnerable to sexual har-
assment because of their low status in the working hierarchy. Women
have always been vastly underrepresented in management, occupying the
lowest status jobs. 2 Professions traditionally filled by women are under-
37 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 1 (identifying sexual harassment as an act of
power); Amelia A. Craig, Musing About Sexual Orientation Discrimination Based on Sex
and Sexual Orientation as "Gender Role" Discrimination, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMIN's
STUD. 105, 110 (1995) ("[Clourts ... recognize that the objective of such harassment is
maintenance and abuse of power and dominance, rather than a real desire for sex."). It Is
also well-accepted today that rape, sexual harassment in its most extreme form, is a crime
of violence rather than sexual attraction. See, e.g., Peggy Miller & Nancy Biele, 71venty
Years Later: The Unfinished Revolution, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE CULTURE 47, 49 (Emi-
lie Buchwald et al. eds., 1993) ("Rape in all its forms ... is an act of violence, a violation
of the victim's spirit and body, and a perversion of power ... ."); SUSAN BROWNMILLER,
AGAINST OUR WILLS: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975) (characterizing rape as a wide-
spread and violent effort to assert power and possession over women's bodies). Sexual
harassment is generally viewed as a mild form of rape, so undoubtedly the motivations of
the two crimes are similar. See Nan Stein, No Laughing Matter: Sexual Harassment in K-
12 Schools, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE CULTURE, supra, at 310, 317-18 (comparing child's
motivation in bullying to motivation behind sexual harassment).
31 Craig, supra note 37, at 106, 112 (explaining both that many men see qualities typi-
cally regarded as "feminine" as denoting weakness and that motivation behind sexual har-
assment is desire of heterosexual men to maintain power and dominance).
39 Deborah Zalesne, When Men Harass Men: Is It Sexual Harassment?, 7 TEMP. POL.
& Civ. RTs. L. REv. 395, 415 (1998).
40 Michael Hunter Schwartz, Power Outage: Amplifying the Analysis of Power in Legal
Relations (With Special Application to Unconscionability and Arbitration), 33 WIL-
LAMETTE L. REV. 67, 74 (1997).
4' See generally Zalesne, supra note 39, at 414.
42 Levin, supra note 36, at 366 ("although 35.6 per cent of the workforce in the com-
panies [surveyed] were women, only 13.1 per cent of management were women"); Cath-
erine O'Regan, Equality at Work and the Limits of the Law: Symmetry and Individualism
in Anti-Discrimination Legislation, in GENDER AND THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL
ORDER, supra note 31, at 65 ("Women constitute less than ten percent of the top three in-
come brackets."). This is especially true of black women. See Felicity Kaganas & Christina
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valued and poorly paid.43 Almost twenty percent of all employed women
are in domestic service, and fifteen percent are in clerical jobs;4 more
than half of the employees in the lowest two income brackets are women,
even though women make up only one third of all employees. 5
Yet, even women who have been able to achieve greater than usual
power in the workplace face a type of discrimination at work that makes
them equally vulnerable to sexual harassment. In South Africa, as in
most countries, gender bias still exists in the workplace in the form of
stereotyping, as many men still view women in their traditional, passive,
subordinate, and domesticated role.46 Accordingly, working women who
do not conform to approved images of womanhood and motherhood face
discrimination:
While those women who remain within their traditional stereo-
types of good wives and mothers are treated with protective pa-
ternalism, women who venture outside those boundaries and
attempt to assert themselves apart from their husbands, for in-
stance as career women, are punished by lack of recognition of
status or financial hardship.47
The discrimination faced by women who fail to conform to gender-based
stereotypes and norms often takes the form of sexual harassment. In these
scenarios, typically the harasser "targets and penalizes individuals for
diverging from prescribed notions of appropriate female appearance and
demeanor."' Ironically, women are often penalized both for possessing
stereotypically female traits, since femininity is generally associated with
weakness and incompetence in the workplace, as well as for portraying
stereotypically masculine characteristics, such as physical strength or
assertiveness, because many men feel threatened when women exhibit the
Murray, Law and Women's Rights in South Africa: An Overview, in GENDER AND THE NEW
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER, supra note 31, at 29 ("Of the 3770 women reflected in the
1991 Manpower Survey as being in managerial positions, only four were Africans.7 (citing
CENT. STAT. SERV., MANPOWER SURVEY: OCCUPATIONAL INFORMATION (1991))).43 Liesl Gerntholtz, South Africa: Gender Bias in Law, SOWETAN (Johannesburg). Mar.
16, 1999, available at 1999 WL 10803547.
4 4 C. O'REGAN & B. THOMPSON, THE UNIONISATION OF WOMEN WORKERS IN DIFFER-
ENT INDUSTRIAL SECTORS IN SOUTH AFRICA 8 (1993) (on file with author).
45 O'Regan, supra note 42, at 65 (citing NAT'L MANPOWER COMMN. ANNUAL REPORT
53(1991)).
4 See infra notes 375-378 and accompanying text.
47Michelle O'Sullivan, Stereotyping and Male Identification: "Keeping W bmen in
Their Place," in GENDER AND THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER, supra note 31. at
190.
48 Hilary S. Axam & Deborah Zalesne, Simulated Sodomy and Other Forms of Hetero-
sexual "Horseplay": Same Sex Sexual Harassment, Workplace Gender Hierarchies and the
Myth of the Gender Monolith Before and After Oncale, I 1 YALE J.L. & FEUNISM 155. 169
(1999).
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valued characteristics which are often deemed necessary for success in
many jobs.49
But sexual harassment does not affect all women equally. South Af-
rican women are divided by, among other things, race,50 class, culture,
urban and rural situation, education, and language.5' Black women, in-
cluding African, Coloured, and Indian women, are the most likely vic-
tims of sexual harassment because of their historical position on the low-
est rung of the working ladder.52 Black women experience subordination
not only as women and blacks, but also typically as members of the
working class. 53 Working class black women face different stereotypes
from middle class career women. It is a truism that working class women
49See generally id. at 165-70. This pattern of harassers choosing targets who possess
traditionally devalued feminine traits or who fail to conform to prescribed gender roles, is
present with overwhelming consistency in sexual harassment cases in the United States. Id.
In South Africa there are many fewer sexual harassment cases from which to derive such a
pattern. However, given the widespread prevalence of such cases in the United States, and
the strong expectations in South Africa that women should conform to their traditional role
of mothers and nurturers, it is not a big leap to assume that sexual harassment in South
Africa stems from a similar discomfort of women in the male-dominated workplace. See,
e.g., Reddy v. Univ. of Natal, 19 I.L.J. 49 (LAC) (1998) (where complainant was employed
as a security guard on the night shift at a university, a job traditionally held by men).
o Black South African women constitute about thirty-six percent of the South African
population, Coloured women make up about five percent of the South African population,
and Indian women make up less than two percent. Adrien Katherine Wing, A Critical Race
Feminist Conceptualization of Violence: South African and Palestinian Women, 60 ALa. L.
REV. 943, 954 n.46 (1997).
51 See Catherine Albertyn, Women and the Transition to Democracy in South Africa, in
GENDER AND THE NEw SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER, supra note 31, at 39.52 Kaganas & Murray, supra note 42, at 29; Audrey Haroz, South Africa's 1996 Choice
on Termination of Pregnancy Act: Expanding Choice and International Human Rights to
Black South African Women, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 863, 869 (1997). The status of
African women in South Africa reflects a history of limited educational and occupational
opportunities:
Prior to the 20th century, African women in South Africa worked primarily as
domestics or teachers. When missionaries opened hospitals for Africans in the
mid-19th century, they employed African women as domestics and nurse's aides.
By 1910, only one African woman had completed full nurse's training compared
to 3,446 African women with teacher's qualifications; shortly thereafter, however,
nursing became one of the most popular and prestigious professions open to Afri-
can women in South Africa. By as late as 1960, economic prospects for the na-
tion's African women had changed little. Out of a population of 7.5 million Afri-
can women, only 800,000 were classified as economically active. Half that num-
ber were working as domestic servants; 200,000 as workers on White farms;
25,000 as professionals (including 12,000 nurses and 11,000 teachers); and the
remainder were employed as factory workers or clerks.
Rowena Martineau, Women and Education in South Africa: Factors Influencing Women's
Educational Progress and Their Entry into Traditionally Male-Dominated Fields, 66 J,
NEGRO EDUC. 383395 (1997) (citation omitted), available at 1997 WL 27774234.53 See O'Regan, supra note 42, at 65; Romany, supra note 10, at 861 ("Black women
in South Africa have suffered multiple oppressions and have been marginalized by virtue
of being both black and female... . [T]heir subordination in society is magnified by the
sexism that intersects with official racism and economic deprivations.").
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have always worked.-" Accordingly, "while there is a strong disapproval
of middle-class wives engaging in careers in the public sphere, there is a
presumption that lower-class and working-class women should be em-
ployed.''55 The presumption, though, is that they should be employed in
the lowest paying occupations, which historically has been the case.
Eighty percent of working black women are employed in agriculture and
domestic work, which are among the lowest paying jobs:s
[Miost black women work without trade union rights and legis-
lative protection. Many work the land or in the textile and can-
ning industries where working conditions are not that much dif-
ferent from those of farm laborers. South Africa has few black
female professionals. In the mid-1970s there were no black
"women lawyers, judges, magistrates, engineers, architects, vet-
erinarians, chemists, or pharmacists."5
Pigeonholing black women in these roles leaves them with the least
amount of power in the workplace.
As affirmative action programs begin encouraging more women, and
particularly black women, into jobs traditionally reserved to white men,
however, sexual harassment will undoubtedly continue. In fact, the rate
of sexual harassment may increase, as some men, who desire to maintain
the socially constructed perception of male strength, seek to reinforce
their own sense of identity and position of privilege in the gender hierar-
chy.59
54See, e.g., Isik U. Zeytinoglu & Jacinta K. Muteshi, A Critical Reriew of Flexible La-
bour: Gender Race and Class Dimensions of Economic Restructuring. 27 REsou cES FoR
FEMnIsT RFs. 97, 110 (2000) (noting that within advanced industrialized economies, be-
cause of financial necessity "minority women and working class women have had consis-
tent economic participation over their lifetimes, have been expected to work outside the
home and have been more systematically positioned as wage earners in full-time domestic
work, field work and industrial work"); Patricia Cooper, A Masculinist Vision of Usefil
Labor: Popular Ideologies About Women and Work in the United States 1820 to 1939. 84
KY. L.J 827, 831 (1995) (noting that in the United States, "many immigrant women and
poor women of all colors" have been expected to work for pay).
55O'Sullivan, supra note 47, at 196.
56 As stated by Nelson Mandela, "black women, in thousands, occupy the lowest ranks
in employment .... [B]lack women are underpaid and are most brutally exploited as farm
labourers and domestic workers." Romany, supra note 10, at 857.
- Black women make up eighty-six percent of South Africa's domestic workers. Id. at
865.
ss I&. (citation omitted).
59 Reddi, supra note 31, at 119 ("The expected increase in the frequency of sexual har-
assment is on account of the fact that male supervisors and co-workers would probably
fight back with the last weapon available to them: sexual coercion:).
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2. Fixing the Problem: Legal Reform
a. The Law Before 1998: History of Sexual Harassment Law in
South Africa
During most of the apartheid regime, "sexual harassment was neither
recognized nor defined as a social or legal problem."6 Prior to 1998 there
was no legislation specifically addressing the problem of sexual harass-
ment in South Africa. There were, however, several possible avenues for
combating sexual harassment through more general laws. Most broadly,
the South Africa Constitution protects the right to equality and non-
discrimination,61 the right to "security of the person,"6 2 and the right to
"dignity."63 Although no sexual harassment case has ever been won as a
straight Constitutional claim, sexual harassment has been characterized
as a violation of "that right to integrity of body and personality which
belongs to every person,"64 and has been said to infringe "the right to
human dignity." Additionally, a victim of sexual harassment in the
workplace could seek civil redress in delict (the South African equivalent
of tort law) or under the labor laws, or could seek redress through the
criminal law. But like many countries that do not explicitly prohibit sex-
ual harassment through statute, the available sources of relief under for-
mer South African law did not adequately protect women who were sub-
jected to sexual harassment.6
Prior to the enactment of the Employment Equity Act in 1998, the
few South African cases dealing with sex discrimination by means of
sexual harassment were generally brought under the Labour Relations
60 Wing & de Carvalho, supra note 13, at 69.
61 § 9 of Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. See Intertech
Sys. Ltd. V. Sowter, 18 I.L.J. 689 (LAC) (1997).62 § 9 of Constitution of Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.
631d.
64 v. M, 1989 (10) I.L.J. 755 (IC).
6Reddy v. Univ. of Natal, 1998 (19) I.L.J. 49 (LAC) (citing S. AFR. CoNsT. § 6).
6For example, in Bulgaria there are no laws specifically addressing the problem of
sexual harassment in the workplace. MINN. ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 4,
at 25. However, Bulgaria's new Constitution provides certain protections for women and
seeks "loyalty to the universal human values of liberty, peace, humanism, equality, justice
and tolerance." BULG. CONST. pmbl. Although Bulgaria's Labour Code does not include
specific language protecting women from sexual harassment, it explicitly prohibits dis-
crimination in the workplace. BULG. LABOUR CODE, art. 1, § 3 (1992). Also, several arti-
cles of the Bulgarian Criminal Code could be used by women against their supervisors
who sexually harass them. BULG. CRIM. CODE, art. VIII, § 153 (amended 1982, 1986)
(punishing a person who compels a woman into sexual intercourse by "taking advantage of
[the woman's] material or official dependency upon him"). To date, however, none of these
provisions has been applied to sexual harassment claims. MINN. ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 27-28. Similar circumstances exist in many Asian countries such
as Pakistan, India, and Nepal. See Janet Sigal & Heidi Jacobsen, A Cross-Cultural Explo-
ration of Factors Affecting Reactions to Sexual Harassment Attitudes and Policies, 5 PsY-
CHOL. PUB. PoL'y & L. 760, 770 (1999); Breaking the Taboo, supra note 6.
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Act.67 A majority of those claims, however, involved claims of unfair
dismissal by the "aggrieved" harasser, rather than claims by the sexual
harassment victim.68 The first case of sexual harassment in South Africa
was not heard until February 1989. In J vt A, the court addressed the va-
lidity of the dismissal of a senior engineering manager found to have
sexually harassed female coworkers. 69 The harasser was asked to resign
after he was found to have repeatedly touched various female employees
in a sexual manner without their consent." The harasser resigned, but
later withdrew his resignation. The court found the dismissal was fair,
despite the fact that the original complaining party withdrew her com-
plaint and several female employees signed a petition in support of his
reinstatement.7' Again in Manmpuru v Putco, an employee was dismissed
on charges of sexual harassment.7- As in J v M, the court found the dis-
missal fair as the harasser had an "intimidating attitude" towards female
employees, thus frightening them into not complaining for fear that they
would be dismissed.73 Other judges were not so sympathetic toward
claims of harassment, and reinstated employees suing for unfair dis-
missal, despite findings of "misconduct"'74 and "abhorrent" behavior."
Although the Industrial Court recognized in several cases that dis-
missal based on behavior constituting sexual harassment was proper,7
6
courts overall still seemed resistant to the idea, and it remained unclear
whether sexual harassment would be deemed "sex discrimination" under
67 Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. See, e.g., J v. M. 1989 (10) I.LJ. 755 (IC) (first
reported case of sexual harassment in South Africa); Gert Visser v. Sunripe Fruit. Case No.
NHK 13/2/1219; Mampuru v. Putco, Case No. IC 1112/2136 (Sept. 1989) (unreported);
Lynne Martin-Hancock v. Computer Horizons, Case No. NH 11/2/14268 (Oct.. 1994):
Intertech Sys. Ltd. V. Sowter, 1998 (18) I.L.J. 689 (LAC); Anthony v. 007 Casino, cited in
Nicholas Smythe, Handling Cases of Sexual Harassment: Code of Good Practice, PEoPLE
DyNAmcs, Aug. 1998, at 17-18; Du Preez v. Car Connection, cited in Smythe, supra, at
18; Pretorius v. Britz, 1997 (5) BLLR 649 (CCMA); Sadulla v. Jules Katz and Co.. Ltd.,
1997 (18) I.L.L 1482 (CCMA); Gerber v. Algorax, Ltd., 1999 (1) BALR 41 (CCMA) (de-
cided before promulgation of Employment Equity Act); Reddy v. Univ. of Natal, 1998 (19)
I.L.J. 49 (LAC); Gregory v. Russells, Ltd., 1999 (20) I.LJ. 2145 (CCMA) (decided before
promulgation of Employment Equity Act).
6 See, e.g., J v. M, 1989 (10) I.L.J. 755 (IC); Mampuru v. Putco. Case No. IC
11/2/2136 (Sept. 1989); Lynne Martin-Hancock v. Computer Horizons, Case No. NH
11/2/14268 (Oct. 1994); Reddy v. Univ. of Natal, 1998 (19) I.LJ. 49 (LAC); Gregory v.
Russells, Ltd., 1999 (20) I.L.J. 2145 (CCMA) (decided before promulgation of Employ-
ment Equity Act); Sadulla v. Jules Katz and Co., Ltd., 1997 (18) I.L.J. 1482 (CCMA);
Gerber v. Algorax, Ltd., 1999 (1) BALR 41 (CCMA).
69 J v. M, 1989 (10) I.L.J. 755 (IC).
7Od.
71 Id.
72 Case No. IC 11/2/2136 (Sept., 1989).73Id.
74 Sadulla v. Jules Katz and Co., Ltd, 1997 (18) I.LJ. 1482, 1488 (CCMA).
75 Gregory v. Russells, Ltd., 1999 (20) LL.J. 2145, 2170 (CCMA). See generally infra
text accompanying notes 296-311.
76See, e.g., J v. M, 1989 (10) I.L.J. 755 (IC); Mampuru v. Putco. Case No. IC
11/2/2136 (Sept. 1989); Lynne Martin-Hancock v. Computer Horizons, Case No. NH
11/2114268 (Oct. 1994).
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the Labour Relations Act. It was not until 1994, five years after J v. M
and Mampuru v. Putco, that the first case was brought by a victim of sex-
ual harassment. However, in Lynne Martin-Hancock v. Computer Hori-
zons77 and several similar cases that followed, the rulings were limited to
the fairness of the dismissal of the female employee, and failed to ad-
dress whether sexual harassment had in fact occurred. 71
Although the Labour Relations Act offered recourse in some situa-
tions, it had several important limitations. Remedies under the Labour
Relations Act were limited to instructing an employer to cease the unfair
labor practice, and did not allow the plaintiff to recover damages for hu-
miliation or lost opportunities. 79 Even if the Industrial Court had allowed
such a claim, this cause of action was not necessarily available to people
applying for employment, and may not have been available against an
employer who was not aware of the harassment. 0 Furthermore the La-
bour Relations Act did not cover all categories of workers. Domestic
workers were excluded from its purview."1 Therefore, the labor law was
not the best route for a plaintiff to seek compensation for damages suf-
fered.
A woman subjected to sexual harassment in the workplace also had
the option of suing in delict for damages suffered as a result of the har-
77 Case No. NH 11/2/14268 (Oct. 1994).78 See, e.g., Martin-Hancock, Case No. NH 11/2/14268 (finding constructive dismissal
of a woman who claimed to be sexually harassed for two years); 0 v. K, 1988 (9) I.L.J.
314 (IC) (finding wrongful dismissal and reinstating female employee after her employer
fired her for ending their consensual affair); Anthony v. 007 Casino, cited in Smythe, supra
note 67, at 18 (finding wrongful dismissal and awarding six months' salary as compensa-
tion where a woman was fired for refusing to succumb to sexual favors in exchange for a
salary increase); Du Preez v. Car Connection, cited in Smythe, supra note 67, at 18
(finding wrongful constructive dismissal where a female employee resigned after her em-
ployer attempted to touch her breasts, made comments of a sexual nature and repeatedly
used foul language over a fairly lengthy period); Pretorius v. Britz, 1997 (5) BLLR 649
(CCMA) (finding wrongful constructive dismissal and awarding nine months' salary as
compensation where a female employee resigned after, over a period of eighteen months,
an employer made a number of sexual advances towards her, including giving her unsolic-
ited gifts of a sexual nature such as pink G-string panties, attempting to kiss her, and ask-
ing her not to wear a brassiere); Coetzer v. J. J. Joubert, cited in Smythe, supra note 67, at
18 (finding constructive dismissal and awarding eight months' salary where an employee
resigned after her employer made sexual advances which were refused and then required
her to work odd and long hours, engaged in unwanted touching on thighs and buttocks, and
came into her bedroom and slept on top of her); Intertech Sys. Ltd. V. Sowter, 1997 (18)
I.L.J. 689 (LAC) (finding wrongful constructive dismissal and awarding twelve months'
salary where an employee resigned after severe and prolonged emotional, physical and
sexual abuse by a co-worker both inside and outside the workplace).
71J. G. Mowatt, supra note 31, at 637. This also meant that the court could find that
sexual harassment is an unfair labour practice without ruling that it amounts to sexual
discrimination. Dancaster, supra note 31, at 465.
80 Carla Sutherland, Paying for Stolen Kisses? Sexual Harassment and the Law in
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assment.n Again, there were several limitations on such a suit. Most
significantly, the victim would be unable to recover damages for lost em-
ployment, or for loss of other tangible assets.83 Damages could only be
recovered under the delictual head of iniuria for the wrongful and inten-
tional impairment of the victim's physical integrity (corpus), dignity
(dignitas), or reputation (fama).Y Moreover, suing in delict could be
quite expensive for a plaintiff who would have to hire a lawyer and might
have to pay the defendant's legal fees if she lost her case. There are no
reported cases involving a sexual harassment case in delict. Sexual har-
assment could also probably give rise to civil damages for assault, al-
though there is no reported case using that remedy in South Africa."
Finally, sexual harassment may also fall into one of the categories of
crimes against the person, such as rape, assault, indecent assault, or cri-
men injuria, allowing for criminal prosecution!' In the past decade, in-creasing numbers of women brought charges of criminal assault as com-
panies refused to act in matters of sexual harassment.' A victim filing
criminal charges, however, would not be able to recover any monetary
damages, nor would she be able to bring charges against an employer for
sexual harassment perpetrated by a co-worker, since the criminal law re-
quires only direct suits against the person alleged to have committed the
crime. Additionally, in criminal cases against the harasser, there is a
heavier burden of proof than in civil cases.88 Since neither the labor, de-
lict, nor criminal laws were written to specifically address the unique
problem of sexual harassment, the options for employees subjected to
sexual harassment were all lacking in significant ways.
b. Employment Equity Act: South Africa Takes a Progressive Stand
on Sexual Harassment
On October 19, 1998, recognizing that South African businesses had
"largely failed to achieve employment equity in the absence of legisla-
82See Dancaster, supra note 31, at 465 (citing Mowatt, supra note 31, at 645).
" See Dancaster, supra note 31, at 465.
4 Dancaster, supra note 31, at 464 (citing J.C. VAN DER WALT, DELICr: PINcIPLES
AND CASES 18 (1979)).
8 See J.C. VAN DER WALT, 10(2) LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA (GENDER AND LABOUR LAW)
244 n.4 (1979).
8 See id. at 244. In J . M, 10 I.L.J. 755 (IC) (1989), for example, the physical contact.
where the harasser repeatedly and without consent touched female employees under his
control in a sexual way, might have been grounds for a criminal charge of indecent assault.
See Dancaster, supra note 3 1, at 465.
87 See VAN DER WALT, supra note 85, at 244 n.4.
$8 SEXUAL HARASSMENT EDUC. PROJECT, DEALING WITH SEXUAL HARASSMENT (Mar.
1998) ("The disadvantage to laying a criminal charge [regarding sexual harassment) is the
high burden of proof required; guilt needs to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This is
very often difficult considering that there are generally no witnesses to incidents of sexual
harassment; cases often consist of one person's %vord against another's.'), at
http://www.sn.apc.org/sadc.pvaw/papers/skakel.htm.
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tion, '89 the South African democratic government enacted the 1998 Em-
ployment Equity Act.90 This legislation seeks to put an end to years of
inequalities in the labor market resulting from apartheid policies, societal
prejudices, and stereotypes, 9' by promoting the use of affirmative action
and prohibiting unequal treatment of employees in the workplace.
The EEA, put into force in August of 1999, prohibits discrimination
in the workplace, either directly or indirectly, on the grounds of "race,
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV
status, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language and
birth."92 It specifies that "harassment of an employee is a form of unfair
discrimination and is prohibited on any one, or a combination of grounds
of unfair discrimination listed in subsection (1)." 93
Positive aspects of the EEA include the fact that it identifies sexual
harassment in the workplace as a serious problem that needs to be dealt
with, and the fact that it places the burden of proving that the discrimina-
tion was fair on the employer. 4 Placing the burden of proof on the em-
ployer is significant because of the difficulty of proving sexual harass-
ment when there are few or no witnesses. The EEA also provides the La-
bour Court with the power to award appropriate damages, including
compensation for harm suffered. 9 The law is written to apply not only to
89 COSATU SUBMISSION ON EMPLOYMlENT EQUITY Acr (Apr. 11, 2000) (presented to
the Portfolio Committee: Labour during hearings on the Employment Equity Act), avail-
able at http:llwww.cosatu.org.zaldocs/2000/empeqa.htm#_Toc480096354.
90 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998.
9' Id. pmbl. The preamble recognizes that "disparities in employment, occupation and
income within the national labour market" resulted from "apartheid and other discrimina-
tory laws and practices... "' Id. The drafters noted that such disparities "create such pro-
nounced disadvantages for certain categories of people that they cannot be redressed sim-
ply by repealing discriminatory laws... "'Id. The EEA sets out as its goal to:
promote the constitutional right of equality and the exercise of true democracy;
eliminate unfair discrimination in employment; ensure the implementation of em-
ployment equity to redress the effects of discrimination; achieve a diverse
workforce broadly representative of our people; promote economic development
and efficiency in the workforce; and give effect to the obligations of the Republic
as a member of the International Labour Organisation ....
Id. d -Id. § 6(1).
931d. § 6(3). The EEA applies only to "designated employers" which is defined as "an
employer who employs 50 or more employees; an employer who employs fewer than 50
employees, but has a total annual turnover that is equal to or above the applicable annual
turnover of a small business ... ; a municipality ... ; an organ of the state ... ; and an
employer bound by a collective agreement ... " Id. § 1.
Id. § 11 ("Whenever unfair discrimination is alleged in terms of this Act, the em-
ployer against whom the allegation is made must establish that it is fair.").
9- If the Labour Court decides. that an employee has been unfairly discriminated
against, it has the power to order, among other things, that the employer pay compensation
and damages to the employee, or that the employer take steps to prevent the same type of
discrimination from occurring again. Id. § 50(2).
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current employees, but also to former employees and applicants for em-
ployment,' as well as to temporary employees, where their employment
is of indefinite duration or for a period of three months or longer.,, Addi-
tionally, the EEA provides for vicarious liability on the part of employers
if the employer is informed about the problem and the employer fails to
take the necessary steps to eliminate the undesirable conduct.' The pro-
visions on employer liability, however, are more employer-friendly than
the law in the United States, where an employer is always vicariously
liable for sexual harassment committed by a superior if there is tangible
harm to the plaintiff, even if the employer was unaware of the problem.
While the EEA briefly describes the procedure for referral of a dis-
pute about sexual harassment, it leaves many questions unanswered. The
"Code of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual Harassment Cases"
(the "Code"), approved on May 4, 1998 by the NEDLAC'10 Market
Chamber under the provisions of the Labour Relations Act, answers
many of those questions.'0' The Code, a guideline for handling sexual
harassment cases, sets out an ambitious objective to "eliminate sexual
harassment in the workplace""r - by encouraging and promoting "the de-
velopment and implementation of policies and procedures that will lead
to the creation of workplaces that are free of sexual harassment, where
employers and employees respect one another's integrity and dignity,
their privacy, and their right to equity in the workplace' 03 But despite
the Code's ambitious goals, it remains to be seen what type of effect the
Code will actually have on the outcome of sexual harassment cases. As a
detailed government-sponsored guideline, it seems likely that courts will
refer to the Code in the disposition of sexual harassment cases, but no
reported cases have yet done so.
Perhaps the greatest achievement of the Code is its detailed defini-
tion of sexual harassment:
-Id. § 51(5).
971 d § 57(1). The Code elaborates, explaining that the perpetrators and victims of
sexual harassment may include "owners, employers, managers, supervisors, employees.
job applicants, clients, suppliers, contractors, or others having dealings with a business.
CODE OF GOOD PRACTiCE, supra note 8, § 2(1).
98 § 60(3) of Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998.
99 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. El-
lerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
100 National Economic Development and Labour Council.
101 The Code is the product of eight months of negotiations in NEDLAC which com-
menced in September of 1997: "[t]he drafters studied a variety of international precedents,
and began negotiations on a draft which was partly inspired by the European Community's
Code of Practice on Measures to Combat Sexual Harassment (November of 1991)."
Smythe, supra note 67, at 18.
02 CODE OF GoOD PRACTICE, supra note 8, § 1(1).
103Id § 1(3).
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(1) Sexual harassment is unwanted conduct of a sexual nature.
The unwanted nature of sexual harassment distinguishes it from
behaviour that is welcome and mutual.
(2) Sexual attention becomes sexual harassment if:
(a) The behaviour is persisted in, although a single incident
of harassment can constitute sexual harassment; and/or
(b) The recipient has made it clear that the behaviour is
considered offensive; and/or
(c) The perpetrator should have known that the behaviour is
regarded as unacceptable.'0 4
The Code also elaborates on the forms sexual harassment can take:
(1) Sexual harassment may include unwelcome physical, verbal
or non-verbal conduct, but is not limited to the examples listed
as follows:
(a) Physical conduct of a sexual nature includes all un-
wanted physical contact, ranging from touching to sexual as-
sault and rape, and includes a strip search by or in the pres-
ence of the opposite sex.
(b) Verbal forms of sexual harassment include unwelcome
innuendoes, suggestions and hints, sexual advances, com-
ments with sexual overtones, sex-related jokes or insults or
unwelcome graphic comments about a person's body made
in their presence or directed toward them, unwelcome and
inappropriate enquiries about a person's sex life, and unwel-
come whistling directed at a person or group of persons.
(c) Non-verbal forms of sexual harassment include unwel-
come gestures, indecent exposure, and the unwelcome dis-
play of sexually explicit pictures and objects.
(d) Quid pro quo harassment occurs where an owner, em-
ployer, supervisor, member of management or co-employee,
undertakes or attempts to influence the process of employ-
ment, promotion, training, discipline, dismissal, salary in-
crement or other benefit of an employee or job applicant, in
exchange for sexual favours.105
4MId. § 3.
105 Id. § 4(1).
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Sexual favoritism is also prohibited, and occurs where "a person
who is in a position of authority rewards only those who respond to
his/her sexual advances, whilst other deserving employees who do not
submit themselves to any sexual advances are denied promotions, merit
rating or salary increases."1' 6 The forms of harassment listed are not
meant to be exclusive, but rather are exemplary of what conduct might
constitute sexual harassment.0 7 The Code also provides procedures to
deal with the problem and prevent its recurrence, suggesting that em-
ployers designate someone outside of management as available to give
advice and assistance, and outlining informal and formal procedures that
can be taken to resolve conflict. 03
The Code's definition of sexual harassment is legally and politically
important because it provides comprehensive legal protection to women
against a broad range of abusive tactics. The EEA responds to women's
experiences by penalizing physical and emotional harassment, as well as
verbal and written harassment, assuring that harm from all types of un-
wanted behavior of a sexual nature may be addressed through legal inter-
ventions.
The Code presents what seems to be a subjective standard for mak-
ing the determination of what conduct constitutes sexual harassment:
"sexual attention becomes sexual harassment if ... the recipient has
made it clear that the behavior is considered offensive... 1,1 This stan-
dard differs from the standard in the United States, under which action-
able harassment must be hostile and abusive in both the subjective and objec-
tive senses. The victim must perceive the environment to be abusive and the
situation must be such that a reasonable person would find the conduct hostile
or abusive."t0
Despite its recognition of the importance of the problem of sexual
harassment, the Code falls short in its failure to give employers an
affirmative duty to act in a preventative manner against potential sexual
harassment. Although employers are "required to take appropriate action
... when instances of sexual harassment which occur within the work-
place are brought to their attention,""' the Code indicates only that they
"should create and maintain a working environment in which the dignity
of employees is respected,1 2 they "should attempt" to ensure the work-
place is free of sexual harassment,"3 and they "should" implement a sex-
106 Id § 4(2).
10I7 § 4(1) (noting that the forms sexual harassment can take are "not limited to the
examples listed").
09 Id § 7.
'1aM § 3(2)(b).
1o Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
" CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE, supra note 8, § (l)(d).
12 t § 5(1) (emphasis added).131ld_ § 5(l)(c) (emphasis added) ("Employers/management should attempt to ensure
that persons such as customers, suppliers, job applicants and others who have dealings
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ual harassment policy and "take disciplinary action against employees
who do not comply with the policy" ' 4 While the Code is explicit and
detailed about what the sexual harassment policy should include"' and
about what procedures should be followed once a complaint is filed," 6
these are only guidelines which employers are not bound to follow. This
managerial prerogative is problematic because management structures
are typically dominated by men" 7 who are less likely to identify sexual
behaviour in the workplace as sexual harassment and less likely to per-
ceive sexual harassment as a serious issue.1 8
There is, however, strong incentive for employers to prevent harass-
ment from occurring. While the Code does not impose penalties on an
employer for failing to issue a policy, a failure to do so could provide the
court with a basis on which to hold employers liable in cases where the
employee files a complaint against the employer for failing to "take the
necessary steps to eliminate the alleged conduct... -"19 Additionally, the
EEA itself requires that all designated employers prepare and implement
an "employment equity plan which will achieve reasonable progress to-
ward employment equity in that employer's workforce" 0 This plan must
state, among other things, "the objectives to be achieved for each year of
the plan." 2 ' A court might interpret the EEA in such a way that an em-
ployer's failure to institute a policy in accordance with the Code amounts
to a failure to accommodate women as required under the plan.
There are also non-legal incentives for compliance. In addition to le-
gal costs, sexual harassment can also cost companies money by reducing
with the business, are not subjected to sexual harassment by the employer or its employ.
ees').
114 Id. §§ 6(1)-6(2).
nSPoliey statements should explain that "allegations of sexual harassment will be
dealt with seriously, expeditiously, sensitively and confidentially" and should state that
"employees will be protected against victimization, retaliation from lodging grievances and
from false accusations:' Id. § 6(3).
116 Id. § 7; see supra text accompanying note 109.
17 See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
l See generally Deborah Zalesne, The Intersection of Socioeconomic Class and Gen-
der in Hostile Housing Environment Claims Under Ttle VIII: Who Is the Reasonable Per-
son?, 38 B.C. L. REV. 861 (1997). This article on sexual harassment in rental housing
argues that "because women have not historically held power positions, men and women
often have different perspectives regarding what conduct constitutes sexual harassment,'
and "actions deemed harassment by women were often perceived as harmless by men:' id.
at 871 (citing Robert Rosenthal, Comment, Landlord Sexual Harassment: A Federal Ren-
edy, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 589, 593 (1992)). Statistics from a joint survey by Redbook maga-
zine and the Harvard Business Review indicate that many more men than women think that
incidents of sexual harassment in the workplace are exaggerated and that various examples
of sexual remarks at work are simply social comments. Id. (citing Eliza G.C. Collins &
Timothy B. Blodgett, Sexual Harassment ... Some See It ... Some Won't, HARv. Bus.
REv., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 76-77).
119 § 60(2) of Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. This theory has yet to be tested.Id. § 20(1).
121 Id. § 20(2).
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productivity, morale, and motivation.2' As noted in a South African busi-
ness magazine, "the penalty for not adhering to the 'Code of Good Prac-
tice for the Handling of Sexual Harassment Cases' is bad publicity, low
morale and loss of employee loyalty which could follow a case of serious
sexual harassment within a company. ' 1-- A pamphlet produced by the
Women's Bureau of South Africa suggests that sexual harassment can
have serious financial implications for companies, including:
An intimidating or hostile environment, lower productivity, poor
performance and poor quality, low staff morale, absenteeism,
accidents caused by stress and distraction, resignations of valu-
able staff, staff losing respect for people in power positions who
"turn a blind eye," poor image of the company in the eyes of
members of both the staff and the public, and litigation and
costly legal battles. 24
Promoting equality and diversity and treating workers with dignity and
respect can have a positive impact on a company's image, and "with the
growing importance of women as clients, it is necessary to create a gen-
der sensitive image."'1
Employment equity has been further advanced in South Africa by
the recent enactment of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Un-
fair Discrimination Act (the "Equality Act"). t: The Equality Act is a law
of general application dealing with equality and discrimination in the
broader society, specifically prohibiting unfair discrimination against any
person (by the state or by any person) on any of the prohibited grounds.''
The Equality Act has been said to complement and in certain respects
122 Ryder, supra note 33, at 27.
Sexual harassment can have a direct impact on productivity and profitability. The
stress resulting from sexual harassment can make employees ill, resulting in time
off work and reduced efficiency, and increasing costs for the employer in the form
of sick pay and medical insurance. While they are at work. victims of sexual har-
assment are likely to be less productive and less motivated, thereby affecting both
the quantity and quality of their work.
Breaking the Taboo, supra note 6.
121 Labour Finds an Ally in Business on the Issue of Sexual Harassment, Bus. VOICE,
May 1998, at 25, 26; see also WOMEN'S BUREAU OF S. AFIR., SEXUAL HARASS31ENT IN THE
WORKPLACE 1 (1992) ("[C]ase histories and research, both internationally and in South
Africa, have proven that sexual harassment can cost companies money, by reducing pro-
ductivity, morale and motivation. Companies may lose valuable staff or incur legal costs.").
124 VOMEN'S BUREAU OF S. AmF1, supra note 123, at 6.
i2 Breaking the Taboo, supra note 6.
126 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000.
127 Additionally, any other ground is prohibited if it causes systematic disadvantage.
undermines human dignity, or seriously affects equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms. Id.
§ 1. Measures designed to "protect or advance persons or categories of persons disadvan-
taged by unfair discrimination" do not constitute unfair discrimination. Id. § 14(1).
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reinforce the Employment Equity Act. 128 It reinforces the Employment
Equity Act by establishing an affirmative duty on the part of the state to
promote and achieve equality by developing awareness of fundamental
rights, enacting further legislation, and providing assistance, advice, and
training on issues of equality.I29 It complements the Employment Equity
Act in several ways: first, it provides protection to employees that are
excluded from the Employment Equity Act, such as members of the de-
fense force; 130 and second, it imposes responsibility and liability on some
employers that are not "designated employers" under the Employment
Equity Act.'3'
Overall, the Employment Equity Act and the accompanying Code,
together with the Equality Act, provide a solid basis for prosecuting sex-
ual harassment. However, the law will only be effective if those whom it
was meant to protect know about their rights and choose to assert them,
if employers are convinced to implement policies and take action against
employees who do not comply, and if lawyers and judges interpret the
laws in accordance with the intent of the drafters.
c. Sexual Harassment Continues: The Extent of the Problem Since
Implementation of the Employment Equity Act
Despite the enthusiasm that accompanied the enactment of the Em-
ployment Equity Act, its effectiveness is still largely untested. Although
some believe that because of the new legislation sexually harassed
women no longer fear speaking out,32 evidence indicates otherwise. In
fact, since its enactment over two years ago, only a few cases have been
brought under the Employment Equity Act, with unclear results.133
Reactions to the statute have been unabashedly contrary to the intent
of the law. The statute has encountered ongoing resistance and skepti-
cism from law enforcement, courts, prosecutors, the business community,
and the general public. There is still "entrenched hostility towards em-
ployment equity by employers and conservative trade unions in some
'2 COSATU SUBMISSION ON EMPLOYMENT EQUITY AcT, supra note 89.
129 § 25 of Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of
2000.
130 COSATU SUBMISSION ON EMPLOYMENT EQUITY AcT, supra note 89.
131 Id.
132 See, e.g., Prega Govender, Sex, Lies, and Bosses: Harassment Victims Turn to Lie-
Detectors to Nail Workplace Lechers, DURBAN SUNDAY TIMES, June 6, 1999, available at
http:lwww.suntimes.co.zal1999/06/06/newsldurban/ndbnl 1.htm.
133 In the December 2000 case of Ngantvini v. Daimler Chrysler, 2000 (9) BALR
1061, 1066 (CGMA), for example, despite the recent promulgation of the Employment
Equity Act, the court made no mention of that Act, instead applying the Labour Relations
Act to determine that the dismissal of an employee based on accusation of sexual harass-
ment was appropriate. Because the incident involved unwanted physical contact, the court
determined the conduct amounted to assault and found no need to address whether sexual
harassment had also occurred.
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sectors " 1 - Many employers "do not involve unions and workers in the
assessment of the workplace as required by the EEA,"'35 and continue to
resist attempts to place matters of employment equity on the table for
discussion at all. 136 This hostility comes as little surprise considering the
fact that the statute directly challenges inherited privileges and disrupts
the current balance of power.
Women report that sexual harassment is still not taken seriously in
the workplace. 37 A 1999 study of the private sector by the Commission
for Gender Equality shows that "despite new legislation, SA business has
done little or nothing to change the poor status of women in their organi-
sations.' '38 The study revealed that of the companies interviewed, forty-
one percent did not have a sexual harassment policy. Of those companies,
twenty-four percent said they did not feel obligated to provide a policy
"because staff had not asked for one," and nineteen percent indicated that
having a sexual harassment policy was "unimportant"' 39 Nerishni Shun-
mugam, a representative of the company that conducted the survey, sug-
gests that the results show a "general disrespect for women" and reflect
"the society we live in as a whole." 40
The minimal effect of the Employment Equity Act on occurrences of
sexual harassment is consistent with national trends in behavior follow-
ing the implementation of various other "women friendly" labor practices
in South Africa. Certainly, the integration of women in business over the
past few decades has had some effect on the economic status of South
African women.' 41 There is still, however, high turnover of women in
managerial positions. Some women have attributed this phenomenon to a
lack of training and promotion. 42 One South African female executive
explained, "the atmosphere that management thinks is tolerant and wel-
coming to all employees is actually corrosive to women""'3 She contin-
ued:
The problem of improving the workplace environment to suit
working parents, which are still mainly women, is not discussed
since both management and women (especially women who do
not want to be perceived as different from men) pretend every-
04 COSATU SUBMISSION ON THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT, suipra note 89.
135 Id
136 Id
137 See, e.g., Govender, supra note 132.
138 Celean Jacobson, Women Still on a Road to Nowhere. Bus. T.mEs (S. Afr.). May 16.
1999, at 1.139 Id
140 Id
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thing is just fine. Women, therefore, feel there is a misunder-
standing on how to manage and motivate them since they feel
they cannot perform to their full potential if their special needs
are not satisfied.144
According to Felice Schwartz, president and founder of Catalyst, a re-
search and advisory non-profit organization, most companies fall into one
of three categories: they either make no effort to recruit, train or promote
women; or they go for quantity, attempting to employ as many women as
possible, irrespective of the position they occupy in the hierarchy of the
company; or they go a step further and actually implement policies meant
to address women's welfare in the company. 145 However, regardless of
which category the company falls into, Schwarts and other labor consult-
ants believe that the status of women in most of these companies remains
subservient to male dominance with respect to "decision-making and
other processes that are central to the running of a successful organisa-
tion."'4 This might be explained by firmly entrenched racist and cultural
stereotypes, such as "black women cannot be depended upon as they are
always having babies," and "men are heads of households and therefore
should be in higher positions,"147 and might account for the low retention
of women in managerial positions.
Women in law serve as an example. In the legal profession, women
are better represented as students and as entry level employees than they
are as practicing attorneys or as partners. Since the end of the 1960s,
universities have significantly increased the percentage of females in
their classes to between thirty-six and fifty percent. Women's representa-
tion in higher status positions, however, has not been as promising:
In 1998, the number of women practising at the Bar in South
Africa showed a downward trend. The number of women advo-
cates had increased (as with women attorneys) from two percent
in the late 1960s to 12.7 percent in 1997, but the figure has now
started to drop. Only two percent of silks[141] in the country are
women, with no women silks practising at certain Bars in the
country. 149
Additionally, a 2000 survey of the top ten legal firms in South Africa re-




147 Jacobson, supra note 138, at 1.
141 Silks are senior counsel.
149NWebber Wentzel Bowens, South Africa: Women in the Legal Profession, MONDAQ
Bus. BRIEFING, Aug. 4, 2000, available at 2000 WL 9238734.
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women, only fourteen percent were partners. 5 Thus, although there are
new opportunities for women entering the legal profession, there are still
hidden barriers to upward mobility. Women still face "cultural and sexist
values" that lead to these obstacles, and it is still very difficult for women
to break from their traditional roles.' 5'
Since the end of apartheid there has been wholesale legal transfor-
mation, but it could take generations for accompanying social transfor-
mation. Despite the new Constitution that grants equality to women,
women are still subject to the sexist conventions and ideology of their
primarily male employers, and in many cases, women are still expected
to conform to traditional roles. It has become clear that the law should
not be relied upon as the exclusive source for change. Political and social
progress, as well as women's more active participation in economic de-
velopment, are also necessary to combat sexual harassment. The ultimate
success and utility of the Employment Equity Act will depend on the
erosion of deep-rooted gender inequality and sexism in the legal system,
as well as in the broader society.
B. United States Sexual Harassment Law: Decades of Struggle
1. Background: Development of the Law Since the 1970s
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19 64 15- provides that "[i]t shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate
against any individual with respect to ... terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's ... sex ... -'11 Title VII
predated the recognition of sexual harassment as a pervasive problem in
the workplace, and the courts' recognition of sexual harassment as a form of
sex discrimination has evolved gradually over the past two decades. Initially,
many courts rejected women's contentions that sexual harassment constituted
a form of actionable sex discrimination.'14 In the view of these courts, sexual
harassment was an inevitable component of interactions between men and
women that constituted a private, interpersonal matter beyond the purview of
employment discrimination laws.'55 In the late 1970s, however, courts began
recognizing that the conduct at issue was intimately related to the target's
status as a woman and thus recognized that conditioning employment-related
Id
151 Id
15242 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
15 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
1'4 See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163-64 tD. Ariz. 1975)
(describing sexual harassment as "nothing more than a personal proclivity" on the part of
the harasser rather than a condition of the plaintiffs employment), racated by 562 F.2d 55
(9th Cir. 1977).
M55 See Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L REV. 691.
699-701 (1997).
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benefits on sexual favors (commonly known as "quid pro quo" harassment)
constituted a form of discrimination "because of.. . sex." 156
Several years elapsed before the courts began to recognize that sex-
ual harassment could constitute a form of sex-based discrimination even
where the harasser did not demand sexual favors in exchange for tangible
employment-related benefits. In the landmark case of Bundy v. Jack-
son, 151 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that sexual harass-
ment that creates a hostile environment alters the conditions under which
an employee must work and constitutes actionable sex discrimination." 8
In 1986, the Supreme Court adopted this reasoning in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson,'159 holding that Title VII forbids not only quid pro quo
harassment but also "hostile environment" harassment: harassment that,
while not affecting economic benefits, subjects the plaintiff to a hostile
or offensive working environment.'16 In 1993, the Supreme Court clari-
fied the parameters of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,'6 ' holding that for actionable sexual har-
assment, the victim must "subjectively perceive the environment as abu-
sive," and an objective reasonable person must also find the environment
hostile and abusive. 62
In the meantime, the business world was not so quick to respond to
the problem of sexual harassment. Although as early as 1976 sexual har-
assment was reported as a serious problem experienced by up to ninety
percent of working women, 63 in the following decades, the business
community continually failed to treat it as such, hesitant to involve itself
with moral dilemmas. t64 Accordingly, women were reluctant to bring
suits because of the low success rate, high costs, and fear of retaliation.16
It was not until Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to permit victims of
sexual harassment to recover damages, including punitive damages,'6
and the ensuing Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings took place in
156See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir 1977);
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
1- 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
1ss Id at 946.
159477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
160 Id
61 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
162 Id at 21-22.
163 Claire Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job: A Shocking Look at Sexual Har-
assment, REDBOOK MAG., Nov. 1976, at 149 (reporting that nine out of ten women re-
sponding to their survey had experienced sexual harassment in the workplace).
6 For example, although eighty-six percent of respondents to a 1988 Working Woman
survey indicated they believed mandatory training programs would help alleviate the
problem, less than sixty percent of companies offered such programs. SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT: CONFRONTATIONS AND DECISIONS 79 (Edmund wall ed., 2000) [hereinafter CoN-
FRONTATIONS AND DECISIONS].
' See infra note 340 and accompanying text.
166Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. IV 1992)).
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1992, that sexual harassment began to become a practical problem for
businesses. Companies began to fear public relations problems and ex-
pensive litigation and finally started to "make moral education part of
their business'" 67 Even then, however, companies reacted slowly and it
was not until several cases awarding high punitive damages became well-
publicized' 68 and solidified companies' fears that they finally began to
recognize the problem and treat it as important.
2. Recent Developments
Before 1998, Meritor and Harris were the only two cases in which
the Supreme Court had occasion to rule on an issue regarding sexual har-
assment. In the 1997-98 term, however, the United States Supreme Court
decided an unprecedented number of sexual harassment cases, bringing
the term "sexual harassment" into American vernacular, and demon-
strating the Court's commitment to addressing issues of gender discrimi-
nation in the workplace.
a. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
In Oncale v. Sundowner,69 the Supreme Court revisited the issue of
what conduct constitutes sexual harassment, but this time in the context
of a man suing another man. In 1991, Joseph Oncale, a self-identified
heterosexual oilrig worker, was sexually harassed by his heterosexual co-
workers and supervisor on an oilrig off the coast of Louisiana. He
claimed that he was sexually assaulted, battered, touched, and threatened
with rape by his direct supervisor and others, including one instance
where three male co-workers held him down in a shower and shoved a
bar of soap between his buttocks. 170 He sued under Title VII, claiming he
was subjected to a hostile work environment, but the lower courts denied
his claim since both he and his harassers were male.' The Supreme
Court reinstated Oncale's claim stating that "nothing in Title VII neces-
'67 CONFRONTATIONS AND DECISIONS, supra note 164, at 83.
'6See, e.g., Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1523 (9th Cir. 1995) (awarding
$3.1 million to a female police officer for being subjected to a hostile work environment);
Scribner v. Waffle House, 976 F.Supp. 439 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (awarding S6.3 million in
punitive damages to sexual harassment victim), vacated by 62 F.Supp.2d 1186 (N.D. Tex.
1999); Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (awarding
$6.9 million, later reduced to $3.5 million, to female employee of law firm where the firm
exhibited conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others by failing to take reason-
able steps to prevent sexual harassment); Coates v. Val-Mart Stores, 976 P.2d 999 (N.M.
1999) (awarding $1.76 million to sexual harassment plaintiffs where employer knew of the
harassment yet failed to protect the plaintiffs and failed to reprimand the employee).
1- 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
170 I. at 79.
171 See Oncale v. Sundowner, 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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sarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of sex' merely because the
plaintiff and the defendant ... are of the same sex.' 172
The Oncale opinion was widely viewed as greatly expanding the
scope of protection of Title VII. 7 The Court's ruling, however, did not
address whether Oncale was in fact sexually harassed in that case, leav-
ing it to the lower courts to work out what proof is required to establish
that same-sex harassment is "because of sex." Oncale's case was re-
manded and Oncale was left to convince a jury that his co-workers and
supervisor discriminated against him because of his sex. The parties ul-
timately settled the case, 74 so it remains unclear whether the Supreme
Court's ruling would have helped Oncale. In fact, while the Oncale deci-
sion allows the possibility of a case of same-sex sexual harassment, there
is no indication that the Court would recognize the right of such a plain-
tiff based on the gender stereotyping that is typical of same-sex sexual
harassment. Accordingly, even if Oncale's co-workers did everything he
said they did, he still might have lost his case on remand.
The media, while correctly reporting the technical holding of the
Oncale case, left the public believing Oncale had already won his suit, or
that he would have been likely to prevail on remand. Many news reports
did not recognize the wide leeway lower courts now have to define what
it means to discriminate "because of sex" in a way which excludes pro-
tection for gay or effeminate men, nor did the media recognize the possi-
bility that the Court's ruling may actually make it easier to eliminate
most same-sex sexual harassment cases.
b. Employer Liability
In two other cases decided during the 1997-98 term, the Supreme
Court resolved a split in the circuit courts over the correct standard for
holding employers liable for the sexual harassment of an employee by a
supervisor. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,75 the Court addressed the
issue in the context of a hostile environment claim. The case involved a
lifeguard who was subjected to repeated and uninvited offensive touch-
ing, sexual comments and gestures, and threatening sexual requests by
her two male supervisors. 176 Her employer, the City of Boca Raton, as-
serted that it could not be held responsible for hostile environment har-
assment that occurred at a remote location and which, although reported
172Oncale, 523 U.S at 79.
173See, e.g., Same-Gender Harassment Is Also Banned, 219 N.Y.L.J. 1, 1 (1998) (refer-
ring to the Oncale decision as a "case of enormous importance for American workplaces")
[hereinafter Same-Gender Harassment].
'7 Mary Judice, L.A. Offshore Worker Settles Ser Suit: Harassment Case Made History
in Supreme Court, TIMES PICAYUNE, Oct. 24, 1998, at Cl.
175 24 U.S. 775 (1998).
176Id. at 782.
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to an intermediate supervisor, was never reported to higher-ups in the
city. 77 In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,'" the Court addressed the
question of employer liability based on a claim of quid pro quo sexual
harassment. Ellerth involved a claim that the plaintiff's supervisor re-
peatedly implied that her job would be in jeopardy unless she succumbed
to his advances. 179 Her employer, Burlington Industries, argued it should
not be held liable because she suffered no job consequences (she actually
got promoted before she quit), and because she failed to utilize the com-
pany's sexual harassment complaint procedure-'
In considering these two cases, the Court determined first that the
distinction between hostile environment and quid pro quo harassment did
not control the issue of employer liability.' The Court then held that
under either type of claim, employers are potentially liable for their su-
pervisors' misconduct, whether or not the company was aware of the
misconduct. 182 Specifically, an employer will be held strictly vicariously
liable to a victimized employee who has an actionable claim of sexual
harassment created by a supervisor who has authority over the employee,
when the exercise of supervisory authority results in tangible harm to the
plaintiff.183 When the plaintiff cannot prove tangible detriment, the em-
ployer can raise the affirmative defense that it exercised reasonable care
to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior, and that
the complaining employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer."
These cases were decided during the height of the sexual harassment
backlash, when common perception was at its strongest that sexual har-
assment law was out of hand. At a time when people were already con-
vinced that too many frivolous suits were being brought, the feeling was
that these decisions would lead to more lawsuits and greater expense to
employers, and ultimately "further complicate a workplace already con-
fused about male-female relations:"" Critics feared that these two rul-
ings would cause employers to adopt overbroad, policies under which
1771ld. at 785.
Mv 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
179 d. at 747-48.
18Id. at 749.
, Id at 753.
182 Id.
1141& at 765.
10 Robert Sherefkin, Sexual Harassment Ruling Creates More Uncertainty. CMLIN's
DET. Bus., Sep. 7, 1998, at 12; See also John 0. McGinnis, Don't Call High Court Con-
servative, NEWSDAY, July 27, 1998, at A27 ("This expansive interpretation of sexual har-
assment will ... impose costs on businesses and social rigidities on everyone else."): Men.
Women, Work and Law: An Even More Dangerous A Lrture Than Before. Thanks to the
Supreme Court, EcoNoW.sr, July 4, 1998, at 21 ("The Court's decisions once again ex-
panded the scope of the law, and may create more rather than less confusion.").
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"offending employees [could be] disciplined or discharged for relatively
trivial offences' 8 6
The Court's decisions, however, have also been viewed by many as
evenhanded. Employers are relieved that effective sexual harassment
policies can shield them from liability while employees are pleased that
the burden of proof for any affirmative defense is on the employer. 1'
Justice Souter, writing for the majority in Faragher, explained that, al-
though Title VII seeks to remedy injuries suffered because of unlawful
discrimination, its primary objective "is not to provide redress, but to
avoid harm."' 8 That, in fact, is exactly the aim of these two decisions.
While these new rulings might have caused some initial confusion, the
cases provide incentives for preventing harassment and dealing promptly
with problems. The likely result is that more workplaces will adopt sex-
ual harassment policies, thereby discouraging sexual harassment in the
first place. Ultimately, more victims should feel safe reporting sexual
harassment to their supervisors, and more cases will be resolved without
resort to litigation.
c. School Liability
In a fourth sexual harassment case decided by the Supreme Court in
the 1997-98 term, the Court took a different turn on the issue of em-
ployer liability. Victims of sexual harassment experienced the biggest
setback in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,'9 where the
Court held that a plaintiff is not entitled to damages for teacher-student
sexual harassment unless a school district official with authority to insti-
tute corrective measures has actual notice of, and is deliberately indiffer-
ent to, the teacher's misconduct. In that case, Alida Star Gebser, a junior
high school student, was subjected to a campaign of sexual innuendo and
provocation by her teacher. She ultimately had an affair with the teacher
that lasted for a year, and ended in prosecution for statutory rape. Gebser
never reported the incidents to anyone, including her parents, because
"she was uncertain how to react and she wanted to continue having him
'1Men, Women, Work and Law, supra note 185, at 21 ("The law already forced em-
ployers to engage in massive censorship of employee speech. The new cases put even more
pressure on them to do this:' (quoting Kingsley Browne, a law professor at Wayne State
University)); see McGinnis, supra note 185 ("In order to avoid lawsuits, companies thus
will react by creating inflexible, overbroad codes that are likely to chill much social be-
havior that does not constitute harassment.").
18 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: The Workplace; Court Spells Out
Rules for Finding Sex Harassment, N.Y. IMES, June 27, 1998, at Al; Robert Lipman &
David Robins, Court's Harassment Rulings Provide Ammunition for Both Sides, 220
N.Y.L.J. 1, 1 (1998).
,8Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998).
,8 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
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as a teacher."90 The couple was eventually discovered having sex and the
teacher was fired and arrested.
Gebser sued under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,19
which bars sex discrimination at educational institutions receiving fed-
eral funds. Although Title VII and IX had been analogized in the past to
determine liability for sexual harassment, the Court departed from the
clear law under Title VII in a 5-4 decision, holding that the school was
not liable for sexual harassment because no one with authority to take
corrective action had actual notice of the harassment.9 2 The result of the
Court's ruling is that school employees are now better protected from
sexual harassment than are students at the same school. In fact, practi-
cally speaking, in some instances where even the principal of the school
does not have authority to take corrective action, a harassed student may
be required to report any instances of sexual harassment to the school
board in order to take advantage of the protections of Title IX.
This ruling actually encourages schools to turn their backs on sexual
harassment altogether as a means of avoiding liability. "What this does is
reward school districts who refuse to have meaningful anti-harassment
policies for students," says employment law scholar Charles Craver.9 3
Gebser has taken away the incentive to have an anti-harassment policy,
putting the responsibility on a thirteen-year-old for reporting an incident,
rather than putting the responsibility on the school or the teacher.
In 1999, the Supreme Court decided another school sexual harass-
ment case. Davis v. Monroe Coun.,m Board of Education'9' was a sex dis-
crimination lawsuit brought by the mother of LaShonda Davis who was
sexually harassed by G.F, a 5th grade classmate.19 Sitting behind her in
the classroom, in physical education class, and in the hallways, G.F.
would try to touch her breasts and vaginal area saying, "I want to get in
bed with you" and "I want to feel your boobs'"'1 He rubbed his body
against hers in the hallways, put a doorstop in his pants, and pretended to
have sex with her during physical education class. 97 LaShonda com-
plained about each incident, but neither her teachers nor the elementary
school's principal did anything about it.s19 Davis tried to get away from
him by asking for her seat assignment to be changed, but it was three
months before the teacher let her move.199 Even then, G.F., who was
never disciplined by the school, continued to sexually harass her in the
19 Id. at 278.
19120 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
192 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292.
193 Marcia Coyle, Sex Harassment Redefined, 20 NAT'L L.J., July 6, 1998. at Al.
1- 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
195 id at 633.
196 Id
197 Id at 634.
198 Id.199 Id at 635.
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hallways.20 She told her mother that she "didn't know how long she
could keep him off her," and worried that the only way she could get him
to stop would be to kill herself.20' It was the criminal justice system, not
the school, that finally put an end to the harassment: G.F. was arrested for
sexual battery and he pleaded guilty to the charge in juvenile court."
A divided Supreme Court affirmed the legal obligation of schools to
protect students from severe and pervasive sexual harassment by other
students. 23 While the decision recognizes that student-on-student sexual
harassment disrupts a student's ability to learn, the Court applied the
same stringent standard it adopted in Gebser. A school board may be
held liable only where it exhibits "deliberate indifference" to sexual har-
assment of which it has actual knowledge. 204 The Court again rejected the
use of agency principles, which they freely apply in the employment
context, to impute liability to the school district-the school will only be
liable for "its own decision to remain idle in the face of known student-
on-student harassment in its schools" 20
5
3. (Mis) Understanding the Law: Backlash to the Recent
Developments
The Supreme Court's recent attention to the issue of sexual harassment
shows its firm commitment to the eradication of sexual harassment in the
workplace, and to clarifying what has been viewed as serious confusion re-
garding the law.206 There seems to be no question that the most recent sexual
harassment laws in the United States have had some positive effect on corpo-
rate culture, as individuals have begun to alter their behavior in the work-
place~w and American companies have reacted to the stricter burdens placed







w See generally Zalesne, supra note 17, at 355-68.2wId. at 352 n.6.
m Today, approximately nine out of every ten companies have a sexual harassment
policy. CNN Morning News (CNN television broadcast, June 26, 1998). Many of these
companies are enforcing "fraternization" policies which outright ban personal or romantic
relationships in the workplace, even when both parties consent. For example, United Postal
Service, American Express, Motorola, Wal-Mart, Safeco, Harvard University, and Tufts
University, among many others, all have policies that bar relationships between superiors
and subordinates. See Stephanie Armour, Romance at Work Tricky to Manage: Even Con-
sensual Relationships Can Hurt Morale, USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 1998, at B2; Lisa Black,
Power Imbalance Is Key to Most Policies on Sex, CI. TRiB., Jan. 29, 1998, at 1; Walter V.
Robinson & Peter G. Gosselin, At Many Firms, Consent Doesn't Make Sex OK, Tumas
PICAYUNE, Feb. 1, 1998, at A10.
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lington209 and Faragher,1 ° employers can be liable for the harassment of an
employee by a supervisor.211 However, liability can be avoided if the em-
ployer exercises reasonable care to prevent or correct the offending behavior,
as long as there was no tangible detriment to the employee, and the em-
ployee failed to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the em-
ployer.2 2 This law has encouraged companies to develop sexual harassment
policies2e 13 and to train and educate employees in sexual harassment aware-
ness to prevent liability.214 Experts note that millions of corporate dollars
have been spent training workers about the hazards of perpetuating sexual
harassment and educating employers about the hazards of condoning it.21- If
nothing else, the laws have served to heighten our consciousness about sex-
ual harassment.
But there is still a long way to go. Studies show that despite recent
educational and legal efforts to prevent sexual harassment, anywhere
from one-third to one half of all working women are still sexually har-
assed at some point during their working lives,216 and "the incidence of
sexual harassment has declined little, if at all, in almost twenty years.:7' 7
The media has arguably played a large part in shaping our society's
perceptions about sexual harassment and the state of the law in that area.
The media has consistently and overwhelmingly reported the recent de-
velopments in the law as overly pro-plaintiff,2i but it has not always
209 Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).210 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
211 Burlington, 524 U.S. at 753.
212 Ild. at 765.
2
13 See supra text accompanying note 208.
214 For example, since the Supreme Court's 1998 Faragher decision, many employers
have "set up stronger anti-harassment programs with more training and a clearer path to
making a complaint." Ellen Forman, It Can Happen to You: Employers Have Been Sent a
Strong Message by Two Recent Sexual Harassment Rulings: Stomping Out On-the-Job Ser
Harassment is a Top Priority, SUN SENTINEL, Aug. 16, 1999, at 16. According to Anne
Marie Estevez, a labor litigation partner at a law firm, "large employers are listening to the
court and taking the message of a thorough prevention program seriously." Id. at 16. Garry
Mathiason, a senior partner in the country's largest employment and labor law firm ex-
plains: "The first phase, the rush to adopt corporate harassment policies and procedures,
occurred in the first two years after the Supreme Court Rulings .... [Mlost companies are
now in the second phase: training managers to investigate and document harassment com-
plaints properly." Joseph A. Slobodzian, Increase in Harassment Cases, EEOC Saiys,
NAT'L L.J., July 3, 2000, at BI; see also Laura Koss-Feder. Doing Business With: Harass-
ment Policy Not Just for the Big Guns, and It's Easy, NEvSDAY, Jan. 4. 1999. at 5 (quoting
Presidents and CEOs from various companies discussing the need to create a policy as a
precaution to protect themselves and their employees).215Slobodzian, supra note 214, at B I (noting that the Supreme Court rules have
prompted a "rush to attorneys and consultants who specialized in providing model sexual
harassment policies and training for companies").2'6 See Anne Lawton, The Emperor's New Clothes: Hol' the Academy Deals with Sex-
ual Harassment, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsm 75, 78 n. 17 (1999).217 Id.
218 See, e.g., John Gallagher, Friends of the Court. ADVOCATE, Mar. 31. 1998. at 13
(reporting that the Oncale decision has "made for a safer workplace"); Same-Gender Har-
assment, supra note 173, at I (referring to Oncale decision as "case of enormous impor-
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painted a complete and accurate picture of the current state of law. The
Oncale decision, while opening the door to claims by men against other
men, might actually restrict the rights of same-sex plaintiffs. 219 The em-
ployer liability cases, while expanding the scope of recovery for plain-
tiffs who can prove sexual harassment by a supervisor, sparked a feud
about the rights of the accused and the extent of the problem of frivolous
lawsuits, causing resentment by employees and employers alike.20 The
school liability cases, while recognizing the problems associated with
harassment of a student by teachers or other students, actually impose
higher standards on students suing for sexual harassment than on simi-
larly situated adult employees. 12
As a result of the deep misunderstanding of the state of the law,
many people have come to resent it and the accompanying change in be-
havior they see as necessary to comply with it. The law encourages com-
panies to voluntarily adopt sexual harassment policies, but due to a fear
of liability based on a lack of understanding of the law, companies have
adopted over-broad, zero-tolerance policies, where employees can be
disciplined, or even fired, for trivial offenses.222 People complain that
companies, living in fear of the disabling costs of sexual harassment
suits, are going off the deep end, forcing their employees into straight-
jackets of political correctness; similarly, employees, living in fear of
being fired for behavior that is objectively innocuous, are unnaturally
conforming their personal behavior to this new mold. An image has
emerged of people walking around their workplaces, stiff and inhuman,
feeling horribly constrained by a set of arbitrary rules imposed by the
"feminazis," afraid to talk to one another about anything personal. This,
in turn, has led to the common perception that sexual harassment laws
have tipped too far in favor of the accuser. Many believe that sexual har-
assment has proven to be a useful tool for disgruntled employees looking
for a legal way to blackmail their co-workers or employers.
The media, by focusing attention on several extreme cases, has
helped to perpetuate the popular myth that employees can be guilty of
sexual harassment for engaging in innocuous interactions in the work-
place that have always been acceptable, and even viewed as welcome.
During the late 1990s, the news media reported several absurd instances
of sexual harassment law gone awry, leaving the public to believe that
those situations represent the norm.223 The media unerringly focused on
tance for American workplaces"); Greenhouse, supra note 187, at Al.219 See supra text accompanying notes 173-174.
m See supra text accompanying notes 181-186.
22 See supra text accompanying notes 192 & 203-205.
22 See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 185 ("In order to avoid lawsuits, companies thus
will react by creating inflexible, overbroad codes that are likely to chill much social be-
havior that does not constitute harassment.").
22 For example, in 1993 the media widely reported the story of a manager at Miller
Brewing Company who was fired after a co-worker complained she was offended when he
[Vol. 25
2002] Sexual Harassment Law in the U.S. and South Africa 179
extreme, sensational cases in which employers overreacted because of
their hostility, bewilderment, or confusion over new sexual harassment
rules?24 The media's exaggeration of the successes won by plaintiffs,
combined with the disproportionate attention given to several sensation-
alized stories, has led to the perception that women now have a hold on
the workplace. This perceived threat, based largely on misperceptions
about the rigidity of the law, has led to a well-fueled backlash, which has
severely limited the effect of the lav on social behavior.
II. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
Professor Martha Minow once stated, "there tend to be two kinds of
people when it comes to the topic of 'law and social change'-those who
believe that law is an important instrument for social change and those
who think not?' 2 5 In fact, Professor Minow goes on to describe several
variations on these two basic positions:
Some people think the law basically lags behind changes in so-
ciety and gradually catches up .... Some believe in contrast
that law can occasionally prompt changes in society but only
occasionally and often unintentionally .... Others emphasize
the unintended consequences of law reform efforts .... The
role of law, for some, is most significantly a cultural medium
that influences people's modes of expression and everyday
hopes and fears .... Quite in contrast are those who agree that
law does not or should not produce social change.2 6
talked about a previous night's Seinfeld episode involving a woman whose name (Dolores)
rhymed with a female body part. See, e.g., Dennis McCann, Seinfeld Trial's Story Line
Isn't Over Yet, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 29, 1998, at 1; Marshall H. Tanick. No
Rhyme or Reason for "Seinfeld" Firing, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 18, 1997, at A19. The media
also seized on a story about a theology professor who was disciplined for discussing a
risqud tale from the Talmud involving sex (see, e.g., Nat Hentoff, Assaulted by the Talmud.
PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1, 1994, at 16; Bernard Levin, Banning Holy Writ, TibIES (London).
July 8, 1994, available at 1994 WL 9160484), as well as a story about a graduate student
told to remove a photograph from his desk that showed his "bikini-clad" wife because two
women who shared his office space said the picture made them uncomfortable. See, e.g..
Americans Lighten Up a Tad on the Topic of Sex-But It's Still Legally Risky Subject in a
Workplace, SUNDAY PATRiOT-NEvs, Feb. 22, 1998, at Fl; James J. Kilpatrick. Sex and the
Court, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 16, 1998, at 10. Similarly, the media widely reported another
story about a six-year-old boy suspended for kissing a little girl classmate on the check.
See, e.g., Sexual Politics, RICHMOND TatEs DISPATCH, May 1, 1998, at AIS: John Temple.
Postlude to a Kiss: "This Ain't Over" Says Boy's Father, NEavs & REc., Apr. 13, 1997, at
Al. In each of those four cases, however, the facts were misreported or underreported. See
generally Zalesne, supra note 17, at 360-65.
,,4 See generally Zalesne, supra note 17.
mMartha Minow, Law and Social Change, 62 UMKC L. REv. 171, 171 (1993).
26 Id. at 171-72 (citations omitted).
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Which of these positions one espouses depends, of course, on one's faith
in people's ability to dissipate long-standing patterns of thought and be-
havior for economic, moral, social, or political reasons, in the face of
judicial activity.
In the United States, imposition of moral values on our legal system
has arguably altered public behavior in many positive ways. Most strik-
ingly, in the 1960s, the civil rights legislation illegitimatized racist con-
duct and helped change racial attitudes.227 Similarly, "domestic violence
has come out of the shadows '22s since the enactment of the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994. 29 "Once unavailable, then unmentionable,
even illegal, contraception is now a given for most American women, '
largely due to two Supreme Court opinions granting the fundamental
right to marital privacy in the use of contraception." The Supreme Court's
forward-thinking decision in Griswold helped pave the way for the idea
that abortion should be a constitutionally protected right, 2 and presuma-
bly the number of abortions has increased since its legalization in
1973. 233 The welfare system, by subsidizing non-marital births, has im-
m See id. at 171 (citation omitted) (stating that "Brown v. Board of Education stands
as a remarkable and unusual moment of judicial leadership in advance of public opinions
and practice" that helped eviscerate racism in our country); but see DERRICK BELL, FACES
AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 1992 (arguing that law re-
form for racial justice has failed).
m Anna Quindlen, Singing Praise to the Crazed, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2001, at 68.
229 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-22, 108 Stat. 1941 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)). The Violence Against Women Act "is a com-
prehensive effort to address the problems of violence against women through a variety of
different mechanisms, including funding for women's shelters, a national domestic abuse
hotline, rape education, and prevention programs, and training for federal and state
judges'" Leonore M. J. Simon, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Sex Offender Legislation and
the Antitherepeutic Effects on Victims, 41 ARiz. L. REv. 485, 532-33 (1999) (citations
omitted). It is often noted that there has been increased attention being paid on the national
level to the issue of violence against women, id. at 532, and conviction rates for domestic
violence have increased since the passage of the Violence Against Women Act. See, e.g.,
Austin Fenner, Domestic Violence Targeted, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Sept. 24, 2000, at 1 (noting
that in Queens, New York, the conviction rate for domestic violence misdemeanor cases
jumped from thirty percent to fifty-four percent since the enactment of the Violence
Against Women Act).
23 Quindlen, supra note 228, at 68.
231 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972).
232 See David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical Per-
spective, 62 ALE. L. REv. 833, 836 (1999).
233See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); PLANNED PARENTHOOD, FACT SLI1EET:
MEDICAL AND SOCIAL HEALTH BENEFITS SINCE ABORTION WAS MADE LEGAL IN THE U.S.
(Jan. 2000) ("estimates of the annual number of illegal abortions in the 1950's and 1960's
range from 200,000 to 1.2 million"), at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/library/
ABORTION/healthbenef.html; Lisa M. Koonin et al., Abortion Surveillance-United
States, 1997, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Dec. 8, 2000, at tbl.2 (indicating that
since 1970, legal abortions have steadily increased from roughly 0.2 million in 1970 to
roughly 1.4 million in 1988), available at http:llwww.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drh/surv-abort.
htm. Even before Roe, abortion was widely available, as many hundreds of doctors secretly
performed them, but the legalization of abortion presumably increased its availability for
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plicitly legitimized such births, -1 and no-fault divorce laws remove most
legal obstacles from obtaining a divorce, thereby destigmatizing di-
vorce.235 "The victories over the past twenty-five years have been so in-
crementally successful that most Americans scarcely even notice unless
they take the long view"' S Although many issues such as abortion and
gay rights remain hotly contested, these causes have slowly "moved from
being considered radical to being mainstream."'
Since the beginning of the feminist movement, though, there has
been an ever-present underlying backlash against women's equality. In
her 1991 book, Susan Faludi commented that "the last decade has seen a
powerful counterassault on women's rights, a backlash, an attempt to
retract the handful of small hard-won victories that the feminist move-
ment did manage to win for women."'  Gloria Steinem echoed those
sentiments in an article for the ten-year anniversary issue of Ms. Maga-
zine back in 1978:
This seems to be where we are, 10 years or so into the second
wave of feminism. Raised hopes, a hunger for change, and years
of hard work are running head-on into a frustrating realization
that each battle must be fought over and over again at different
depths, and that one inevitable result of winning the majority to
people who could not have formerly afforded one. See Garrow. supra note 232, at 834.
There is also a widely held belief that the Roe r. lWade case "created an intensely ener-
gized right to life movement" which would not have taken on the life it did absent the Su-
preme Court's mandate in 1973. See Garrow, supra note 232, at 840.
2 See GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ONE NATION, TWO CULTURES 63 (1999). Of course
the law had already abandoned the harsh treatment of "bastards:' See Andra J. Hedrick,
Decedents' Estates-Bilbrey v Sinithers: Limitations on Post-Death Paternity Claims for
Purposes of Intestate Succession in Tennessee, 27 U. MEM. L. REv. 517, 519 (1997) (cita-
tion omitted) (noting that "[t]raditionally, the law has treated nonmarital children less fa-
vorably than children born within the bonds of matrimony," but "[riecognizing the harsh-
ness of this rule, the individual states have gradually expanded the rights of nonmarital
children by statute and judicial opinion"). But by actually subsidizing such births, the gov-
emnment implicitly sanctioned them.
2 See HI mELFARB, supra note 234, at 63. Arguably, however, the move to no-fault
divorce was in response to already changing cultural and moral views about marriage and
divorce. Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals, and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral
Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 503, 522 (1994). Many see the adoption of the no-fault
divorce as an acknowledgment of a practice that already existed, rather than as a precursor
to a change in social attitudes. See Minow, supra note 225, at 171. Before the change in the
law, a spouse who wanted out of a marriage would have to demonstrate that the other
spouse was to blame for the breakup of the marriage. Id. Evidence has shown that many
thousands of people manufactured evidence under the blame system, indicating that the
desire to allow divorce without proving fault had been around well before the change in the
law. Id.
236 Quindlen, supra note 228, at 68.
27 Id.
23 SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED VAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN
xviii (1991).
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some changed consciousness is a backlash from those forces
whose power depended on the old one. 9
Frequent flare-ups of resistance to women's rights are not random, but
rather occur when men fear that women are making progress that will
threaten men's economic and social well being.24 These inevitable set-
backs have severely impaired the social and economic progress of the last
several decades.
The hotly contested nature of the law in the United States and the
lag in social change may be instructive on the situation in South Africa.
South Africa naturally presents a very different set of challenges than the
United States, where a vastly different political economy and social cli-
mate abounds as a result of the legacy of apartheid, the level of economic
development, the political power of the trade union movement, and the
extent of unemployment.
Since the end of apartheid, South African women have made great
gains in representation in government, law, and society. The Constitution
"stands out among contemporary constitutions for its evident concern for
women'" 241 proclaiming non-sexism to be a "foundational principle of the
South African state"' 2 Gender studies programs have been established in
higher education, and the public has begun to recognize the negative im-
pact of domestic violence on women's equality. Law, certainly an impor-
tant mechanism for change, has been successfully used to remove the
most blatant discrimination against women. Since 1993, South African
women have experienced some significant legislative victories, including
the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination
Act,u 3 Commission on Gender Equality Act,2" Customary Marriages
239 Gloria Steinem, Far From the Opposite Shore, Or How to Survive Though a Feni-
nist, Ms. MAG. (1978).240 FALUDI, supra note 238, at 46. The media has a history of inflicting damage on
feminists and other progressives. As Faludi noted:
In the last decade, publications from the New York Times to Vanity Fair to the Na.
tion have issued a steady stream of indictments against the women's movement,
with such headlines as "when feminism failed" or "the awful truth about women's
lib." They hold the campaign for women's equality responsible for nearly every
woe besetting women, from mental depression to meager savings accounts, from
teenage suicides to eating disorders to bad complexions. The "Today" show says
women's liberation is to blame for bag ladies. A guest columnist in the Baltimore
Sun even proposes the feminists produced the rise in slasher movies. By making
the "violence" of abortion more acceptable, the author reasons, women's rights
activists made it all right to show graphic murders on screen.
Id. at xi.
241 HUMAN RIGHTS YEARBOOK, supra note 34, at 296.
242 Id. at 296.
24 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. The
goals of this Act are to facilitate the implementation of relevant sections of the South Afri-
can Constitution, and to facilitate compliance with certain international law obligations
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Act,24 Domestic Violence Act,'4 amendments to the Maintenance Act, -1
the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act,2- 8 and the Guardianship
Act.249
having to do with racial and gender discrimination. Id. § 2. The EEA establishes an
affirmative duty on the part of the state to promote and achieve equality by developing
awareness of fundamental rights, enacting further legislation, and providing assistance.
advice, and training on issues of equality. Id. § 25. It prohibits unfair discrimination
against any person (by the state or by any person), on the grounds of race. gender, sex.
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual orientation, age, disability,
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. Id. § 1. Additionally, any other
ground is prohibited if it causes systematic disadvantage, undermines human dignity, or
seriously affects equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms. Id. Measures designed to "pro-
tect or advance persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination"
do not constitute unfair discrimination. Id. § 14. See generally A stePtuCA SocIETY or
INTERNATIONAL LAW, SOUTH ARucA: PROMOTION OF EQUALITY AND PREVENTION OF
UNAiR DISC mINATION Acr (June 17-23, 2000), at http://www.asil.orgilibrilib0315.htm.
24- Commission on Gender Equality Act 39 of 1996. This Act was created pursuant to
§ 119 of the Constitution, which provided for the establishment of a Commission on Gen-
der Equality. Id pmbl. The object of this Commission is to promote gender equality and to
advise and make recommendations to Parliament or any other legislature with regard to
any laws or proposed legislation that affects gender equality and the status of women. Id.
245 Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. This Act gave legal recognition to all ex-
isting African customary marriages, as well as future customary marriages that are in com-
pliance with the provisions of the Act. See generally Johan D. van der Vyver, Constitu-
tional Perspective of Church-State Relations in South Africa, 1999 BYU L. REv. 635. 663
(1999).
246 Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998. This Act includes in its definition of "domestic
violence": physical abuse; damage to property; economic, emotional, verbal, and psycho-
logical abuse; and stalking. Id. § l(viii). Under the Act, a "domestic relationship" includes
not only legally sanctioned marriages but also those married according to South African
customary law and those who live or have lived together as though they were married.
including persons in homosexual unions. Id. § l(vii). The Act requires the police to inform
a complainant of her rights under the statute and to arrest the alleged abuser without a
warrant if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that an act of violence has occurred. Id.
§§ 2-3. The Act also allows for:. immediate interim protection orders when delay would
create "undue hardship"; protection orders forbidding the abuser to enter the victim's home
or place of employment; orders requiring the abuser to pay the victim's rent or mortgage
payments; denying the abuser contact with his children if in the child's best interests;
omitting the victim's physical address from the protection order, and any "additional con-
ditions which it deems reasonably necessary to protect and provide for the safety, health.
or wellbeing of the complainant." Id. §§ 5(2), 7. See generally Penelope E. Andrews. Vio-
lence Against Women in South Africa: The Role of Culture and the Limitations of the Law,
8 ltMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 425, 449-52 (1999) (examining provisions of the Do-
mestic Violence Act).
24Maintenance Act 99 of 1998. This Act allows courts to authorize employers to de-
duct maintenance payments from an individual's salary. Id. § 28(b). It also allows for the
seizing of the property of those who refuse to pay. Id. § 40(b). See generally South African
Press Association, NNP Demands Better Protection of Women, NVORLD REP.. Aug. 9. 2000.
available at 2000 WL 24054851.
248 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. The Preamble of this Act rec-
ognizes the right of persons to security over their bodies and to make decisions concerning
reproduction, and notes that the Act fulfills the values such as non-sexism which underlie a
democratic South Africa. Id. pmbL The new law permits an abortion on demand for any
woman during her first twelve weeks of pregnancy. Id. § 2. An abortion from the thirteenth
week through the twentieth is permitted to ensure the physical or mental health of the
woman, if continued pregnancy would significantly affect the social or economic circum-
stances of the woman, if a substantial risk exists of severe physical or mental abnormalities
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Women are at a critical juncture. Gender equality is central to the
continued development of democracy in South Africa, but many women
have yet to feel the effect of the new laws. Lack of education and re-
sources, coupled with cultural notions about women, institutionalized
gender stereotypes, and the priority given to racial issues, have interfered
with women's ability to take advantage of the new legislation, 2o and
caused their experiences and testimony to be discredited and devalued. '
For law to affect social behavior, the law must have legitimacy. Yet
traditional sexual harassment statues have often lacked the popular sup-
port necessary for widespread effectiveness. This Section examines the
limitations of traditional sexual harassment statutes, and identifies a vari-
ety of cultural impediments to their full implementation.
A. Coercion vs. Acculturation: The Effect of Standard Sexual
Harassment Self-Regulatory Legislative Schemes Depends on Their
Cultural Legitimacy
The law can have two different effects on behavior: it can change the
action people take by imposing economic costs on such actions (i.e.,
taxing an action or imposing other penalties), but it can also change be-
liefs people have about the taxed action.2 2 The former is consistent with
the deterrence theory, an economic model under which "people commit
crimes unless the law deters them with adequate punishments"' 3 The
latter is consistent with the normative model, which states that people
commit crimes unless the law prohibiting them has legitimacy32 Under
either theory, however, the law cannot be relied upon as the sole method
of altering workplace behavior.
in the fetus, or if the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. Id. After the twentieth week,
an abortion is permitted if the pregnancy would endanger the life of the woman, result in a
severe malformation of the fetus, or pose a risk of injury to the fetus. Id. An abortion under
this Act requires the informed consent of the woman, and does not require parental or
spousal notification regardless of the pregnant woman's age. Id. § 5. See generally Haroz,
supra note 52, at 887-88 (examining provisions of the Choice on Termination of Preg-
nancy Act).
29 Guardianship Act 192 of 1993. Prior to this Act, fathers in South Africa were the
natural guardians of minor children born within a marriage (mothers, then and now, are the
sole guardians of illegitimate children). The 1993 Guardianship Act gives the mother of a
legitimate minor child the same guardianship rights as the father. See generally Vivienne
Goldberg, South Africa: Private Law in Transition; The Effect of the New Constitution, 33
U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 495,498 (1995).
m See infra 324-35.
251 See discussion infra Part ll.C.
752 ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NoRMs 33 (2000).
253 Id. at 111.
2 Id.
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1. Deterrence Theory
The deterrence theory examines the use of punishment or sanctions
to control socially undesirable behavior. Under both the American and
South African sexual harassment legislative schemes, the method of en-
forcement relies on the use of legal sanctions as a strategic method of
self-policing. Responsible self-policing is certainly a necessary element
in controlling institutional power. But economic and legal incentives for
compliance may not be sufficient. Under both laws, there is no require-
ment that companies implement sexual harassment policies: the law
seeks the voluntary compliance of companies that fear the existence of
moral or political force and want to avoid the liability and adverse pub-
licity associated with a sexual harassment lawsuit. A study of ten United
States corporations showed that, overwhelmingly, their goal in handling
internal discrimination complaints was to resolve the complaints and
avoid legal intervention, rather than to identify and eliminate practices of
discrimination. 55 These private management priorities and goals, which
are purely economic, are inconsistent with the egalitarian principles of
anti-discrimination law.
Traditionally, economic motives have not been sufficient to make
companies responsive to social and community concerns. Empirical
studies frequently show that "most companies are rather poor at imple-
menting self-regulatory measures to eliminate discrimination" when the
only incentive is economic.2 6 Louis Seidman, in his article about pun-
ishment as a deterrent to crime, attests that society depends on appeals to
both self-interest and moral inhibitions to ensure compliance with social
norms.' He defines self-interest as "incentive structures that promise the
potential criminal more pain than pleasure if he performs the criminal
act," and he defines moral inhibition as "a disinclination to perform an
act even when the actor perceives it to be in his self-interest: ' z" Seidman
states:
Although the extent to which the threat of punishment actually
deters crime is intensely controversial and probably unknow-
able, it can hardly be doubted that some people avoid criminal
acts because of the threat of criminal sanctions. But it is certain
as well that many others would refrain from criminal conduct
25- Christine Parker, How to 11n Hearts and Minds: Corporate Compliance Policies
for Sexual Harassment, 21 LAwV AND POLIcY 21, 30 (1999) (citing a 1993 study by Edel-
man, Erlanger & Lande).
2 Id at 24. Parker cites the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which de-
crease fines for companies that have compliance programs, as an example of a successful
voluntary corporate compliance program. Id. at 22.
2-7 Louis M. Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the
Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 335 (1984).
258 Id. at 334.
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even if there were no chance of punishment, simply because
they believe that the conduct is reprehensible.u 9
Applying this theory to civilly actionable behavior, if economic
sanctions are the only deterrent to "socially costly but privately beneficial
behavior,"26 the actor will always balance the pleasure he gets from the
harassing behavior against the risk and extent of the economic sanctions,
and at least in some cases may conclude that it is "worth it" to engage in
sexual harassment. 61 It follows that economic sanctions alone may not be
a sufficient deterrent to improper social behavior. What is needed is a
more fundamental belief that the behavior at issue is morally wrong, so
that the actor will not engage in the conduct even if the pleasure it would
give him would outweigh the costs. Without the added moral inhibitions,
voluntary compliance may not be a comfortable source on which to rely.
2. Normative Theory
The normative theory examines the use of social and cultural
influences to control "immoral" behavior. "No society exists in which
law is the sole regulatory force: there are also religion, gossip, the threat
of scandal, and the subtler reinforcements of socialization." 6" The law
must work in conjunction with these other control forces to have maxi-
mum effect. The normative theory operates under the assumption that
people and institutions care deeply about their reputations. Under the
normative theory, law helps in part to alter the inferences drawn about a
person who engages in a taxed action. This, in turn, can lead to non-legal
mechanisms of cooperation such as gossip, disapproval, or ostracism.2
There is an argument that the passage of a law "signals the existence
of a national consensus" denouncing the regulated behavior, thereby
helping to create a societal norm.264 Under this theory, even if a majority
believes the conduct at issue is morally wrong, "persons who do not
219 Id. at 335.
2'0 POSNER, supra note 252, at 4.
261 Parker, supra note 255, at 35-36 (noting that "whatever penalty is set will always
be too small to deter those whose wrongdoing is so profitable it does not matter" (citing
John Braithwaite, On Speaking Softly and Carrying Big Sticks: Neglected Dimensions of
Republican Separation of Powers, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 305 (1997))); see also POSNER,
supra note 252, at 27 (noting that "people violate social norms simply because they care
more about the intrinsic benefits they obtain from a behavior than about the reputational
consequences").
262 Daisy Hilse Dwyer, Outside the Courts: Extra-Legal Strategies for the Subordina.
tion of Women, in AFRICAN WOMEN & THE LAW 90 (Margaret Jean Hay & Marcia Wright
eds., 1982).
263 POSNER, supra note 252, at 4. For example, as Posner points out, "people draw dif-
ferent inferences today than they did in the past about the characters of those who engaged
in racial discrimination." Id. at 33.
265 Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or
Tool for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REv. 1227, 1259 (2000).
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share these views may be unaware of this consensus because they most
often associate with others who share their views and they exaggerate the
typicality of those views."2 The very passage of a law signals to those
people that, as a society, we view the behavior as inappropriate and that
they will be penalized both socially, through reputation, and economi-
cally, through sanctions, for engaging in it.26
Scathing reports, with the proper attention, could bring increased
pressure, public disapproval, and shame upon companies in non-
compliance with sexual harassment law. Thus, efforts to educate society
about sexual harassment by publication of studies showing companies'
insensitivity to the problem and detailed reports of their violations, may
encourage companies to respond and take steps toward prevention.
But under the normative model, people obey the law only when they
see it as truly legitimate and reflective of societal norms. People are de-
terred from committing a crime either because they "believe that the law
is morally right and they seek to engage in moral behavior," or because
they "believe that they should follow any law that is created by a legiti-
mate authority" ' b So if a law has legitimacy, it is more likely that people
will obey it, not because they derive utility from obeying a legitimate
law, but because they are likely to obtain future returns when others see
them obeying a legitimate law.2 If the law lacks legitimacy-that is to
say, if there is the universal sense that the law does not reflect the major-
ity perspective-then it is less likely that the law will be obeyed.
History has shown that in some instances law can enter and shape
private institutions. 9 However, we must understand those institutions as
social and political entities, as well as legal and economic ones. Institu-
tions will respond to cultural mores and other outside influences out of a
desire for legitimacy. But for maximum effectiveness of nonlegal mecha-
nisms of cooperation, the law itself must have legitimacy. Companies
need to understand the harm of sexual harassment, and why it amounts to
sexual discrimination, before they will see compliance as a means toward
external legitimacy.
26I5 .
2Id. Beale argues, for example, that enactment of a federal hate crime law, though
not technically necessary for enforcement of hate crimes since the conduct in question is
already a crime under state law, is necessary to "signal the existence of a national consen-
sus denouncing bias-motivated crimes and affirming that the groups in question are full
and equal members of society." ld. Similarly, the visible enforcement of law can serve to
strengthen societal norms because it signifies a "reaffirmation, a validation. of the moral
sense of society." H t IELFARB, supra note 234, at 66.
2 POSNER, supra note 252, at 111.
2s Id. People also violate social norms because they change so quickly that people do
not always have adequate information. Political correctness norms are a recent example,
having changed "so rapidly that people could be sanctioned for conduct that was consid-
ered innocent a few years earlier." Id. at 28.
2 See HIItMELFARB, supra note 234, at 63 (stating that "[l]aw can change incentives,
and incentives can shape behavior"); see also supra notes 208-215 and accompanying text.
Harvard Women's Law Journal
B. Legitimacy of the Law Depends on Full Understanding of the Harm of
Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment legislation is often viewed as lacking legitimacy
because of what is commonly perceived as an improper regulation of per-
sonal and private relations in the workplace. Although it is often said that
society cannot legislate morality,270 morality has, indeed, always been an
essential source of the law.27' The State has dictated a code of morality
270 See, e.g., GREAT BRITAIN, COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENCES AND PROSTITU-
TION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENCES AND PROSTITUTION 24
(1957) ("[T]here must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief
and crude terms, not the law's business."), cited in EDWIN M. SCHUR & HUro ADAM BE-
DAU, VICTIMLESS CRIMES: TWO SIDES OF A CONTROVERSY 5 (1974); GILBERT GEIS, NOT
THE LAW'S BUSINESS: AN EXAMINATION OF HOMOSEXUALITY, ABORTION, PROSTITUTION,
NARCOTICS, AND GAMBLING IN THE UNITED STATES X (1979); Karen T. White, The Court.
Created Conflict of the First Amendment: Marginalizing Religion and Undermining the
Law, 6 J. LAW. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 204 (1994) (reporting Justice Holmes' statement that"you can't legislate morality").
271 See Don Welch, The State as a Purveyor of Morality, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 540,
542 (1988) ("Morality serves as a source of law. Laws result from community choices
about values we wish to enhance, rights we want to protect, and goals we deem important
to pursue?'); see also White, supra note 270, at 204 (reporting Supreme Court nominee
Robert Bork's response to the argument that we shouldn't legislate morality that "we leg-
islate little else"); Stephen Macedo, Morality and the Constitution: Toward a Synthesis for
"Earthbound" Interpreters, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 29, 29 (1992) (noting that "morality must
play some role in legal interpretation .... The question there is not whether moral theory
but which moral theory").
Some believe the moral agenda was set by the will of God, and since the earliest de-
velopment of American law, for example, we have used moral or religious bases to formu-
late secular laws. Interestingly, on many sensitive issues involving moral prohibitions, both
sides have been known to make reference to the Bible in support of their arguments. For
example, in the hotly contested debate over the legalization of abortion, pro-lifers often
argue that in the Bible God recognizes the life of an unborn fetus ("Now the word of the
Lord came to me saying, 'before I formed you in the womb I knew you."' Jeremiah 1:4-5),
while pro-choicers have argued that the loss of a fetus is not treated as the loss of a life in
the Bible (reading Exodus 21:12, 22 together, "[W]hoever strikes a person mortally shall
be put to death .... When people who are fighting injure a pregnant woman so that there
is a miscarriage, and yet no further harm follows, the one responsible shall be fined what
that woman's husband demands, paying as much as the judges determine."). See generally
Roy Bowen Ward, The Use of the Bible in the Abortion Debate, 13 ST. Louis U. Pun, L.
REV. 391, 396, 398 (1993). Similarly, in arguments about the morality of the death penalty,
both sides frequently reference biblical passages. See John H. Blume & Sheri L. Johnson,
Don't Take His Eye, Don't Take His Tooth, and Don't Cast the First Stone: Limiting Re-
ligious Arguments in Capital Cases, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 61 (2000) (noting the
surprising frequency with which both prosecutors and defendants use religious quotations
or allusions in their arguments). Death penalty proponents have cited the "eye for eye,
tooth for tooth" passage in Leviticus 24:19-21, while anti-death penalty advocates have
referenced Exodus 20:13 ("Thou shalt not kill"). See id. at 67. In similar manner, "prohibi-
tions on the sale of alcohol on Sunday evolved from British and colonial laws that codified
the Fourth Commandment's requirement that the Sabbath be respected:' and prohibitionists
have argued that drinking is implicitly prohibited in the Bible (Proverbs 20:1 "Vine is a
mocker, strong drink a brawler, and whoever is led astray by it is not wise:'). Anti-
prohibitionists, however, have cited 1 Timothy 5:23 in support of their argument against
prohibition ("No longer drink only water, but take a little wine for the sake of your stom-
ach and your frequent ailments?'). See generally Steven L. Lane, Liquor and Lemon: The
[Vol. 25
2002] Sexual Harassment Law in the U.S. and South Africa 189
for thousands of years, and today, our whole criminal justice system, if
not our entire legal system, imposes moral beliefs on our society.? There
is no universally accepted moral truth. Generally moral practice is cultur-
ally driven, and within all cultures there is debate over whether and when
legislation of morality is proper. Most cultures would agree that conduct
involving an unmistakable victim, such as murder or theft, is immoral
and would have no problem criminalizing such conduct. Victimless
crimes, and in particular those involving intimate issues, however, are
more controversial. Typical examples of "victimless crimes" (usually
defined as crimes in which all participants consent and are unlikely to
initiate an enforcement action) 73 include homosexual behavior, abortion,
prostitution, narcotics, and gambling, and are generally prohibited or
condoned in a society, depending on the culture's view of the morality of
the act.274 Within each of those issues, debate rages over whether the
Establishment Clause and State Regulations of Alcohol Sales, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1491,
1493-94 (1996).
Others, in line with Nietzsche, and other post-French Revolution philosophers, believe
"God is dead?' See PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 124 (Valter Kaufmann ed., Viking Press 1954).
So is absolute morality dictated by God (i.e., what is good, what is bad, ctc). As a result,
the State was required to put forth the moral agenda-in part to avoid obvious chaos if
human beings determined on an individual basis what is "moral" and in part to assert its
power for the benefit and survival of the political and economic ruling class. Under this
view, secular morality has taken the place of the traditions of religious faith.
m For example, aside from some of the more hotly contested moral issues such as
abortion or capital punishment, the government has promoted its own view of morality
through regulations such as "sin taxes, dry-county ordinances, church tax exemptions.
licensing and permit requirements, inheritance laws, child-support laws and other legisla-
tion.' Timothy G. Barrett, Is Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children Worthy of
Stricter Scrutiny Under the Constitution?-The Relationship Benveen State Intestate Suc-
cession Statutes and the Social Security Act in Claims for Child Benefits for Illegitimate
Children, 33 U. OF LOUISVILLE J. OF F~t. L. 79, 99 (1994). Similarly, Professor Bellah
notes that "tax law generally has moral consequences, as does criminal law, family law,
and libel law?' Robert N. Bellah, New Perspectives in the Law, of Defamation: The Mean-
ing of Reputation in American Society, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 743, 751 (1986).
m- Certain acts are said to be victimless not because there are in fact no victims, but
rather, because "the victimization from them is more remote and/or more arguable than in
the case of most other acts defined as criminal. They also involve willing exchanges of
desired goods or services, and it is only rarely that a participant will initiate an enforce-
ment action?' White, supra note 270, at 204.
2 4 Incest and polygamy, for example, are widely viewed as immoral and are therefore
illegal in the United States but are not banned in all cultures. An apt example is under
customary law in South Africa, where the law of polygamy allows male South Africans to
take more than one wife, but does not allow female South Africans to take more than one
husband. See Haroz, supra note 52, at 874. Issues such as gay marriage, sodomy, prostitu-
tion, pornography, and abortion are more hotly debated in the United States, as only some
percentage of the American population views the conduct as immoral. See, e.g., URvAsrt
VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY 20 (1993) ("For the past twenty years, the National Opinion
Research Center's Annual General Social Survey has consistently reported that between 70
and 77 percent of the American public believe that homosexual relations are 'always
wrong' .... []n the eighties, 66 percent to 75 percent of Americans thought homosexual-
ity was immoral; in surveys done in the nineties, 50 percent to 66 percent of those sur-
veyed thought the same?'), cited in Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on
Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. LJ 1871, 1910 n.209
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majority should impose its views of morality on the minority. As a soci-
ety we have not reached consensus on which of those issues has social
costs and to what extent the social costs outweigh the benefits of individ-
ual freedom and choice.
With respect to sexual harassment, many see recent legislative and
judicial attempts at altering workplace interactions as inappropriate leg-
islation of morality. Critics have portrayed excessive legislation of per-
sonal interactions at work as stifling, unhealthy, outdated, hypocritical,
and repressive.275 It is a mistake, however, to discuss the morality of sex-
ual harassment as if it were a victimless crime and to engage in a debate
about whether the behavior itself is natural. Sexual harassment is not a
victimless crime-it inflicts physical, emotional, psychological, and eco-
nomic harm on its victims and society.276 Therefore, it falls in the cate-
gory of immoral behavior that requires government regulation.
Resistance to the proper implementation of new sexual harassment
laws is often fueled by misinformation about the ways in which sexual
harassment can harm its victims. 277 Proving a case of sexual harassment
can be difficult as there are often no witnesses or documentary proof; in
many sexual harassment cases, there is no physical injury and the psy-
chological injury may be more difficult to see.278 In fact, many types of
intimidating or hostile workplace behavior which presumably fall under a
statute's definition of sexual harassment often go unnoticed because the
(1997); Richard L. Gray, Note, Eliminating the (Absurd) Distinction Between Mallon in Se
and Malum Prohibitum Crimes, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1369, 1371 n.15 (1995) (citing opinion
polls to show that "the morality of abortion remains a divisive issue in America").
25 Carl Schneider explains:
Sexual morals have come to connote a narrow, rigid, prudish, restrictive, and re-
pressive regime of outdated ideas hypocritically stated and heartlessly imposed.
"Puritan" and "Victorian" are not complimentary adjectives. They suggest, first,
attitudes toward sexual and thus personal relations that are not just unreasonable,
but in the therapeutic view, actively unhealthy, that inhibit successful sexual and
thus personal exchange, that burden sexual life with guilt, that repress what is
natural, that darken with gloom what ought to be bright with joy. They suggest,
second, moral attitudes that are unwholesome: grim, hypocritical, meddlesome,
censorious, unreasoning, rigid, and harsh. Worse, such moral arguments seduce
their makers into an arrogance that binds them to the error and even immorality of
their position.
Schneider, supra note 235, at 537-38.
27 6 See infra text accompanying notes 280-290.
277 As Justice Marshall said in the context of capital punishment, "American people are
largely unaware of the information critical to a judgment on the morality of the death pen-
alty, and ... if they were better informed they would consider it shocking, unjust, and
unacceptable." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting), Al.
though the death penalty and sexual harassment are radically different issues, the severity
of which need not be compared, it seems that as to the reality of the extent of understand-
ing the problem, an apt comparison could be drawn.278 See infra text accompanying notes 284-290.
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behavior is still perceived as acceptable and normal. 9 People resist
change when they do not understand why the change is necessary.
Legislative efforts will have limited success in curbing sexually har-
assing behavior in the workplace without an understanding of the moral,
economic, and social harm of sexual harassment and, importantly, why it
amounts to sexual discrimination. For companies and courts to take real
notice, they must understand that it is not only the target employee who
is harmed by sexual harassment, but also the community that tolerates it.
The physical effects of sexual harassment on the target employee
are, of course, the easiest to identify. Many hostile work environment
cases involve physical assault or even rape. Sexual harassment often
leads to sexual harassment trauma syndrome,2- 0 which can involve physi-
cal symptoms such as headaches and nausea, or psychological stress
symptoms such as nervousness, fear, or anger.sl Even if a harasser's un-
wanted physical touching does not directly lead to physical injury, per-
mitting such behavior may encourage other physical violence against
women,2 as can exposure to sexually degrading, violent, or porno-
graphic material.3
Often there is injury to the victim that is not as easy to see. Sexual
harassment violates privacy and liberty rights. -  There is a well-
established link between violence and equality that has been reflected in
law and culture since the 1960s.2 Sexual harassment is founded on a
broader structural gender inequality. Sexual harassment is a manifesta-
tion of gendered power relations of coercion and subordination, and ob-
structs women from achieving equality in the workplace.? Not only does
sexual harassment impair an employee's job performance, but often times
it leads to employees being fired or forced to leave their jobs, even if they
do not file a complaint.3 Thus, individual employees who are victims of
279 See Felicity Kaganas & Christina Murray, Law and Women's Rights in South Af-
rica: An Overview, in GENDER AND THE NEv SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER, supra note
31, at 23; BENoRaITrrIs, supra note 3, at 11. In J it A for example, a senior executive w-as
found to have sexually harassed a much older woman by "caressing and/or slapping her
buttocks and fondling her breasts." J v. M, 10 I.L.J. 755 (IC) (1989). Despite this behavior,
he was able to obtain a petition from "all the ladies in the office controlled by him ...
pleading for compassion and stating that they did not feel offended or sexually harassed"
by his behavior. Most likely, those women would not have signed the petition if that be-
havior were viewed as a serious problem. Sutherland, supra note 80.
m Vaughana Macy Feary, Sexual Harassment: Why the Corporate World Still Doesn't
"Get It," in CONFRONTATIONS AND DECISIONS, supra note 164, at 92.
281 d
= Id
mId. at 93.284 Id.
285 See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED VOMEN AND FFnINIST LAWMAKING 4
(2000).
26 Reddi, supra note 31, at 119.
John W. Whitehead, Eleventh Hour Amendment or Serious Business: Sexual Har-
assment and the United States Supreme Court's 1997-1998 Term. 71 TEtP. L. REv. 773.
780 (1998).
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sexual harassment also suffer economic detriment for many reasons. As
explained by one commentator, "[v]ictims of sexual harassment who
change jobs have lower long-term earning capacity; those who remain on
the job may be hampered by their harassing supervisors or may refuse
certain opportunities for advancement in order to avoid harassment""28
Sexual harassment may also "diminish[ ] their professional credibility
and depriv[e] them of the cooperation of colleagues .... By inhibiting
the careers of females in particular, sexual harassment contributes to the
wage gap between the genders."' 9 Finally, sexual harassment may "create
resentment among male colleagues, discourage men in positions of
authority from serving as mentors to women, irreparably damage vic-
tims' prospects from developing warm working relationships with col-
leagues and for expanding their professional networks, and impair their
prospects for securing employment elsewhere" 29 Sexual harassment is
the ultimate reminder to women of their role and status in society as sex
object, homemaker, mother, and caregiver. Sexual harassment prevents
women from achieving positions of authority and serves as an impedi-
ment to political and economic power.
Sexual harassment also has high economic costs for the company
that fails to prevent it, as well as the society that tolerates it. Sexual har-
assment is inefficient for the company which allows it, most obviously
because it can lead to expensive litigation, but also because companies
will bear the economic costs of job turnover, sick leave, and decreased
productivity.291
Evidence shows that this deeper understanding of the harm associ-
ated with sexual harassment has not yet fully occurred in the United
States: "Despite all the recent ballyhoo over sexual harassment in the
workplace, corporate America still doesn't really 'get it' much less un-
derstand how to put an end to it "' 292 This applies to employees, expected
to conform their behavior to the law, as well as employers:
[W]hile the American public knows that there are rules govern-
ing sexual behavior in the workplace, the source of these rules is
largely mysterious. They were authorized through an arcane
process of statutory interpretation by the federal judiciary; their
specific content has been generated largely in various federal
administrative agencies that are run by faceless experts who are
themselves influenced by lawyers and more experts. The gov-
ernment's rules involve immediate and highly intimate matters,
but the authorities who produce these rules, as well as the intel-
2 Id.
zId. at 781.
o Feary, supra note 280, at 95.
291 Id. at 95.
292 Id. at 78.
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lectual processes used by these authorities, are distant and un-
seen. Most people, of course, accept the rules and try to live by
them without much thought about their specific sources. But this
submission involves a degree of fictionalization because the
rules treat intimate matters in ways that do not accord with or-
dinary experience. Some of their main premises-for example,
that the workplace is an inappropriate place for sexual flirtation
or that sexual advances toward women with subordinate status
are inherently exploitative-are widely improbable to most
Americans, as was emphatically demonstrated by the success of
President Clinton's argument that any sexual improprieties be-
tween him and a female intern in his offices were a private mat-
ter. Millions of Americans in workplaces across the country
nevertheless submit to regulations that must seem to them
strange, a mysteriously scripted national account of human
sexuality that has intense psychic significance but that is, in im-
portant respects, unreal.-93
Because of the fundamental lack of understanding of the harm caused by
sexual harassment, the new United States sexual harassment laws have
been widely viewed as unnecessary at best. Many believe that the protec-
tion afforded women is not worth the unintended chilling effect and
creation of an oppressive and stifling environment.:?4 Based on that be-
lief, some employers refuse to respond appropriately to employee's com-
plaints, and some judges think sexual harassment matters do not belong
in court.25
2 Robert F. Nagel, Privacy and Celebrity: An Essay on the Nationalization of Inti.
macy, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 1121, 1137 (2000).
29 4Zalesne, supra note 17, at 366.
295 See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 615, 622 (6th Cir. 1986)
(holding that the plaintiff's "irascible and opinionated personality and her inability to work
harmoniously with co-workers" was the source of her problems, and not the sexually ex-
plicit poster displayed in her workspace and the constant barrage of insults and obscenities
from her supervisor, also holding that the defendants' use of obscenities and the preva-
lently displayed pictures of nude or scantily clad women in many employees' offices "had
a de minimis effect on the plaintiff's work environment when considered in the context of
a society that condones and publicly features and commercially exploits open displays of
written and pictorial erotica at the newsstands, on prime-time television, at the cinema, and
in other public places"); Downes v. Federal Aviation Admin., 775 F.2d 288, 294 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (holding that for conduct to amount to sexual harassment it should "be repeated to
the point where it is 'routine' or 'of a generalized nature"' or "become standard operating
procedure" in the company); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210. 211-12, 213-14
(7th Cir. 1985) (holding that even if all the facts alleged by plaintiff were true, there was
"no evidence whatsoever" that defendant's conduct was "so pervasive or psychologically
debilitating that they affected [plaintiff's] ability to perform on the job:' where plaintiff
alleges that one of her superiors "repeatedly propositioned her, would wink at her and also
suggested he give her a rub-down," and another "slapped her on the buttocks" and "told her
he knew she must moan and groan while having sex"); see generally Casey J. Wood. "In-
viting Sexual Harassment": The Absurdity of the Welcomeness Requirement in Sexual Har-
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Evidence shows that sexual harassment is even less understood in
South Africa. In South Africa, there is a distinct history of employers,
police officers, and judges failing to take claims of sexual harassment
seriously. The Industrial Court's approach to sexual harassment cases, for
example, has, in the recent past, been one of utilitarianism.296 That is, the
court has generally viewed the employer's obligation as one of "capitalist
rationality" rather than one of moral obligation.297 As the Gregory court
noted, in referring to former Industrial Court decisions, "it is conceivable
that the corporate value of the abuser to the organization might so far
outweigh the value of the abused, that it is 'logical' that little or no action
is taken against the former."2 98 For example, in a 1996 case, the court or-
dered only a two-week suspension without pay of a seriously abusive
employee, because of his being "valued by the company both as a skilled
and efficient employee as well as an effective shop steward."299 That court
clearly did not understand the value to a low-level employee, to the com-
pany, and ultimately to the larger society in which it operates, of a toler-
able work environment for all employees.
The Industrial Court showed a similar lack of sympathy toward vic-
tims of sexual harassment in a 1997 case. In Sadulla v. Jules Katz &
Co.100 an employee was fired based on allegations that he had invited a
female employee to watch a pornographic movie with him, described
some of the scenes in the video to her, asked her if she "used her finger
when she gets a sexual urge," and asked her whether she used a vibra-
tor.30' Despite a finding that the employee had, in fact, engaged in such
conduct, the court found that there was no "real victim" since they were
"two willing and consenting adults,"302 noting that it is often difficult to
distinguish between "the real victim and the pretended or ridiculously
hypersensitive victim."3 3 Although the woman indicated that the male
employee's conduct was unwelcome and spurned, the court failed to see
how the complainant was truly victimized. The court felt she had not
adequately indicated her offense at his conduct, and thus refused to pun-
ish the aggressor.
In a more recent case, Gregory v. Russells, Ltd.,304 an employee was
fired for alleged sexual harassment and later reinstated. A female em-
assment Law, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 423 (2000); Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the
Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665, 1672
(1990).
296 See Gregory v. Russells, Ltd., 1999 (20) I.L.J. 2145, 2162 (CCMA).
2W Id.
298 Id.
299See Tiger Wheels Mfg. and NUMSA and D Dikgang & Others, 5 ARB 8.25.10
(1996), quoted in Gregory, 20 I.L.J. at 2162.
'0 18 I.L.J. 1482 (CCMA) (1997).
301 Id. at 1483-84.
m Id. at 1488.
"3 Id. at 1486.
20 1999 (20) I.L.J. 2145 (CCMA).
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ployee complained that he had brought a Hustler Magazine into her
office, asked her to look at it and left it on her desk. When she refused,
he told her "not to act like a fucking virgin." - She also complained he
"grabbed her from behind" and asked her to apply ointment to a sore on
his penis that he had gotten from having sex with an eighteen-year-old
the previous night.306 Despite the fact that the employee denied those
charges, the court believed the victimized employee to be particularly
credible, found most of her accusations to be true,3 and found the male
employee to be guilty of harassment in the form of a hostile work envi-
ronment claim. Considering, among other things, "evidence of his com-
petence as a manager" and his "corporate worth,'"3- the court nonetheless
decided to reinstate him, averring that appropriate sanctions would have
been "a stern reprimand, a final written warning and perhaps psychologi-
cal counseling." Here, the court recognized that harassment had oc-
curred, but failed to see how it harmed the victim.
As the Gregory court pointed out, the history of jurisprudence in
South Africa on the subject of sexual harassment is one of "indulging the
sexual peccadilloes of a senior employee."3 0 In the past, employers and
courts have, for productivity reasons, cared more about pleasing high-
ranking employees than about the well being of more dispensable work-
ers. The Gregory court noted that "strict rules prohibiting sexual inter-
play in the workplace, even that which is found offensive, may interfere
with the productivity of (male) employees used to functioning in a macho
corporate culture' 31' It hardly needs stating that this court did not see the
negative productivity implications of a hostile work environment.
In both cultural examples, because of a lack of understanding of the
real harm of sexual harassment, society permitted such conduct to go
unchallenged. Lack of enforcement of the law tends to legitimize the
prohibited conduct, and ultimately it becomes a societal decision to again
permit such practices.312
30 Id. at 2148.
Id. at 2148-49.
3 Id. at 2155, 2157-58. While finding that the employee did reference a sore on his
penis, the court did not find that he also asked her to apply ointment to the wound. Id. at
2158.
308Id. at 2170.309Id.
310 Id. at 2163.311 Id at 2162.
312 Lack of understanding of the harm of sexual harassment renders it low priority in
many societies. But even to the extent a society has decided that sexual harassment is
harmful and has decided to punish sexual harassers, making that a reality might be difficult
in a country embroiled in war, or other vast social and economic transformation. See gen-
erally Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium
Movement, 73 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1 (2002) (arguing in the context of capital punishment
that "major long-term national event[s], such as war or economic crisis" can distract a
society from issues perceived as less important). In South Africa, for example, many be-
lieve that, given the severe impact of apartheid on the overall well-being of blacks, at this
Harvard Women's Law Journal
C. Political, Economic, and Cultural Impediments to the Full
Understanding and Effective Implementation of Sexual
Harassment Legislation
Law does not exist outside of culture. In order to evaluate properly
the effect of sexual harassment legislation on social behavior in any par-
ticular country, it is first essential to understand the social setting in
which the law functions, including the cultural and historical background
of that country. To be sure, cultural norms, biases, and traditions can of-
ten serve as barriers to the full implementation of sexual harassment
laws. The following Subsections identify cultural impediments to legal
reform in the context of South African and American experiences, and
attempt to use those experiences to facilitate the transition for other
countries facing similar obstacles.
1. Unequal Access to the Law: Socio-Economic and Cultural Limits
to the Full Implementation of Sexual Harassment Legislation
In spite of good intentions for broad protections, law reform does
not mean equality is a reality for most women-the mere enactment of
progressive sexual harassment legislation does not guarantee that it will
be effectively used or that women will fully benefit from it. The effec-
tiveness of any law depends in large part on the ability of the intended
beneficiaries to take advantage of that law. This requires knowledge of
the law, willingness to complain, and financial resources to bring a suit
on the part of the aggrieved. These factors will vary among different
cultures, depending on attitudes regarding litigation and trust in the legal
system, as well as the status women have achieved in the workplace.
Studies show that factors such as gender, race, education level, and
income level affect the probability that a victim will file a lawsuit based
on discrimination in the workplace.313 For example, evidence suggests
point in their history there is rightly more concern with racial equality than with gender
issues. Rene Grawitzky, Companies Warned to Act Against Offensive E-Mail, Bus. DAY (S.
Afr.), Jan. 7, 2000, at 1 (describing "management" as "more concerned at this time with
racial equality," and still "insensitive to gender issues"). And to the extent there is concern
over the treatment of women in South Africa, it involves the rampant physical abuse and
rape. South Africa is a country with alarmingly high rates of crime, racially motivated
violence, and violence against women. See Hope and Fear in South Africa, HINDU, June 2,
1999 (on file with author) ("South Africa has some of the highest rates of murder and re-
ported rape in the world."); S. Africa Police Probing Attack on American, L.A. TItEs, Nov.
13, 2000, at 11; South African Press Association, The Demon of Racism Still Lurks in SA,
Sept. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24056791; Johnson, supra note 10, at 497 (in South
Africa, a woman is killed by her husband or boyfriend every six days and a rape occurs
every 30 seconds). Despite these facts, sexual harassment is considered a low priority,
Accordingly, sexual harassment, especially if it is non-physical, is often tolerated in the
workplace.
313 Michele Hoyman & Lamont Stallworth, Suit Filing By Women: An Empirical
Analysis, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61, 73 (1986).
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that women in the United States are generally less likely to bring a law-
suit than men.314 At least two theories have been advanced to explain this:
"the first theory addresses the inevitable economic and non-economic
costs that the individual incurs upon filing a complaint. The second the-
ory attributes this disparity to the perception which women hold of their
historical and legal status in society, particularly in the workplace.""3
Likewise, African Americans are less likely than whites to bring work-
place discrimination claims because they are less likely to win Title VII
cases, 316 they have less confidence in the United States judicial system,""?
and "black women typically have poor mobility and scarce resources
with which to file a suit."318
In South Africa, women are even more reluctant to assert their legal
rights because of their cultural upbringing to be humble, submissive, and
unassertive. 319 Women are also often reluctant to report violence against
them because of the social stigma, shame and humiliation associated with
such claims, the fear of being ostracized by their families and communi-
ties if they report the harassment, and the fear of reprisal, retaliation, or
loss of employment.
Income level also contributes to the likelihood of filing suit. The
"stakes hypothesis" suggests that "the higher a person's salary, the
greater the likelihood of filing because the person's 'stake' in the out-
come is greater or because they would stand to lose more by not protect-
ing their rights through filing suit."- 0 Also, victims with higher education
levels are likely to file lawsuits more frequently,' - most likely because
314 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Being a Woman, Being a Laisyer and Being Human Be-
ing-Women and Change, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 955; Donna L. Laddy, Can lt'omen Prison-
ers be Carpenters? A Proposed Analysis for Equal Protection Claims of Gender Discrimi-
nation in Educational and Vocational Programming at Women's Prisons, 5 TEMnP. POL. &
Civ. RTs. L. REv. 1 (1995).315Hoyman & Stallworth, supra, note 313, at 62.
316See Ronald Trner, A Look at 7ide Vll's Regulatory Regime, 16 W. NEW ENO. L.
REv. 219,237 (1994).
317See Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification: A Response
to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 109, 119 n.49 (1996) (stating that "a substantial
minority of black Americans have either 'very little' confidence (37%) or 'no' confidence
(7%) in the criminal justice system" (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, 1994 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 171 tbl.2.38 (1995))).
"8 Hoyman & Stallworth, supra, note 313, at 72.
319See Colleen Lowe Moma, Equity Act ill Affect ibnen. Bus. DAY (S. Afr.) Aug.
18, 1999, at 14 (noting that South African girls are encouraged from childhood to be hum-
ble and submissive); Meet an Executive Who Keeps It 7lght, Bus. Tlbs (S. Afr.), Aug. 13.
2000, at 15 (stating that "South African women like to defer"); South Africa-bmen in
Business, NAT'L TRADE DATA BANK MARKET REP., Apr. 23, 1997, available at LEXIS,
Reference Library, Mktrpt File (quoting Sharon Manfred-Trail, general manager of the
Council of South African banks, as explaining that her South African female colleagues
are reluctant to "command respect and demand equality"); Nels' AIDS Weapons. Bus. DAY
(S. Afr.) Mar. 5, 1999, at 15 (suggesting that South African women are "not assertive in
controlling their lives").
3'0 Hoyman & Stallworth, supra, note 313, at 73.
32Id.
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they better understand their legal rights. The type of employment might
also impact a woman's decision whether to sue. In the United States, for
example, workers in kitchens, textile factories, and clerical areas are less
likely to sue their employers "because they lack knowledge of the law;
they do not have adequate access to the legal system; they are more con-
cerned about losing their jobs; or they worry over the length and cost of
the litigation." '322 Finally, people who have experienced a lifetime of
"double discrimination" such as discrimination on the basis of both race
and gender, "may be more likely to produce survival oriented coping
strategies," making them more likely to "continue in the workplace and
remain silent about the harassment.'"3
In South Africa, the most likely victims of sexual harassment are
black women. Women occupy the lowest status jobs and, specifically,
black women sit on the lowest rung of the working ladder.324 "In South
Africa, many black women have little education, time or resources. It is
unrealistic to expect them to know how to write and present comprehen-
sive complaints in legal language.: ' -' Therefore, it is no surprise that the
highly educated, urbanized women in South Africa have benefited most
from legislation like the Employment Equity Act. For example, as Amien
and Paleker noted, "even though the Constitutional Court has been vocal
about its advancement of gender equality, it is noteworthy that the only
litigants who have evoked the equality clause in the Constitutional Court
have been either men or persons of financially privileged backgrounds. '326
One might expect, then, that a high percentage of women subjected to
sexual harassment in South Africa have hesitated and will continue to
hesitate to file a lawsuit.
Cultural attitudes about litigation also play a large role in assessing
the likelihood that a victim of sexual harassment will file a lawsuit. Gen-
erally, the belief prevails that there is an excessive amount of litigation in
the United States, a country often characterized as the most litigious in
the world. 27 In South Africa there are many reasons relating to the judi-
322 Rey M. Rodriguez, The Misplaced Application of English-Only Rules in the Work-
place, 14 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 67, 79-80 (1994).
323 Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the
Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151, 208 (1994).
324 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
325 Beth Goldblatt, A Feminist Perspective on the Law Reform Process: An Evaluation
of Attempts to Establish a Family Court in South Africa, 13 S. AFR. J. ON HuMt. RTs. 373,
398 (1997). For example, in the South African context, it is difficult to imagine a black
female domestic worker taking her white male employer to court for sexual harassment.326 W AHEEDA AMIEN & MOHAMED PALEKER, WOMEN AND THE LAW 6-7 (1988).327 See Dean Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 773
(1977); see also Kent H. Rogers, Civil Wars: Taking a Tough Look at Our Legal System,
and Our Sue Happy Ways, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 16, 1991, at 65 (reviewing WAL-
TER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION ExPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UN-
LEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991)); Gerald Walpin, Civil Justice Systems in Other Democratic
Countries Provide Means to Torpedo the Litigation Explosion Here, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L.
REv. 557 (1997) (reporting that in 1992 "there were twenty million lawsuits filed in state
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cial system and the litigation process that might cause an injured person
to choose not to bring a suit.31 For example, in South Africa the courts
continue to be staffed primarily by men, and "a white male-dominated
court system has contributed to cementing black women's distrust."'-
Many women feel that reporting the problem would be of no use because
of indifference or hostility on the. part of police and judicial authorities.
Also, it has been suggested that "the legal system is currently too embat-
tled with rising crime rates to take gender issues as seriously as it might
otherwise take them."30 Thus, women often prefer alternative dispute
resolution to subjecting themselves to gender-biased courts.'3 '
Most sexual harassment goes unreported in South Africa. Lisa Vet-
ten, Gender Specialist at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Recon-
ciliation, has said that "sexual harassment is one of the most under-
reported crimes, because it was often hard for women to decide if com-
ments or behavior were 'inappropriate'-it is also difficult to know what
one can do about it?' 332 One study of the extent of sexual harassment in
Pretoria found that "a lower reporting rate was recorded among the vic-
tims of sexual harassment than sexual assault' '3 3 Of the women surveyed
who said they had been sexually harassed, only thirty-five percent re-
ported the offense to the police, whereas fifty-seven percent of women
who said they had been sexually assaulted later reported the attack to the
police. Reasons advanced for the failure to report include believing the
crime was not serious enough (eighteen percent), feeling ashamed
(thirty-six percent) and feeling that the police would not be able to help
(twenty-seven percent).331 Although the laws may change some of the
structures and procedures in the courts "many of the problems related to
and federal courts, one for each twelve and one-half persons in this country-; Marcia
Sielaff, Legal Sewer: United States Reigns Supreme in its Litigious Idiocy. PHlOENIX GA-
ZETTE, July 23, 1991, at All (reporting that "America has almost three times as many
lawyers per capita as Britain"); Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Leg-
ends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARiz. L. Rav. 717, 720 (1998) (describing the
widely shared grievances among Americans about "the litigation explosion, undeserving
claimants, excessive regulation, the legalization of life, and the ascendancy of lawyers").
32' See, e.g., Kevin Maler, Twin Cities Stocks Column, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, July
16, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24230200 (suggesting that until recently, South Africans
would not have even considered litigation an option for resolving disputes in many situa-
tions).
329 Romany, supra note 10, at 867.
31 South Africa-Women in Business, NAT'L TRADE DATA BANK MARKET REp.. Apr.
23, 1997, available at LEXIS, Reference Library, llktrpt File.
331 See generally L. Amede Obiora, New Skin, Old Wine: (En)gaging Nationalism.
Traditionalism, and Gender Relations, 28 IND. L. REv. 575, 591 (1995) (addressing an
"African experience").332A Step Too Far, at http://www.iafrica.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2001).
333 ANToINETrE LOUW, INST. FOR SEC. STUDIES, CRIME IN PRETORIA: RESULTS OF A CITY
Vicrmt SURvEY (Aug. 1998), available at http:/wvv.iss.co.za/PublicationsOthesinde.x.html
(summarizing sexual harassment and sexual assault data in Addendum).
334 Id.
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a lack of resources, poor administration and unskilled staff are likely to
continue to hamper people's access to justice in South Africa." '335
The situation in the United States, despite gradual improvements
over the first thirty years, still has a long way to go. As sexual harass-
ment has become accepted by the courts as an actionable claim of sex
discrimination, more and more women have felt comfortable asserting
their legal rights, and as more women enter the workforce and achieve
higher job status, more and more victims have had the financial resources
to bring a lawsuit. Accordingly, sexual harassment claims have increased
quite significantly in the past decade.3 36
But despite increased financial ability of some women to take ad-
vantage of the law, increased awareness of the law, and fairly accepting
cultural attitudes toward litigation, many female employees still fail to
report sexual harassment. 37 One survey showed that women are more
likely to ignore a harassing incident or use informal means of dealing
with the harassment than to report it to the appropriate authority,338 de-
spite the fact that three out of every four respondents knew about the
available channels for formal reporting.339 Reasons given for victims'
failure to report include "(a) positive results were not likely to come of
reporting, (b) the benefits of reporting would not outweigh the repercus-
sions, (c) they had no control over the procedure, (d) their complaint
would be trivialized, and (e) reporting would exacerbate rather than re-
lieve their situation.' '340 These reasons are not unlike reasons given by
many South African women for failure to report. Thus, even in light of
recent Supreme Court attention to the problem of sexual harassment and
335 Goldblatt, supra note 325, at 375.
336 A 1997 study showed that the number of sexual harassment claims filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission increased from 6800 in 1990 to 16,000 In
1997. See 144 CONG. RFc. E1081-82 (daily ed. June 10, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hamil-
ton) (noting that sexual harassment claims have increased as more women have entered the
workforce). See generally Christine Coyne, Anjelino v. New York Times Co.: Granting
Men Standing to Fight Injuries Received as a Result of Sexual Discrimination Towards
Female Co-Workers, 45 VILL. L. REv. 651, 652 (2000).
337 Coyne, supra note 336, at 652-53 n.7; see also Lawton, supra note 216, at 86 (not-
ing that "very few (as low as five percent...) officially report sexual harassment to those
in authority"); John Whitehead, supra note 287, at 778 (noting that "despite popular belief,
sexual harassment is not grossly over-reported; rather, many experts believe that it is un-
der-reported. Only a minority of victims tell someone that they have been harassed").338 Lawton, supra note 216, at 86.
339 Id. at 87.
mid. at 140; see also Whitehead, supra note 287, at 778 (noting that women fail to
report sexual harassment for three general reasons: "First, the workplace climate indicates
the problem will not be taken seriously, so victims fear no one will respond. Secondly,
women are afraid they will be blamed as they have seen others blamed .... Thirdly,
women do not want to hurt the harasser"); Frank C. Morris, Jr., Employment Discrimina-
tion and Civil Rights Actions in Federal and State Courts: Creating a Harassment-Free
Workplace in the Wake of Ellerth and Faragher, SE70 ALI-ABA 117, 128 (2000) (explain-
ing that the "reluctant reporter" is generally a victim of sexual harassment who fails to
report incidences of sexual harassment based on "fear of retaliation, increased harassment,
and/or need for the job").
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consciousness raising over the past several decades in the United States,
many women are still reluctant to assert their legal rights. This trend
should be instructive to other countries with developing sexual harass-
ment laws.
2. Institutional Gender Bias: Inaction and Resistance of Officials
A law's effect on social change depends not only on access to the
law and the content of the law, but also on its interpretation and enforce-
ment. Even the best intentioned law will not have the anticipated effect
on the lives of real people if those called upon to evaluate the underlying
incidents are laden with biases about the crime and its victims.
In the United States, laws protecting women from violence, such as
rape or domestic abuse, have encountered ongoing resistance from law
enforcement and courts.MI In our recent history, judges have frequently
blamed the victim, minimized the severity of the conduct, or denied the
victim's experiences. -42 Courts have often protected sex offenders who
"may have been reacting 'normally' to provocative dress and sexual per-
missiveness 34S and punished rape victims who are viewed as having pre-
cipitated the crime.' Women have been stereotyped as "seductive deceit-
ful temptress[es]" who provoke and are "thus responsible for the violence
against [them]'S 5 Victims of domestic violence are subject to "similar
biases that reflect the long cultural and legal treatment of wives and
women as property."3 6
The examples of gender bias in American sexual harassment juris-
prudence often involve a female plaintiff subjected to severely abusive
behavior, but not vindicated because of her own unsympathetic behavior.
For example, in Reed v. Shepard,
341 See, e.g., Jenny Rivera, Puerto Rico's Domestic Violence Prevention and Interven.
tion Law and the United States Violence Against Wbmen Act of 1994: The limitations of
Legislative Responses, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 78, 125 (1995) (addressing the legal and
political resistance faced by the implementation of the Violence Against Women Act).
12 Norma J. Wfilder, On the Judicial Agenda for the 80's: Equal Treatment for Men
and Women in the Courts, 64 JUDIcATuRE 202, 203 (1980) (noting that there is "over-
whelming evidence that gender-based stereotypes, biases and myths are embedded in...
the attitudes, values and beliefs of some of those who serve as judges").
343 Id. at 206 (citing a Wisconsin case in which the victim was simply wearing blue
jeans at the time she was attacked).
34 See id. at 206 (citing a California case in which a rape victim was said to have in-
vited the rape by hitchhiking).
345NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL JUDGES, AM. BAR ASS'N. JUDGEs' BOOK 68
(1989). One commentator has noted that "such reckless behavior as walking at night.
crossing a park at a certain hour, or talking to a strange man, may be enough to turn a vic-
tim into a co-conspirator in the eyes of the judge:' Terri Villa-McDowell, Privacy and the
Rape Victim: The Inconsistent Treatment of Privacy Interests in Two Recent Supreme Court
Cases, 2 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 293, 328 (1992).
3Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1.41 (1994).
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Plaintiff was ... handcuffed to the drunk tank and sally port
doors, ... subjected to suggestive remarks, ... physically hit
and punched in the kidneys, ... her head was grabbed and
forcefully placed in members' laps, ... a cattle prod with an
electrical shock was placed between her legs, ... she was
placed in a laundry basket, handcuffed inside an elevator, hand-
cuffed to the toilet and her face [was] pushed into the water and
maced.347
The court held that the defendants' abhorrent conduct was "welcome,'
simply because "the plaintiff used vulgar language, told dirty jokes, par-
ticipated in suggestive gift-giving, and sometimes did not wear a bra to
work."348 The court's failure to recognize the violent and abusive nature
of the defendant's conduct reflects its deeper gender-based stereotyped
view of the "type of women" who are victims of sex-related crimes. As
our experience in the United States has shown, "police, prosecutors, and
judges can and do undermine anti-violence legislation and strategies by
disavowing the severity of the violence. '3 9
Gender bias is equally prevalent in South Africa, but uniquely so.
The South Africa Constitutional Court,350 progressive in its treatment of
equality issues, has taken strong feminist positions and has shown par-
ticular sensitivity to all forms of marginalization and exclusion.35' The
34 939 F.2d 484, 486-87 (7th Cir. 1991).
mId.; see also Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., 32 F.3d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir 1994)
(explaining that the trial court found that the plaintiff "welcomed" severely abusive be-
havior through her use of profane language and "crude behavior" in the workplace); Brown
v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 397 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff "utterly failed to
avoid harm" when she "unnecessarily put herself in a situation that permitted repetition of
... the advances"). See generally supra text accompanying notes 343-346.
349 Rivera, supra note 341, at 125.
350 The Constitutional Court "has the last word on the interpretation and enforcement
of the Constitution, while the Supreme Court of Appeal has the final say on all other mat-
ters.' Justice Albie Sachs, Equality Jurisprudence: The Origin of Doctrine in the South
African Constitutional Court, Tenth McDonald Lecture (1998) (edited transcript on file
with author). The Constitutional Court is currently comprised of nine men and two women
(Yvonne Mokgoro and Kate O'Regan). Constitutional Court of South Africa, Judges of the
Constitutional Court, at http:llwww.concourt.gov.zaljudges/index.html (last visited Mar.
12, 2002).
35, Sachs, supra note 350. Justice Sachs notes that:
The main focus of equality jurisprudence is what I would call the human rights
dimension. Equality as we understand it in the contemporary world is associated
with non-discrimination. It is designed to deal with the ways and means whereby
societies marginalise, oppress, diminish, or demean people because they are what
they are.
Id. The test was first established in Harksen v. Lane, where the Court enumerated the fol-
lowing factors for determining whether conduct amounts to unfair discrimination:
(a) the position of the complainants in society and whether they have suffered in
the past from patterns of disadvantage... (b) the nature of the provision or power
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Court's approach to equality is fundamentally different from most coun-
tries,' including the United States,' focusing primarily on "respect for the
equal worth and dignity of all human beings""' - Likewise, South Africa's
Parliament has been particularly sympathetic to gender issues. Since at
least one-third of African National Congress ("ANC")' " members of
Parliament must be women,354 South Africa is now among the top ten
countries in the world with respect to representation of women in Parlia-
ment.355 As a result, women have seen great legislative victories over the
past several years. 356
and the purpose sought to be achieved by it... (c) the extent to which the dis-
crimination has affected the rights or interests of complainants and w hether it has
led to an impairment of their fundamental human dignity or constitutes an im-
pairment of a comparably serious nature.
Harksen v. Lane, 1997 (11) BCLR 1489, 151OF-1511B. The goal of the South African
constitutional order is to achieve equal treatment in a way that "prevent[s] further disad-
vantage" and "remed[ies] the consequences of unfair discrimination endured by already
vulnerable and historically disadvantaged groups:' AMIEN & PALE.ER, supra note 326. at
2. For example, in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice.
1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC), the Constitutional Court found that the common law crime of
sodomy violated the constitution because, among other things, it "constitutes an infringe-
ment of the right to dignity." In President of the Republic of South Africa 1. Hugo, 1997 (6)
BCLR 708 (1997 (4) SA 1) (CC), the Constitutional Court upheld the "Presidential Act"
which ordered the release of, among others, mothers of children under twelve, but not
similarly situated fathers, because the impact of the measure did not undermine human
dignity. Similarly, in Prinsloo v. Van der Linde and Another, 1997 (6) BCLR 759 (CC). the
Court rejected plaintiff's equality challenge based on a statute which treated people living
in non-fire controlled zones differently from people living in fire-controlled zones, because
his dignity was not assailed. See also Brink v. Kitshoff, NO 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (1996 (4)
SA 197) (CC) (striking down a law where the estates of women married to insolvents were
treated differently from the estates of men married to insolvents); Fraser v. Children's
Court, 1997 (2) BCLR 153 (CC) (declaring a statue invalid that said that the consent of
both parents is required for adoption when the parents are married, but only that of the
mother when the parents are not married, recognizing the importance of encouraging pa-
ternal responsibility for and involvement in child-rearing); Larbi-Odam v. Member of the
Executive Council for Education, 1997 (12) BCLR 1655 (CC) (striking down a law that
precluded non-nationals from becoming members of the permanent teaching staff); WYalker
v. Pretoria Municipality, NO 1988 (3) BCLR 257 (1998 (2) SA 363) (CC) (holding that
plaintiff, who argued he was called upon to pay full metered rates for water and electricity
while people living in the Black townships had their rates subsidized, among other things.
was not the victim of unfair discrimination on the basis of race under the circumstances).
3-' Sachs, supra note 350.
353 The ANC is the majority party in South Africa's government. See generally African
National Congress, at http://www.anc.org.za (last visited Mar. 12, 2002).
3-'4 The ANC adopted a quota requiring that one-third of their parliamentarians be
women, which resulted in women comprising one-quarter of the parliament after the 1994
elections. See Zoe Rathus, The New South Africa: Women and the Making of the Constitu-
tion (Jan. 30, 1998), at http://www.womensconv.dynamite.com.aulrathus.htm; see also
Amina Mama, Transformation Thwarted: Gender-Based Violence in South Africa's New
Democracies, AFR. GENDER INsT. NEWSL. (May 2000), available at http'Jlwwwuct.ac.zal
orglagilnewslet/vol6/transf.htm.
35AMEN & PALEKER, supra note 326, at 48.
3-6 See supra notes 243-249 and accompanying text.
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However, despite the unequivocal support at the highest legislative
and judicial levels for gender equality, sensitivity to gender issues is not
the same at the local levels. The "Report on the Audit of Legislation that
Discriminates on the Basis of Sex and Gender" describes inherent dis-
crimination in the local electoral system, in which there is typically no
quota system, just the discretion of political parties.357 As for the court
system, women continue to receive inadequate protection from the lower
courts. In 1998, only one-quarter of court personnel were women, two of
thirty-four chief magistrates were women, and all attorneys general were
men, leaving women distrustful of the criminal justice system.358
Furthermore, evidence shows that South Africa's experience with
rape enforcement is still characterized by gender bias to some degree." 9
In one case, for example, in which a father was accused of raping his
fourteen-year-old daughter,36° the judge suggested that maybe it was the
girl's fault for flirting with her father.361 Charlene Smith, a forty-two-
year-old South African rape survivor relates the following account of her
experience with the police:
Five days after I was raped, the police lost everything. I com-
plained to the minister of police who contacted the commis-
sioner's office, who said there was no such case. The guy was
calling me three or four times daily telling me he loved me,
threatening to return to kill me. I taped the calls. The police lost
the tapes.362
357 Gerntholtz, supra note 43.
358 COMMISSION ON GENDER EQUALITY, A FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSFORMING GENDER
RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 59, 66-67 (Aug. 2000), at http://www.gov.za/reports/2000/
transformation.pdf.319 See Press Release, Human Rights Watch Women's Project & Human Rights
Watch/Africa, Medico-Legal System Fails Women Victims of Violence (Aug. 8, 1997), at
http://www.africapolicy.org/docs97/sa9708.hrw.htm (reporting that "women victims of
rape or assault in South Africa face a criminal justice system that is too often unable or
unwilling to assist them in their efforts to seek redress. The police are frequently callous or
disinterested in their treatment of women and the court system is little better"); Janine
Pokroy, Police Sensitivity to Rape Survivors: Police Perceptions (1999) (abridged A.B.
dissertation, University of Witwatersrand) (reporting findings that "police intervention for
raped women is inadequate and often apathetic and unsympathetic"), available at
http://www.speakout.org.za/legal/police/police-sensitivity.html; South African Press Asso-
ciation Leon Visits Rape Crisis Centre on Cape Flats, WORLD REP., Mar. 27, 2001, avail-
able at 2001 WL 16987780 (reporting, after visit to rape crisis center, that "rape survivors
talked about secondary trauma-the experience of trying to report the crime and find
treatment, support and justice").360 See 7me to Take a Stand, SOWETAN (Johannesburg), Oct. 28, 1999, available at
1999 WL 10804029 (discussing this case, which went to trial in the fall of 1999 in front of
Judge John Foxcroft).
361 Id.
362 What's Happening to the Women in This Country is Genocide, JANE, May 2000, at
153, 154. Other have recounted equally disturbing experiences with the police:
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The Women's Rights Project of the Human Rights Watch has esti-
mated that less than one-third of reported rapes in South Africa are
prosecuted, and among those prosecuted, only half result in convic-
tions.313 When there is a conviction, judicial sentencing is inconsistent
and often lenient.364 Rape victims are often disbelieved, accused of over-
reacting, or blamed because of perceived sexual promiscuity.15 Even if a
rape victim can prove the acts occurred, authorities often respond with
claims that the conduct did not amount to rape, the crime was not serious
enough because the victim lacked any serious injury, or the crime was not
based on violence, but rather sexual gratification.'6
Considering the gender bias that pervades the handling of rape cases
in all stages of the process in South Africa, it is not surprising that reac-
tions to sexual harassment complaints have been even more apathetic.
South African police, busy with issues involving racial violence and
more serious physical violence against women, have not made sexual
harassment a priority. In a survey of women who reported incidents of
sexual harassment to the police, all of them said they were dissatisfied
with the way the police treated them, and half reported that the police did
not investigate their cases.36 The Constitutional Court has not yet de-
cided any cases involving sexual harassment, but many lower courts have
adhered to a similar discriminatory pattern of review. For example, al-
though officially abandoned by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 1998,- s
some courts continue to apply the "cautionary rule" in sexual harassment
cases.369 This rule urges against convicting upon the word of the com-
Last October a fourteen year old girl told a newspaper how she ran to the police
after pouring hot oil over her father who was trying to rape her. After sitting in
the waiting room for hours, she says she was taken by a policeman to a room
where he forced her to lie across two chairs and raped her.
Id Similar stereotypical responses are seen in cases of femicide, where men accused of
murdering their wives are given extraordinarily light sentences because of presumptions
that the husband was provoked. See, e.g., S v. Ramontoedi, Unreported Case No: 188196
Witswatersrand Local Division 23 (June 1996).
6 HUMAN RIGHTS VATCH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN tN SOUTH AFRICA: THE
STATE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIc VIOLENCE AND RAPE 51 (1995), cited in HUMtAN RtITS
YEARBOOK, supra note 34, at 319.
3Id at 322.36 See generally infra notes 380-397 and accompanying text.
36PUTTING WOMEN ON THE AGENDA 103-07 (Susan Bazilli, ed., Ravan Press 1991).
3 See, e.g., Louw, supra note 333.365 See S v. Jackson, 1998 (4) BCLR 424, 430H (SCA) (holding that the cautionary
rule in sexual assault cases is based on irrational and out-dated assumptions).
369 Although the highest court in South Africa abandoned the cautionary rule in 1998,
"it is trite that legal enforcement does not always follow legislative or judicial pronounce-
ments." Penelope E. Andrews, Globalization, Human Rights, and Critical Race Feminism:
Voices from the Margins, 3 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 373, 381-82 n.42 (2000); see also
New Life Sentences for Rapists Welcome, DISPATCH ONLINE (July 27, 1998) (noting that
although the cautionary rule is no longer applied officially, "most of the magistrates are
men .... some were appointed when it was still in place and subconsciously apply it"). at
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plainant, because of the cultural belief that women are "devious and
hysterical"370 and that they habitually lie about sexual offenses.37' Al-
though not officially applying the cautionary rule, the judge in Ngantwini
v. Daimler Chrysler noted that "uncorroborated evidence of a complain-
ant in sexual harassment matters must be approached with great cau-
tion. 372 Likewise, the court in Sadulla required evidence to corroborate
the sexual harassment victim's testimony, because of, among other
things, "hysteria that can cause a neurotic victim to imagine things which
did not happen. 373 The continued application of such stereotypical as-
sumptions validates the notion that women are not rational or credible
witnesses and keeps women from asserting their rights when there are no
other witnesses.
Resistance to sexual harassment law is driven in large part by deeply
rooted gender-based stereotypes and patriarchal notions about women's
sexual roles and roles in the workplace. Despite the consciousness-
raising of the past few years, in most countries women are still expected
to perform particular roles in the workplace and family. This type of
stereotypical expectation is perpetuated by images of women in popular
culture in their traditional roles of nurturers and caregivers. In the United
States, for example, advertisers continue to feature women "spooning
cough medicine to their kids, agonizing over their spouse's diarrhea,
[and] pondering bath tub rings," leaving the impression that "women
seem to live only to cook and clean and please children and husbands."374
Likewise, advertisers in South Africa continue to feature women "as vic-
tims and caregivers, for example, without their broader role being
seen" 375 and women continue to be portrayed in these stereotyped roles
in textbooks and by school teachers.376 "Even educated, successful
women ... face expectations that they will fulfill a traditional role as
obedient, serving wives.' 377
http://www.dispatch.co.za/1998/07/27.
370 Johnson, supra note 10, at 509.
371 See Andrews, supra note 369, at 382 n.42.
3- 9 BALR 1061, 1066 (CCMA 2000).
373 Sadulla v. Jules Katz & Co., 1997 (18) I.L.J. 1482, 1486 (CCMA).
314 Paul Farhi, Another World on Daytime TV- Advertisers Still Stuick in the '50's, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, May 9, 1993, at 1J.
375 Lindsay Barnes, African Media Give Women a Raw Deal, CAPE ARus, June 11,
1998 (on file with author).376 Martineau, supra note 52, at 383.
371 Alexandra Zavis, Hopes Rise for Women's Rights in the New Soath African Gender,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1997, at A32. See also Gail Smith, Just Don't Say "No," MAIL &
GUARDIAN, Dec. 4, 1998, at F2 (stating that South Africa is still "caught up in the mythol-
ogy of the kind, nurturing, caring, selfless mother"); Claire Keeton, South African Women
"A Priority," SoWETAN (Johannesburg), May 7, 1999, available at 1999 WL 10803701
(reporting South Africa's president Thabo Mbeki's statement that "girls were often taught
to be inferior and 'wrong messages' reinforced this, while family socialization did not
encourage them to go beyond their traditional roles in society").
This portrayal of women in their roles as caretakers, nurturers, and mothers is consis-
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Eradication of ingrained gender norms can take generations. In the
United States the Women's Rights Movement has been going on for
many decades, and the cultural history of gender violence in South Af-
rica is even more entrenched than it was here in the United States four
decades ago. "Redefining as unacceptable that which previously has been
acceptable will remain difficult unless society can acquire a different
language, a language that reflects the experiences of those abused. . .
3. Tradition of Violence Against Women and Preexisting Cultural
Nonns as Barriers to Change
As a form of oppression of women, sexual harassment can not be
controlled without an understanding of a culture's history with respect to
violence against women and traditional beliefs regarding male aggres-
siveness.
In South African tradition and culture, violence against women is
endemic. South Africa is a highly male-dominated and patriarchal soci-
ety where women have limited power over their own lives and/or bodies.
Women are often expected to follow gender-based, exploitative practices
that keep them subordinated and powerless. It is a culture of sexual vio-
lence, estimated to have the highest incidence of reported violence
against women in the world.379 One in three South African schoolgirls are
victims of sexual abuse,"' and one in two South African women will get
raped at least once in her lifetime.3 1 There is little evidence to suggest
tent with a deeply entrenched universal conceptualization of women's roles in societies
around the world. For example, Germany has a cultural orientation deeply resistant to up-
setting traditional family roles. See Valeria Fargion. Trning and the Development of Social
Care Services in Europe, W. EUR. POL., Apr. 1, 2000, at 59 (2000). In many South Ameri-
can countries like Peru, "the traditional culture expects women to be submissive toward
men.' Sandra Orihuela & Abigail Montjoy, The Evolution of Latin Aterica's Sexual Har-
assment Law: A Look at Mini-Skirts and Multinationals in Pent, 30 CAL. V. INT' L.J. 326
(2000). Likewise, traditional ideas about women's roles continue to be obstacles prevent-
ing women from advancing in the workplace in most Asian countries. See More 1bnen in
Senior Positions Now, STRArrs TIMES, June 27, 2000, at 30; Korea Suffers Loss of Female
Workers Due to Poor Childcare, KOREA HERALD, Aug. 26. 2000, available at 2000 WL
21234857.
371 Minow, supra note 295, at 1672.
319 See A Rape Occurs Every 83 Seconds in South Africa, AFR. NEws, Dec. 3. 1999 (on
file with author); Michael Dynes, A Nation's Disgrace, TImEs (London), Feb. 12, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 2866220; Corinna Schuler, A Voice Against Rape Rattles South Af-
rica, CHRISTIAN Sci. MoNrroR, OCL 13, 1999, at 1. For example. 51.249 cases of rape
were reported to the police in 1999 alone. See S. A'n. POLICE SERv.. INCIDENCE OF SERI-
OUS CRIME IN SOUTH AFRICA BETWEEN JANUARY AND DECEBIER 1999 (Jan. 2000). at
http://www.saps.org.za/8_crimeinfo/12000/SemesterO l_2000.htm (summarizing 1999
statistics in Annexure A).
m See One in Three Schoolgirls Serually Abused in South Africa, AGENCE FM,\NCE
PRESSE, Jan. 7, 1999, available at 1999 WL 2524994.
3N Charlene Smith, Mbeki's AIDS Stand Intolerable, TORONTO STAR. July 11. 2000 (on
file with author).
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these numbers are decreasing.3 2 South African boys are taught that rape
is "macho," and many view it as "fun" and "harmless. ' 3 3 Girls are taught
that "male violence is the condition against which their rights and free-
dom are negotiated."'3 Sexual abuse is so common that it is discussed in
a casual way, and many adolescents see it as an "expression of love. 3 5
These endemic attitudes stem in part from deeply entrenched cul-
tural norms, such as the belief that "forced sex with your girlfriend is not
rape because she's yours' 386 or the belief that any forced sex with some-
one you know does not constitute sexual violence.38 7 One study showed
that eight of ten young men think that women are generally responsible
for causing sexual violence388 and that women are "asking for it" if they
wear tight clothing. 389 Young girls are even blamed for rapes of eighty-
year-old grandmothers: "After seeing her we are aroused. When you turn
the corner and you see a granny, then you just shove it in.' 319 Another
study revealed that it is a commonly held view in South Africa that men
have "insatiable urges to have sex with an unlimited number of women, '39' a
finding consistent with the common view that "once aroused, a man can-
not control his sexual urges and is not henceforth responsible for his ac-
tions.' 392 In a separate study, one half of the boys interviewed said they
thought "when a girl said 'no' she usually meant 'yes,"' a third of the
boys thought that "girls who were abused were 'looking for it,"' and one
out of ten believed the victims enjoyed the experience.393
The normality of violence against women in South African culture
has also affected women's attitudes about sexual violence. Most women
8 In fact, reports indicate that "the reported incidence of rape and attempted rape in-
creased by 20 percent from 1994 to 1999-though there are serious concerns about the
quality of the statistics" See S. AFR. POLICE SERV., supra note 381.
383 Schuler, supra note 379 (citing a survey of 1500 students from South African black
townships which found that 25% of boys between the ages of twelve and twenty-two con-
sider gang rape to be fun).
3 Gumisai Mutume, South Africa Education: Violent Crime Begins in the Classroom,
INTER PRESS SERV., Feb. 20, 1998 (on file with author) (quoting the report "Gender Equity
in South Africa" submitted by the Gender Equity Task team).3n5Shereen Usdin & Lebo Ramafoko, Callous Normality of Rape in South Africa, AFR.
NEWS, May 7, 1999 (on file with author).386Id.
387 Tom Masland, Breaking the Silence, NEWSWEEK, July 17, 2000, at 32.311 1d. (citing a three-year study released in June, 2000 by Johannesburg's Southern
Metropolitan Local Council).389 Usdin & Ramafoko, supra note 385.
390 Id.
391 Corinna Schuler, A Small Step in Combating AIDS, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov.
24, 1999, at 8 (quoting a study by social psychologist Catherine Campbell published in
1999 in Social Science Medicine, a research journal).392 Usdin & Ramafoko, supra note 385.
393 One in Three Schoolgirls Sexually Abused, supra note 380 (citing a study published
in January of 1999 by a non-government organization). This is also a problem in the
United States, but one that we have been dealing with for the past few decades. See infra
notes 410 - 415 and accompanying text.
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do not believe they have a right to disobey men."9 A study conducted by
CIET Africa, an NGO researching sexual violence, showed that "12% of
young girls do not know they have a right to refuse sex in relation-
ships" 395 or avoid sexual abuse. 96
Many of these widely held beliefs are confirmed by a tradition of
tolerance toward sexual crimes by families of children who have been
raped, who will often accept very small bribes to drop the matter,3, and
by legal authorities, who are known to blame the victim completely or
grant very light sentences.3 9 As stated by Johanna Kistner, a clinical psy-
chologist who runs a counseling program for rape victims and rapists in
Johannesburg, "South Africans have simply become used to employing
violence as a means of resolving conflict or asserting power over oth-
ers."39
9
The United States has experienced a similar history of violence
against women, and it was not too long ago that many of the South Afri-
can beliefs and stereotypes about women and rape were commonly held
here in the United States.4°° Historically, American law has condoned
violence against women. During the nineteenth century, it was a com-
monly held view that a man should be permitted to beat his own wife, so
long as the stick was "no thicker than a man's thumb:' based on the idea
that a husband had the "marital right" to discipline or restrain his wife.,,
By the 1870s, this practice was officially abandoned, but until very re-
cently, courts regularly continued to give wide leeway to husbands in the
treatment of their wives under the guise of preserving the sanctity and
privacy of the marriage. "0 Today, despite the recent enactment of the
Violence Against Women Act in 1994,*10 a reported 12.1 million women
have been raped,' and "[1]ittle suggests that the incidence of rape is de-
creasing.' '4 A shocking 1998 survey of college students revealed that
"one in twelve college men admitted to committing rape. Another study
394 Sarah Ruden, AIDS in South Africa: IVhy the Churches Matter, 117 CHnUSTIAN
CENTuRy 566, 568 (2000).395 Usdin & Ramafoko, supra note 385.
39 Masland, supra note 387.
39 Smith, supra note 381 (noting that "a rapist can pay compensation of as little as S3
to the family whose child he has raped, and the matter ends there").
398 See supra notes 364-365 and accompanying text.
319 Dynes, supra note 379.
0In fact, many would argue that those stereotypical beliefs are still held by many
Americans today. See infra notes 408409 and accompanying text.
401 Lori L. Schick, Breaking the "Rule of Thumb" and Opening the Curtains-Can the
Violence Against Women Act Survive Constitutional Scruainy?. 28 U. TOL. L. REv. 887, 887
(1997).
412 Id. at 888.
41Id. at 891.
411 Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape
Law, 110 HARv. L. REv. 563, 564 (1997).
4Id.
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found forty-three percent of college males reporting that they had en-
gaged in coercive sex" '4 6
The high incidence of rape in the United States is commonly thought
to be a reflection of cultural and social norms that accept gender inequal-
ity and even encourage rape. 07 As in South Africa, the social norms are
based in large part on the familiar myths about rape, such as "women,
motivated by revenge, blackmail, jealousy, guilt, or embarrassment falsely
claim rape after consenting to sex; women fantasize about being raped;
only 'bad' women are raped; and women provoke rape through their ap-
pearance and behavior."8 One comprehensive study of rape in America
showed that "sixty-six percent of one sample group believed that women's
behavior and/or appearance provoked rape. Thirty-four percent believe
that 'women should be held responsible for preventing their own rape.'''419
Stereotypes about women and rape are not the same for all women
across racial lines. In the United States, black women are often stereo-
typed as "naturally voracious" and more likely to have consented to sex,
than white women.410 Black rape victims are also more likely to be seen
as having suffered little harm from a sexual assault because of their per-
ceived sexual experience. 41' Further, "if a Black woman is poor, addicted
to drugs or alcohol, or involved in prostitution, she does not have a
prayer that her charges of sexual assault will be taken seriously. '412 Many
black victims' claims of rape have been disbelieved for those reasons,
413
406Id. at 576.
40See id. at 577-78, 582 (noting that men "rape in conformity with, rather than in de-
viance from, social norms"); see also Christina E. Wells & Erin E. Motley, Reinforcing the
Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation, 81 B.U. L.
Rav. 127, 158 (2001) (noting that "men who rape have simply internalized certain cultural
and sex role norms").
40s Wells & Motley, supra note 407, at 148-49. Morrison Torrey summarizes the myths
about rape which have been popularly believed in American culture:
[W]omen mean "yes" when they say "no"; women are "asking for it" when they
wear provocative clothes, go to bars alone, or simply walk down the street at
night; only virgins can be raped; women are vengeful, bitter creatures "out to get
men"; if a woman says "yes" once, there is no reason to believe her "no" the next
time; women who "tease" men deserve to be raped; the majority of women who
are raped are promiscuous or have bad reputations; a woman who goes to the
home of a man on the first date implies she is willing to have sex; women cry rape
to cover up an illegitimate pregnancy; a man is justified in forcing sex on a
woman who makes him sexually excited; a man is entitled to sex if he buys a
woman dinner; [and] women derive pleasure from victimization.
Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in
Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1013, 1015 (1991).
40 Baker, supra note 404, at 587.
41o Stacey P. Dougan, With Justice for Whom? The Presumption of Moral Innocence in
Rape Trials, 71 IND. L.J. 419,437 (1996).
411Y Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. Rev.,
1261, 1294 (2000).412Dougan, supra note 410.
413 For example, in one case, a juror argued for an acquittal of a man accused of raping
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and these myths "play an important role in the way judges, jurors, and
others perceive testimony in rape trials" in the United States.' 4
Violence against women succeeds in the workplace because of une-
qual power relations between the sexes in the typical workplace hierar-
chy. Power disparities are typically the result not of "nature or evolution,
but societies which, through legislation and social custom, have made
women second-class citizens.' 415 Such a cultural reality will undoubtedly
have a grave impact on a country's sensitivity to sexual harassment law.
4. Prudish or Promiscuous?: Cultural Attitudes About Sex and tire
Effect on Perceptions of When Sexual Harassment Has Occurred
Since sexual harassment laws prohibit sexual behavior in the work-
place, a society's attitudes about appropriate sexual behavior will sharply
affect its approach to the legislation. Compared to most other Western
societies, Americans have typically been viewed as more prudish about
sex,416 often described as having "puritanical,"41 7 "conservative"4 18 and
"reserved 419 attitudes about sex. Stringent sexual harassment laws are
a young African American woman "on the grounds that a girl her age from 'that kind of
neighborhood' probably wasn't a virgin anyway." Taylor-Thompson, supra note 411, at
1294. Another juror told researchers, "Negroes have a way of not telling the truth. They've
a knack for coloring the story. So you know you can't believe everything they say." Id.
414 Schick, supra note 401, at 889 n.16.
415 Vetten, supra note 2.
416 See, e.g., James R. Petersen, Playboy's History of the Sexual Revolution, Part IX:
1980-1989-The Great Repression; History of Sexual Attitudes, PLtYBOY, Apr. 1, 1999
(on file with author) (describing a sexual counterrevolution under way in America. where
"casual sex, spontaneous sex, [and] enthusiastic sex all were signs of irresponsibility").
417 See, e.g., The Place of Pornography, HARPER'S, Nov. 1, 1984. at 31 (referencing the
comment of Al Goldstein, the publisher of Screw, that our society has long been dominated
by "puritanical attitudes about sex"); Roger Cohen, Germany's Top Se Businesswoman
Hopes to Seduce U.S. Market, INT'L HERALD TjUs., Feb. 17, 2000, at 1 (describing the
founder of a German erotic corporation's perception that the American market is "basically
so conservative,' as well as the founder's shock at the "puritanical streak that is much
stronger than in Germany"); Abigail Caope Saguy, Puritanism and Promiscuity? Sexual
Attitudes in France and the United States (1997) (unpublished paper presented at the East-
ern Sociological Society, on file with author) (contrasting the "puritan United States" with
the "Gallic or promiscuous French").
418 See, e.g., Fred A. Minnigerode, Attitudes Toward Homosexuality: Feminist Attitudes
and Sexual Conservatism, 2 SEX ROLES 347, 351 (1976) (positing that our society's wide-
spread conservative attitude about sex contributes to homophobia); Avedon Carol, Don't
Get Fooled Again: Assailed in Britain, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 183, 189 (1993) (suggesting
that our society's widespread conservative attitude about sex leads to acceptance and pos-
sibly encouragement of rape and domestic violence); Jessica Arons, Misconceived Laws:
The Irrationality of Parental Imolvemnent Requirements for Contraception, 41 W,I. &
MARY L. REv. 1093, 1129 (2000) (stating that teenagers have more conservative attitudes
about sex than in the recent past); The Edge with Paula Zahn (Fox News Network televi-
sion broadcast, Mar. 22, 2000) (presenting interview between Hugh Hefner and Paula
Zahn, in which Hefner remarked, "I think we remain, quite frankly, a very conservative
and Puritan people [in reference to] our attitudes towards sex").
419 See, e.g., HBIMELFARB, supra note 234, at 10 (contrasting the "relatively reserved
... bohenianism" of Greenwich Village with Bloomsbury, which was "flagrantly promis-
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seen by critics as attempts to "stomp out people's fun," and have been
referred to as causing the "desexualization of the United States" '420 Con-
versely, in many countries, sexual flirtation is viewed as second nature. 2
In these countries, suggestive remarks and flirtatious behavior in the
workplace are often considered harmless, 42 and generally "the concept of
sexual harassment is widely perceived as a Western plague that threatens
to spoil the 'natural' relations between men and women "' 423 Accordingly,
understanding a country's social climate and its attitudes and customs
about sex and flirtation is deeply critical to the evaluation and under-
standing of the effect of sexual harassment laws regulating conduct in the
workplace. 4
The balance between freedom of expression and social control,
which has been so difficult to find in the United States, might prove even
cuous").42oTanya Martinez Shively, Sexual Harassment in the European Union: King Rex
Meets Potiphar's Wife, 55 LA. L. REv. 1087, 1145 (1995) (citing Alan Riding, Harassment
or Flirting? Europe Tries to Decide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1992, at A8); see also Vivienne
Walt, Regarding Sexism on the Job, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2000, at GI (observing "in the
popular media and in innumerable caf6 conversations, American workplaces are portrayed
as humorless prisons"). Although these types of stereotypes are, of course, quite imprecise,
they may still have a germ of truth to them. Even if they are not altogether true, it remains
relevant to know whether they are still perceived as true. For example, in the United States
there is a sense that our prudish attitudes about sex have been changing in recent years.
See, e.g., HIMMELFARB, supra note 234, at 120 (referring to the "Europeanization" of
American sexual attitudes); Eric Harrison, The SEX Revolution, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 12,
1999, available at 1999 WL 23997581 ("[I]n mainstream Hollywood movies, portrayals of
sex have reached the point where serious actors in serious films no longer must decide
simply whether they'll go nude. Now the question is whether they'll bury their faces in
someone's crotch and, if so, then for how long and with the camera at which angle."). But
many people most likely still continue to believe that Americans are generally prudish, and
this stereotype probably continues to inform other countries' attitudes about our laws
regulating sexual behavior.
421 For example, in France, "eroticism has helped to define the country." Walt, supra
note 420 ("When one thinks of France, certain images spring to mind.., the French lover,
whose seductive skills have long seemed as much a birthright as a good Bordeaux."). See
generally Saguy, supra note 417, at 5 (describing the "high value the French have accorded
to the expression of sexuality and seduction in social life"). In Italy, "flirtatious banter is
considered a natural part of male-female relationships:' See Protocol Counts: Tone It
Down, Americans, a Familiar Western Welcome Could Prove Overwhelming to These In-
ternational Visitors, RocKY MTN. NEWs, June 15, 1997, at 10W (citing "Protocolorado"
guides for several nations for the Colorado International Trade Office). In Russia, physical
contact is the norm. Id. ("Russians stand closer to people than Americans do."). Mexican
men are often known for their machismo. Cecilia Rodriguez, Muy Macho: A Latina and a
Gringa Consider the Animal in Its Mexican Lair, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 6, 1992, at 49.
422 Needless to say, it is typically the men that see such behavior as harmless, However,
many women, conditioned to living under these conditions, also do not see the harm in
such behavior.
423 Orihuela & Montjoy, supra note 377, at 323, 325 (citing Ladka Baverova, Czech
Poll: Harassment of Women Is Common, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2000, at A7). In Czechoslova-
kia, for example, sexual harassment is considered "a stupid invention of hysterical Ameri-
can feminists" and in many South American countries, "if a boss grasps a female em-
ployee by her shoulders ... it might just be considered 'graceless paternalism."' Id.
4 2A Within a multi-cultural society, as well, cultural differences in attitude about sex
might also affect the perception of whether sexual harassment has occurred.
[Vol. 25
2002] Sexual Harassment Law in the U.S. and South Africa 213
more problematic in a country with South Africa's cultural history. Dur-
ing the years of apartheid, South Africa was a country with "an official
code of sexual behavior rooted in conservative Afrikaner Christianity."' 2
Sex was completely banned across race lines under the Prohibition of
Mixed Marriages Act,42  which prohibited marriages between "whites"
and "non-whites," and under the Immorality Act,4- which prohibited,
among other things, sexual intercourse between "whites" and "non-
whites:' 418 Not only were gays and lesbians considered indecent and im-
moral,429 but the country legally sanctioned discrimination against them,
with anti-homosexuality laws found in each of its legal traditions.""'
Legislation made it illegal for a male to commit "any act which is calcu-
lated to stimulate sexual passion or to give sexual gratification" to an-
other male,431 and the common law punished "sodomy, frottage, mutual
masturbation, and 'other unnatural sex offences' between men.- --- Con-
tinuing in a tradition of sexual intolerance, erotica and pornography of all
kinds were also completely banned.433 The old Afrikaner regime "frowned
on public dancing, banned TV until 1976[r 4] and enforced more than 100
censorship laws in an Orwellian attempt to protect strict Calvinist moral-
ity and white supremacy."435
425Bill Keller, New Freedom in South Africa Brings Easing of Sexual Taboos, N.Y.
Tams, Jan. 15, 1995, at A25; see also Amanda Gouws & Lourens M. du Plessis, The Re-
lationship Between Political Tolerance and Religion: The Case of South Africa, 14 EaIoRY
INT'L L. Rv. 657 (2000) (arguing that the three Afrikans churches heavily influenced
South African law under apartheid); Johan D. van der Vyver, State-Sponsored Proselytiza-
tion: A South African Experience, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 779 (2000) (arguing that sepa-
ration of law and religion in South Africa was largely a myth).426 See Gouws & du Plessis, supra note 425, at 661 n.l I (citing Prohibition of Mixed
Marriages Act 55 of 1949).427 See id. (citing § 16 of Immorality Act 23 of 1957).
428 Id
419 See Eric C. Christiansen, Ending the Apartheid of the Closet. Sexual Orientation in
the South African Constitutional process, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 997, 1000 (2000)
(noting that there were often "virulent anti-gay sentiments among both Africans and Afri-
kaners"); Graeme C. Reid, It Takes Faith to Make Church: Gay and Lesbian Christian
Proselytizing in South Africa, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 613, 625 (2000) (noting that the
African Christian Democratic Party had argued that "homosexuality was both unafrican
and unchristian").430 Christiansen, supra note 429, at 1019.
431 See Gouws & du Plessis, supra note 425 (citing Immorality Act 23 of 1957).
432 Christiansen, supra note 429, at 1019 n.84 (quoting Pierre de Vos, On the Legal
Construction of Gay and Lesbian Identity and South Africa's Transitional Constitution, 12
S. AR. J. Htmi. RTS. 265, 274-75 (1996)).433 See Bob Drogin, In South Africa Freedom Is a Cultural Revelation, L.A. TIwEs, Jan.
5, 1996, at Al; Robert L. Berner, WORLD LITERATURE TODAY, Jan. 1, 1998, at 192 (rc-
viewing MARGREET DE LANGE, THE MUZZLED MusE: LITERATURE AND CENSORSHIP IN
SOUTH AFRICA (1997)); Judith Matloff, As Porn Proliferates, South Africa Debates Free
Speech, CRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 8, 1997, at 5.
434 And after 1976, "even a hint of nudity was banned on television." Matloff. supra
note 433.43S Drogin, supra note 433.
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Since the 1994 election, there has been a "rapid relaxation of the
sexual taboos enforced by the old order. 436 As discussed above, the
country's new Constitution is among the most progressive and tolerant in
.the world, prohibiting discrimination against anyone on seventeen sepa-
rate grounds including pregnancy, marital status, and sexual orientation,
and distinguishing between sex and gender as two separate grounds of
discrimination. 437 New progressive laws have opened the door for a
revolution of sexual mores.
The new South Africa is now sexually permissive, with a booming
and still growing sex industry. Although not supported by national con-
sensus, 438 there has been a "proliferation of sex clubs and erotic caba-
rets;,439 and nightclubs and restaurants are known to "offer everything
from topless waitresses to jelly or oil wrestling and live sex shows. '44°
Sexually explicit films and magazines have been unbanned 441 and have
become "more risqu6,''442 while pornography is flourishing. n3 Full frontal
nudity is now being allowed, whereas prior to 1994, "photographs of fe-
male breasts couldn't be published without a censor's star covering the
nipples."44 Newspapers are now filled with "lurid ads for prostitutes,
massage parlors, and escort services," '5 and brothels, and hard-core adult
book and video stores are opening even in the most respectable neigh-
borhoods."6 The sex trade, though still technically illegal, is also
flourishing. 47 The police have eased up on sex-related crimes, and at one
436 Keller, supra note 425.
437 See § 9 of Constitution of Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.
438 For example, the moral right, whose agenda is "to ensure that the Christian ethos of
sex in marriage is maintained," has "serious problems" with the new sexual freedom. PoR-
NOGRAPHY IN SOUTH AFRICA: DRAFT PAPER FOR SADC CONFERENCE % 3.5 (Mar, 1998),
at http:llwww.sn.apc.orglsadcpvaw/papers/porn.html. They argue that pornography"makes sex dirty and easy." Id. Alternatively, some feminists claim that pornography leads
to violence against women.
These feminists focus on dehumanisation and the sexualization of brutality in a
context that suggests endorsement or approval of such behaviour. They claim that
pornography is a form of discrimination based on sex. It focuses on the presenta-
tion of women dehumanised as sexual objects, being raped, or physical hurt or in
postures of subordination.
Id. 3.8. The feminist objections to pornography typically have nothing to do with moral-
ity or religious values. Id. 3.5.
439 Keller, supra note 425.
410 See Puritans Out: Sex and Gambling In, S. AFR. Bus. INTELLIGENCE, Nov. 3, 1995,
at 1.
441 See, e.g., id.; Wells, supra note 30; Drogin, supra note 433; Matloff, supra note
433.
442 Keller, supra note 425 (quoting statement of Daniel Morkel, the chair of the appeals
board that is the highest censorship authority).
"43 Wells, supra note 30.
"4 Wells, supra note 30; Drogin, supra note 433.
445 Drogin, supra note 433.
"6Id.
47 Wells, supra note 30; see also Andrew Maykuth, Prostitution Explodes in Cape
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point, South Africa was even considering decriminalizing prostitution.
This movement to "free the national libido" 19 has been called the "sec-
ond liberation movement?'45
The recent sexual revolution in South Africa could have anomalous
effects on the enforcement of the sexual harassment law. The country has
experienced a history of deprivation and is now making up for it. The
"dizzying pace of change"'45' in South Africa since the end of Apartheid
could, however, lead to confusion about appropriate sexual behavior, and
many feminists and anti-porn activists believe it could contribute to an
increase in sexual violence.452
Generally a more liberal sexual climate will promote more promis-
cuous behavior in the workplace, and sexual behavior in the workplace
can contribute to a hostile work environment. If a society (particularly
men) views legislation against any sexual or flirtatious behavior in the
workplace as inconsistent with their culturally bestowed sexual freedom,
it could lead to resentment of the law. These cultural attitudes about sex
are likely to seriously influence interpretations of sexual harassment leg-
islation.
m1I. CONCLUSION: FACILITATING THE TRANSITION FROM LEGAL
STANDARDS TO SOCIAL NORMS
There are three basic ways in which a law can alter social behavior.
First, the law can coerce change by penalizing individuals who do not
follow its mandates. Second, the law can serve as a meter by which be-
havior is judged in a society. In this manner, the law can cause individu-
als to alter their behavior in order to be recognized by society as good.
Third, the law can serve as an impetus for education about right and
Town, SEATTLE Thms, Dec. 12, 1999, at A30 (noting that "prostitution has proliferated
like never before").
44 In 1997, the Gauteng Province submitted a proposal to the national government to
decriminalize prostitution in hopes that it will influence changes to the Sexual Offenses
Act of 1957 which makes prostitution illegal in South Africa. See Gumisai Mutume, South
Africa: Gauteng Province Decriminalizes Prostinution, INTER PRESS SRM., Nov. 7, 1997,
available at 1997 WL 13257515. The African National Congress, at its national confer-
ence in 1997, supported the Gauteng initiative. See SEx WORK: DECR.%uNAUZATrON (Mar.
1998), at http:llwww.sn.apc.orglsadce-pvaw/paperslsexwork.html (SADC conference paper
presented by Sylvester Rakgoadi, Secretariat for Safety and Security, Gauteng Province).
In 1998, however, the Gauteng provincial government "quietly shelved plans to decrimi-
nalize prostitution, fearing a backlash from conservatives . Major News Items in
Leading South African Newspapers, XINJUA ENG. NEwswiRE, July 21. 1998 (on file with
author). The current law against prostitution has been criticized as highly discriminatory,
as only the sex worker is prosecuted, but not the pimps or buyers of sex. See Revolutionary
Country, supra note 27, at 18A.
49 Keller, supra note 425.4
5 Id.451 Drogin, supra note 433.
452 See, e.g., Maykuth, supra note 447.
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wrong, ultimately influencing a change in behavior because of an indi-
vidual belief about the morality of the behavior.
Each of these steps is critical to the eradication of workplace sexual
harassment. First, and most simply, governments must enact legislation
which recognizes sexual harassment as an impediment to workplace
equality and penalizes those who engage in sexually harassing behavior.
Second, the law must be viewed as having external legitimacy-it must
be seen as reflecting a majority cultural perspective so that companies are
convincetl that adherence to the law will be to their reputational, and
therefore economic, benefit. Finally, in order for the statute to be truly
effective as law, there must be individual moral acceptability, so that em-
ployers and employees cease to engage in the regulated conduct even if
they could derive some benefit from it because they believe the behavior
to be morally wrong.
The United States, South Africa, and at least thirty-eight other
countries around the world, have, in fact, enacted legislation that penal-
izes individual employers for fostering a hostile work environment. In
many countries, victims of sexual harassment can now recover damages
(including punitive damages) for wrongs occurring in the workplace, and
employers can be held responsible for the actions of their employees.
Stringent global sexual harassment laws have encouraged many compa-
nies to develop sexual harassment policies and to train and educate em-
ployees about the hazards of sexual harassment and how to avoid liabil-
ity. Undoubtedly, sexual harassment laws have brought the issue into our
collective consciousness and have managed to alter behavior in certain
cases.
But sexual harassment flows from the culture of a workplace, and
corporate policies alone cannot produce a significant change in culture.
Legal norms have no effect unless individuals and communities attempt
to integrate them into their everyday lives. Integration will not occur if
the law is perceived as lacking legitimacy. The next step, then, is to edu-
cate the public about the law and why it is necessary to achieve justice in
the workplace.
Legal education must occur on several levels. First, the law will have
no effect if intended beneficiaries do not understand their rights and do
not know how to go about asserting them. Accordingly, education must
start with detailed analysis of the law so that employees understand the
type of conduct prohibited and the procedural mechanisms for filing a
grievance. Education must also include teaching individual employees
about the legal and economic consequences of engaging in sexual har-
assment, and teaching employers about the legal and economic conse-
quences of condoning sexual harassment. Employees must be convinced
that the law has legitimacy in the workplace environment, so that victims
will not fear making a claim and perpetrators can expect action to be
taken against them. Even where a law prohibits behavior, a harassing
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employee may continue to engage in the prescribed behavior if he gains
the benefit of community tolerance and acceptance. Companies can con-
trol such a downward spiral by making it clear that sexual harassment is
not condoned, and making it more likely that an employee will be criti-
cized and even ostracized for engaging in such behavior. This, in turn,
requires the company's desire for larger community acceptance. The
company itself must be convinced that the law has a broader cultural le-
gitimacy, so it is encouraged to conform to social norms. The employer
must realize that bad press on the issue of sexual harassment could have
economic implications as societies come to recognize the wrong of sex-
ual harassment.
Employer attention and respect, popular culture, and the media can
all influence the perception of sexual harassment laws. Employers have
influence over how employees react to a workplace policy, popular tele-
vision shows and music can raise consciousness on relevant social issues,
and the media, which generally has the power to popularize a correct at-
titude toward women, certainly can be used as a tool to promote gender
equality. Yet employers or media alone (or together) cannot alter public
perception about sexual harassment, if those sources do not have a clear
understanding of its true physical, psychological, emotional, and eco-
nomic harm. Ultimately, to effect real change, companies' responses to
the law must be based on more than a fear of liability-there must be
actual disapproval of sexual harassment, and that disapproval must be
communicated to employees.
While anti-discrimination laws have the power to provide remedies
for discriminatory behavior and to signal the conduct that a society does
not tolerate, they do not necessarily have the fundamental power to alter
the underlying sexist attitudes that cause the discriminatory behavior. On
a general level, social change will not occur without the abandonment of
deep-rooted notions about what type of behavior is culturally acceptable.
This demand calls for "moral education" as well as legal education.'" In
order to eviscerate the sexism, society must be taught the basic principle
that all people are created equal. Educational programs must teach those
in power that "sexual harassment is morally wrong and why they have
ethical responsibilities to eliminate it.' 4'
The manner in which different countries go about moral education
will vary, depending on cultural attitudes about sex, gender relations,
violence against women, and economic entitlement. However, through
case studies of the United States and South Africa, two countries with
radically different cultural and social histories, I hope to illustrate that
almost any country will experience economic, political, and cultural
5I Parker, supra note 255, at 33 (noting that "it is better to teach people that they
shouldn't discriminate at all, than the ins and outs of the law").4 Feary, supra note 280, at 84.
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limitations on the effective implementation of law. In the United States,
for example, the hard fought victories won with the recent Supreme
Court attention to sexual harassment have seen a substantial backlash.
Similarly, for the short period of time since the promulgation of the Em-
ployment Equity Act in South Africa, the country continues to experi-
ence significant levels of violence against women in the workplace, and
South African women continue to have little economic independence.
Both countries fight racism and sexism on all levels, in all social con-
texts, and across all class levels. But to achieve the desired impact of
sexual harassment law ultimately requires that deeply entrenched gen-
dered power imbalances be eradicated. This calls for social education
starting in the family: teaching young boys, for example, that men and
women are of equal value. Education and awareness, the keys in chang-
ing belief systems, must also include educating and training police,
prosecutors, court officials, and judges, as well as employers, about gen-
der sensitivity and the immorality of sexual harassment.
Additionally, if sexual harassment does occur, women must have
greater access to redress in the courts, and sexual harassment litigation
must become an acceptable means for women to speak out. To accom-
plish this, women need a greater understanding of their rights and status
in the workplace, and women's experiences need to be more visible to
judges. The most progressive laws will have no effect if victims are not
able to take advantage of them.
Countries must also look beyond consciousness raising to other
more concrete mechanisms of enforcement. Women with the same career
expectations as men45  still face many obstacles to equality in the work-
place. In many countries, though, legal barriers are no longer the main
cause of these inequalities. Women around the world still bear a large
majority of the homemaking and child rearing responsibilities, 456 and em-
455Not all women aspire to "increased participation ... in the public world of careers
and political power." Denise Meyerson, Sexual Equality and the Law, 9 S. AFR. J. ON HuM.
RTs. 237, 252 (1993). In South Africa, for example, some feminists argue,
[I]t not only implies that women who want recognition and security must behave
like men, but also that it leaves the meritocratic structure of society intact, merely
holding out the hope to white middle class women that they may come to enjoy
the same opportunities, status and privileges as white middle class men. Since the
vast majority of women have no chance of making it into the boardroom, these
feminists would prefer to see the traditionally feminine pursuits rewarded with
dignity and financial security.
Id.
456 See, e.g., Rebecca Sultana, Womenomics' Might Be Best for Moving Up in the
Changing World, INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 16, 1999, available at 1999 VL 11578182
(noting that "from New York to Tokyo, women still bear most of the burden of housework
and childcare"); Equal Opportunity in the Workplace, CHINA NEWS, Nov. 4, 1999 (on file
with author) (noting that in Taiwan, "women are also frequently saddled with the extra
burden of child-rearing, housework, and caring for elderly relatives"); Elizabeth Brainerd,
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ployers still expect that employees should have no family commitments
that interfere with full-time work.457 These expectations and traditions, of
course, make it vastly more difficult for women to compete with men for
jobs. As Justice Goldstone of the South Africa Constitutional Court
noted, "The result of being responsible for children makes it more
difficult for women to compete in the labour market and is one of the
causes of the deep inequalities experienced by women in employ-
ment.... It is unlikely that we will achieve a more egalitarian society
until responsibilities for child rearing are more equally shared."' -1 As
more women enter the workplace, working conditions must also be im-
proved for women. Labor markets that are geared to workers without
children or child-care responsibilities (typically male workers) must be
changed.459 This means institutional changes such as "more flexible work
schedules, increased status for part-time work, job-sharing, adequate
leave for reasons of child-care " ' and an improved level of social assis-
tance for child support. Women in the United States and around the world
still face marginalization and wage discrimination. There must be im-
provement in women's access to education, and women must be trained
in skilled professional and managerial work."
While litigation plays an important role in eradicating workplace
harassment, it does not necessarily occupy the main foucs. A shift away
from litigation to the involvement of public bodies such as unions and
other employee organizations might be more empowering to victims, who
tend to lack power in the criminal justice system. While laws may serve
Women in Transition: Changes in Gender Wage Differentials in Eastern Europe and the
Former Soviet Union, 54 INDUS. & LAn. REL. REV. 138, 140 (2000) (noting that women do
the "bulk of the housework" in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union); Australian
General News, AAP Newsfeed (ABC Radio broadcast (AM program), Oct. 28. 1999) (not-
ing that in Australia women do "more than twice the housework" as men); M. Brockerhoff
& P. Hewett, Inequality of Child Mortality Among Ethnic Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa,
BULL. WoRLD HEALTH ORG., Jan. 2000, at 30 (noting that generally in Africa women carry
the heavy responsibility of childrearing); Marcela Valente, Rights.Argentina: An Eight
Hour Day, But No liages or Benefits, INTER PRESS SERV., Feb. 9, 2000, available at 2000
VL 4089786 (noting that in Argentina "many women work nearly eight hours a day. seven
days a week" as homemakers, and even women who work outside the home often "dedi-
cate an average of four hours and 17 minutes a day to domestic responsibilities"); With AM
Family Report Stress, CAN. PRESS NEWSWIRE, May 19, 2000, available at 2000 WL
22517595 (reporting on a study released on Canadian families showing that Canadian
women still do more "housekeeping, child and elder care [than men) whether they were
single or married, mothers or childless"); Cherry Norton, Forget the Gadgets: Housework
Today Is as Tough as It Was 60 Years Ago, INDEPENDENT (London), May 5, 2000, at 11
(noting that in London, women do an average of thirty-five hours a week of housework,
while men do an average of five hours a week).457 See, e.g., Meyerson, supra note 455, at 251-52.
458 President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR 708, 7271-7281B
(CC).459 For example, there are still largely inadequate child-care facilities in South Africa.
Meyerson, supra note 455, at 251.
60 Id. at 253.
6 See generally AmIEN & PALEKER, supra note 326, at 9.
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as a deterrent and litigation may provide an important avenue of recourse
for some people, working communities need to get involved at a more
fundamental level. In South Africa, for example, black industrial labor is
highly organized 62 and the trade union movement has more clout and
public influence than here in the United States. However, agricultural and
domestic workers, and others engaged in casual forms of employment,
have only recently organized. 463 These workers need to organize to ac-
complish real change, such as improved social security benefits and job
security. And of course, women themselves must take responsibility to
"organize and develop their own skills. " 64 Such empowerment will help
lead to equality in the workplace, which is necessary for women to be
able to realize economic independence and free themselves from the cy-
cle of workplace violence.
For sexual harassment law to be effective, reform efforts must be
aimed at all three modes of altering social behavior, so that factors like
education, media, cultural attitudes, and workplace policies reinforce,
rather than undercut, enforcement of sexual harassment legislation. The
experiences of the United States and South Africa demonstrate the need
for advocates to focus on the perceived legitimacy behind change. Only
with widespread support can society realize the impact promised by sex-
ual harassment law.
462 See, e.g., C. Matthew Smith, The Right of Revolution: Black Trade Unions, Work-
place Forums, and the Struggle for Democracy in South Africa, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 595, 597 (2000) (noting the "historical role of black trade unions in the inner turmoil of
the apartheid era and in that hegemony's eventual demise").
463 See, e.g., GENDER AND POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRiCA: DoMEsTIc vORKERS, at
http://www.pressroom.com/-hbhamilton/sa-gender.htm (last updated Mar. 3, 1998) (noting
that "although domestic workers' labor unions have formed in South Africa as a means of
activism and redress of past apartheid inequities, their cause has not yet reached the daily
life experiences of most black women today").
464 Goldblatt, supra note 325, at 400.
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